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If the doors of perception were cleansed, 
everything would appear to man as it is: Infinite. 
 
– William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Human faces convey essential information for social behaviour, such as information 
about others’ mental states and intentions. Crucially, many studies have claimed that 
several facial features such as configural facial information, emotional expressions, and 
gaze direction modulate how faces gain access to perceptual awareness. However, the 
procedures employed in said studies suffer from multiple methodological issues and 
limitations. 
In a series of experiments, I tested whether configural facial features, emotional 
expressions, and gaze direction modulate how faces gain access to awareness. To achieve 
this, I used stringent procedures that allow measurement of perceptual sensitivity and 
decision criterion to the location and identity of faces. I used these measures to assess 
how long it takes faces to reach awareness as they overcome Continuous Flash 
Suppression – an interocular suppression technique that can render images invisible for 
several seconds. Using classical and Bayesian analyses, I found that configural face 
processing (which occurs for upright, but not inverted faces) promotes faces’ access to 
awareness. Similarly, faces making eye contact gain access to awareness faster than faces 
looking away. Contrary to past claims, however, I found that faces expressing negative 
emotional expressions (anger or fear) do not enter awareness faster than neutral 
expressions. 
In another series of experiments, I measured the minimal exposure durations required 
for configural facial processing, emotion processing, metacognition, and conscious access. 
To this end, I used a newly developed LCD tachistoscope that can present images with 
sub-millisecond precision and examined both behavioural (psychophysical) and neural 
(electroencephalography) markers of processing. I found that configural face processing 
promotes faces’ access to awareness by showing that upright faces require shorter 
exposure durations than inverted faces to be seen. Crucially, only around four 
milliseconds of exposure were required to find this advantage. Fearful expressions, 
however, do not gain access to awareness faster than neutral expressions. Evidence from 
neural markers expanded this by showing that the exposure duration required for 
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configural facial processing is the same as that required for faces to reach conscious 
access. Finally, around six milliseconds of exposure were required for emotion processing. 
Together, these findings shed light on the factors that affect access of faces to 
awareness: configural facial information and gaze direction can modulate faces’ access to 
perceptual awareness; and such modulation is due to perceptual sensitivity rather than 
decision criterion. Furthermore, the perceptual processing of faces follows a hierarchical 
pattern: configural information precedes and facilitates access to awareness, and emotion 
processing follows awareness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
LAY SUMMARY 
 
Faces convey a wealth of information that is crucial for social interaction. By 
looking at someone’s face we can learn about how they feel, what they want, and who 
they are. Scientists have studied how face perception occurs and how the brain became 
so specialised at processing faces so efficiently. But do all aspects of face perception occur 
consciously? Or are there aspects that do not require it to occur? Using different 
approaches, many scientists have claimed that a great number of facial features can be 
processed unconsciously, including their emotional expressions, gaze direction, and their 
whole configural organisation.  
Most studies exploring visual perception and awareness use methods that allow 
them to show people images while suppressing those images from observers’ awareness. 
These are collectively known as ‘masking’ techniques. They create the conditions to 
investigate the way that many aspects of visual processing can occur in the absence of 
awareness. These studies, however, are rather controversial because the methodologies 
they used have yet to be refined and their results do not always replicate. 
In this thesis, I present fourteen experiments that study face perception and 
explore whether face configuration, gaze direction, and emotional expression modulate 
faces’ access to awareness, and whether face configuration, perceptual awareness, and 
emotion processing occur in sequence or all at once. To do this, I employed two novel 
procedures, in which I always controlled how long people were exposed to images. In the 
first of these, I used a masking technique and examined whether a previous claim – that 
faces making eye contact broke through this suppression into awareness faster than faces 
looking away – holds up even when controlling how long participants look at the image. 
My findings confirmed this older claim, suggesting that processing of gaze occurs prior 
to – and facilitates access to – perceptual awareness. 
Having this method validated, I then examined whether another previous claim 
about emotion holds up – that faces expressing negative emotions broke through 
suppression into awareness faster than faces expressing positive or no emotion. My 
findings cast doubt on these claims, suggesting that emotional expression cannot be 
processed in the absence of awareness. 
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Are facial features processed in a sequence of steps or all at once? The second 
novel procedure I used is a newly developed display system that is capable of extremely 
brief presentations. This allowed me to measure the minimal exposure duration required 
to perceive various aspects of faces, both upright and inverted. I found that it took longer 
for people to identify faces’ emotional expressions than to integrate their isolated parts, 
and that this integration took longer than to discriminate intact faces from scrambled 
faces. This demonstrates that faces are processed in a sequence of steps. 
However, it could be the case that these aspects of faces are processed 
simultaneously in the brain but transmitted to other areas at different speeds, resulting in 
the sequence just described. To explore this possibility, I measured the minimal exposure 
durations required for neural markers to engage with face processing, emotion processing, 
and perceptual awareness. My findings corroborate that face perception occurs in a 
sequence of steps and also suggest that the ability to process a face as an integrated 
configuration arises alongside perceptual awareness. 
This work demonstrates that while some facial features may be processed in the 
absence of awareness, other features cannot, thus casting doubts on past claims that 
implied that perceptual awareness was not required to process a face. Furthermore, this 
work shows that face perception occurs in a sequence of steps, and that the ability to 
process a face as an integrated configuration arises alongside awareness, thus suggesting 
that perceptual awareness and visual integration may be related. 
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Chapter 1 
1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Human faces convey a wealth of crucial information that we use to guide our 
social behaviour, such as information about others’ mental states and intentions (Grill-
Spector et al., 2017; Jack & Schyns, 2015; Little et al., 2011). They are remarkably effective 
at capturing attention (Fox, 2002; Langton et al., 2008; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003), 
especially when expressing emotional states. For example, fearful and angry expressions 
are detected faster than neutral and happy expressions (Fox et al., 2000; Hansen & 
Hansen, 1988; Krysko & Rutherford, 2009). Another facial feature that is effective at 
capturing attention is gaze. For example, faces making eye contact draw attention toward 
the face whereas averted gaze draws attention to the gaze’s direction (Dupierrix et al., 
2014; Farroni et al., 2002; Hood et al., 1998; Senju & Hasegawa, 2005). As described 
below, face processing can also be affected by certain psychiatric disorders. For instance, 
depression enhances salience of sad expressions (Lazarov et al., 2018), anxiety enhances 
salience of fearful and angry expressions (Bishop et al., 2007; Mogg et al., 2007), and 
Autism affects face processing by inducing avoidance of eye contact (Senju & Johnson, 
2009b). Therefore, understanding how facial information is processed and integrated can 
shed light on the cognitive mechanisms of perception and emotion both in healthy and 
psychopathological conditions. A myriad of studies has explored how facial information 
is processed in the visual system and what mechanisms are involved, including what 
aspects of a face are prioritised when gaining access to perceptual awareness, one of the 
main topics of this thesis. Do emotional expressions reach awareness faster than non-
emotional ones? Are faces prioritised because of their socially relevant configural 
organisation? Do faces making eye contact reach awareness faster than faces looking 
away? Are the neural mechanisms of face processing engaged before faces gain access to 
awareness? As I discuss below, multiple claims have been made about how facial 
information gains access to awareness. However, some of those findings are inconsistent, 
and some have failed to replicate, among other issues addressed below. 
15 
 
Consciousness (or awareness1) has been defined in many different ways, but it 
ultimately refers to the ability to have a subjective experience of our surroundings and 
inner thoughts. Even though its nature is often described as private and qualitative – and 
therefore subjective – consciousness researchers agree on a key distinction for its study: 
On the one hand, consciousness can be thought of in terms of state, defined by the ability 
to be aware and able to respond to external stimuli (arousal level), as when we are awake 
(Hobson, 2007); or in pathological states, such as vegetative state, coma, and minimally 
conscious state, in which consciousness is thought to be partially or totally absent. 
Additionally, the states of consciousness normally exhibit distinct neurophysiological 
correlates (Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Boly et al., 2008; Cruse et al., 2011; Goupil & 
Bekinschtein, 2012; Monti et al., 2010; Noreika et al., 2019; Stevner et al., 2019). On the 
other hand, it is often thought of in terms of contents, defined as the experience associated 
with perceiving, feeling, thinking, and acting, often described as qualitative and irreducible 
by philosophers (Searle, 1992; Seth et al., 2008). In fact, this private and qualitative nature 
of subjective experience has led many thinkers of the past, like Gómez Pereira (1554) and 
René Descartes (1641), to support the idea that consciousness – as an apparent immaterial 
phenomenon – is substantially distinct from the brain, an ontological stance called mind-
body dualism. This philosophical debate is probably far from resolved. 
Because of its subjective nature, consciousness was not considered a valid object 
of scientific study until just a few decades ago. Consciousness, as a phenomenon, did not 
seem necessary to explain the mechanisms behind cognition and behaviour either – what 
does consciousness add to an explanation of how the brain works? Behaviourists such as 
John Broadus Watson and Burrhus Frederic Skinner, for instance, argued that private 
experiences – perhaps real, perhaps illusory – were irrelevant to understanding behaviour 
(Lashley, 1923; Pratt, 1922; Skinner, 1974; Watson, 1913). Even cognitive psychologists, 
like George Miller (1962), once argued that consciousness, as a concept, obscured more 
precise descriptions and explanations of cognition (Hilgard, 1980). This negative attitude 
towards consciousness as an object of scientific study may have also been partially driven 
 
 
1 In this thesis, I use the concepts ‘consciousness’ and ‘awareness’ interchangeably, referring to the ability 
to become aware (e.g. of face images). However, these concepts are rather nuanced in the literature: for 
example, ‘consciousness’ may refer to physiological states of consciousness whereas ‘awareness’ may refer 
to subjective experience as in visual perception, interoception, and hallucination. 
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by esoteric claims found in psychoanalytic theories (e.g. Freud, 1915, 1927; Lacan, 1970), 
which despite being circular, fallacious, and oftentimes empirically untestable – hence 
pseudoscientific (Bunge, 1991; Cioffi, 1985, 1998; Kuhn, 1977; Popper, 1963) – gained 
popularity throughout the century. 
But how can we scientifically address a question about the contents of 
consciousness, like how faces gain access to it? William James, by integrating first-person 
(phenomenology) and third-person approaches (empirical study), famously distinguished 
consciousness from attention and thought, defending it as a valid phenomenon for 
scientific study a century ago (James, 1890). However, it was not until the end of the 
twentieth century that consciousness gained full acceptance in science (Block et al., 2014; 
Dehaene et al., 2006). A philosophical distinction that was crucial for this, made by David 
Chalmers, is that consciousness involves two kinds of problems: a hard problem and a 
set of easy problems. The hard problem refers to why and how we have subjective 
qualitative experiences (or qualia), and why physical brain processes are accompanied by 
experience. The easy problems refer to the functions of consciousness and their neural 
correlates (Chalmers, 1997). While the hard problem can be qualified as a modern 
summary of the philosophical enquiries of the past, and therefore might escape the scope 
of what science today can empirically address, the easy problems are empirically 
addressable. We can ask people to provide subjective reports about their experience in its 
simplest forms – e.g. whether they saw a light flickering or not – and measure their 
perceptual discrimination together with their neural correlates in relation to a condition 
where they were not subjectively aware of the stimulus of interest.  
Of course, subjective reports are limited. While their subjective nature makes 
them essential for the development of other disciplines like phenomenology (Husserl, 
1913; Merleau-Ponty, 1945), subjective reports alone (like in introspection) are not 
accepted as a valid method for scientific research – because of people’s biases and 
introspection’s limited reach, we simply cannot learn in a rigorous fashion about the brain 
mechanisms of consciousness by asking people about their own experience (Hixon & 
Swann, 1993; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson & Brekke, 1994; Wilson & Dunn, 2004). 
Nevertheless, subjective reports as a source of raw data are accepted and unavoidable 
when studying the contents of consciousness. In fact, we need subjective reports as 
indices of awareness to look for objective behavioural and neurophysiological patterns 
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(Corallo et al., 2008; Dehaene, 2014; Fleming et al., 2010; Marti et al., 2010; McGovern & 
Baars, 2007; Seth et al., 2008) and to verify that a sensory stimulus is being processed 
while making manipulations that will lead to changes in awareness. In conclusion, 
subjective reports are essential to determine changes in the contents of consciousness and 
are usually accompanied by objective measures that can shed light on the role of 
awareness in cognition. 
As mentioned at the beginning, faces can convey a great deal of information. Due 
to their richness, they are considered complex stimuli and there is a large body of research 
that has shown that faces go through an intricate processing hierarchy, where their 
configural features, emotional content, attributed intentions, personality traits, and social 
characteristics are extracted. But what is the processing hierarchy of facial features in their 
access to awareness? In the following section, I will describe how this question has been 
addressed in the past, what methods have been employed, and what limitations these 
entail. First, I will describe what methods are commonly used when addressing questions 
about unconscious visual processing. Secondly, I will summarise some of the findings that 
have been obtained with these methods when studying how faces and different facial 
features are perceived and gain access to conscious awareness. Finally, I will discuss the 
main issues and limitations that these methods involve and how they are addressed and 
circumvented in the experimental chapters of this thesis. 
 
1.1    The study of awareness in visual perception 
Visual perception is the ability to process, interpret, and become aware of visual 
information. Abilities such as visual detection, discrimination, and recognition, are 
examples of visual processing involved in visual perception. The last bit of this definition 
– awareness – refers to the subjective experience (or content) contained in the act of 
perceiving. 
To answer how facial information gains access to awareness, we must first review 
what approaches have been taken by researchers studying visual perception and 
specifically awareness, including what limitations the field presents, and how we can 
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circumvent them. As mentioned above, visual perception involves interpreting 
information. Those interpretations will reach awareness, but some types of visual 
information may enjoy priority over others when gaining access to awareness. Because 
simply impoverishing visual stimuli to render them faint or invisible (i.e. subjectively 
undetectable) will very likely eliminate any possible visual processing as a consequence, 
different strategies have been developed with the objective of testing what types of visual 
information are prioritised when entering awareness. 
In this section, I will describe a series of approaches that have been employed to 
this end. Understanding the contributions and limitations of these approaches is essential 
for understanding the contribution of this thesis in the study of face processing and 
perceptual awareness. 
1.2    Methods in visual processing and awareness 
Multiple methods have been employed to study visual processing and awareness. 
These methods mainly include using brief exposures, masked stimuli presentations, and 
Continuous Flash Suppression (an interocular suppression technique). Both presenting 
stimuli for brief exposure durations and employing masking techniques to interrupt 
stimulus processing are widely used in the field of consciousness research. Both often 
involve estimating whether an objective task (e.g. stimulus detection or classification) can 
be performed when observers report absence of awareness of a given stimulus, thereby 
dissociating awareness from other visual processes (Baars, 1993; Crick & Koch, 1990, 
1998; Erdelyi, 1986; Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). Isolating awareness from other visual 
processes – also known as the dissociation paradigm (Augusto, 2016; Snodgrass, 2004) – 
provides an opportunity to investigate the dynamics of conscious and unconscious 
processing (Kim & Blake, 2005), including whether different stimulus features enter 
awareness faster than others. In this section, I provide a brief description of these 
methods, and thus of the logic that underlies the study of visual awareness. The limitations 
of these methods are addressed in section 1.4. 
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1.2.1 Brief exposure durations 
Probably the simplest method there is to study how visual stimuli gain access to 
awareness is to present stimuli for predefined exposure durations and measure what visual 
features enjoy an advantage over others. By presenting stimuli for very brief exposure 
durations, observers can be asked to perform a detection or recognition task. For example, 
Intraub (1981) presented participants with sequences of unmasked pictures at rates of 
114, 172, or 258 ms of exposure per picture. The target was specified by name (e.g. 
giraffe), by superordinate category (e.g. animal), or by negative category (e.g. the picture 
that is not food). Participants were instructed to press a key as soon as they saw the cued 
picture and to describe it briefly. They were able to detect the pictures even in the most 
difficult condition, when the exposure duration was the shortest – where they obtained 
71% correct responses. If observers cannot consciously report stimuli presented for very 
brief presentation durations but can exhibit above-chance performance in an objective 
task (e.g. detection, recognition), this performance can be interpreted as evidence of 
unconscious processing. Therefore, for example, measuring neural markers during such a 
task can provide data about the neural correlates of consciousness. For instance, Thorpe 
et al. (1996) presented observers with pictures for 20 ms of exposure and asked them to 
perform a categorisation task (to indicate whether the picture contained an animal or not) 
while measuring electroencephalography (EEG). They found that the average proportion 
of correct responses was around 94% with just 20 ms of exposure, with an ERP frontal 
negativity developing roughly 150 ms after stimulus onset. Later on, Fabre-Thorpe et al. 
(2001) showed that both novel and highly familiar scenes could be categorised in the same 
150 ms period just mentioned, and with only 20 ms of exposure, thus suggesting that the 
visual system does not decrease in speed when the stimuli are unknown by the observer. 
In a different study but following the same logic, Joubert et al. (2007) asked observers to 
categorise unmasked natural and manmade environments presented for 26 ms of 
exposure. They found that 26 ms of exposure were sufficient for participants to obtain 
around 96% accuracy for both categories. More recently, Liu & Tanaka (2019) presented 
observers with faces by using predefined exposure durations of 17, 50, 250, and 500 ms. 
They found that even 17 ms of exposure were sufficient to produce holistic face 
processing. In summary, by using predefined exposure durations to measure the minimal 
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visual exposure that can elicit above-chance performance, conclusions can be drawn 
about a variety of cognitive functions, including perceptual awareness. 
While this procedure is very straightforward and the results it yields are oftentimes 
easy to interpret, it has several limitations, which will be addressed later in section 1.4.1. 
along with additional studies that exemplify this approach and its limitations further. 
 
1.2.2 Masking visual stimuli  
Technically, it is extremely difficult for experimenters to present stimuli at briefer 
exposures than 16 ms, because most studies over the last few decades have presented 
stimuli on computer monitors, which (at least until recently) have typically had a refresh 
rate of around 60 Hz. Even newer monitors that have a refresh rate of more than 60 Hz, 
such as monitors with 100 Hz, 120 Hz, and 144 Hz cannot present stimuli at briefer 
exposures than 10, 8.33, and 6.94 ms, respectively. Therefore, subsequent attempts to 
determine the minimal exposure duration required for visual perception had to employ 
masking techniques to interrupt visual processing. Masking techniques allow 
experimenters to reduce a target stimulus’ visibility – and hence observers’ awareness – 
by presenting another image (a mask) very close in time. For example, Greene & Oliva 
(2009) presented observers with landscape images and asked them to perform basic-level 
categorisation (i.e. identifying objects in the image) and global-property classification tasks 
(i.e. identifying what kind of landscape was shown). Importantly, these images were 
suppressed from awareness by presenting a mask image right after the target stimuli were 
presented (backward masking; Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000; Kim & Blake, 2005). They 
found that a threshold of 75% correct responses on both tasks was achieved using 
exposure durations ranging from 19 to 67 ms, with high variation among participants. 
Shorter exposure durations were found for detection of scenes’ global properties (i.e. 
identifying what kind of landscape is shown) than scenes’ basic properties (i.e. identifying 
objects in the image). 
As mentioned above, one key feature of masking techniques such as backward 
masking is that they interrupt visual processing. For example, Codispoti et al. (2009) 
presented observers with pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant pictures, masked and 
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unmasked, across exposure durations ranging from 25 to 6000 ms, and measured their 
emotional reactivity using various techniques such as electromyography, EEG, skin 
conductance, and both pleasure and arousal ratings. Crucially, when masked pictures were 
employed, they found no evidence of emotional engagement with any measure, at any 
exposure duration under 80 ms, but when unmasked pictures were employed, they found 
evidence of emotion processing at all exposure durations. This indicates that exposure 
durations around 25 ms and longer are sufficiently long to reveal visual processing of 
scenes and faces and that, therefore, may be significantly longer than the real minimal 
exposure durations required for those processes to occur. However, it is still a matter of 
debate what specific aspects of visual processing are interrupted by masking techniques 
(e.g. feedforward processing, feedback processing, afterimage processing, lateral 
inhibition, visual cortex integration), and therefore, whether conclusions drawn from 
studies employing one particular masking technique can be extended to studies employing 
another masking technique or none. Therefore, using masking techniques may add 
potential confounding variables (Agaoglu et al., 2015; Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006; Davis 
& Kim, 2011). I return to this method in section 1.4.2, where I discuss critiques and 
limitations. 
Finally, studies employing standard masking techniques may also be more 
vulnerable to post hoc data selection. Oftentimes, masking studies condition their 
analyses on a subjective report in order to test whether participants can show above-
chance performance in a task while reporting no awareness of it. As shown by Vadillo et 
al. (2016) and Shanks (2017), performing post hoc data selection, to group trials where 
participants reported having no awareness of a stimulus, increases the risk of false 
negatives. When data from a group of participants are collected, measurement errors 
cancel out and the aggregate means approximate the mean true score. However, this 
assumption does not apply to a data subgroup selected post hoc because of regression to 
the mean – unaware participants may exhibit above-chance performance scores, and thus 
suggest unconscious cognitive processing, because of a statistical artefact. 
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1.2.3 Continuous Flash Suppression 
When a different stimulus is presented to each eye at corresponding retinal 
locations, the observer experiences perceptual alternation between the two stimuli instead 
of simply experiencing two incompatibles halves or a fused image combining them 
together. This phenomenon is known as binocular rivalry (Blake & Logothetis, 2002). 
Furthermore, when one eye is presented with a constantly moving visual pattern while 
the other eye is presented with an often stationary and less salient image, the image is 
suppressed from awareness for a long period of time (usually several seconds). This 
phenomenon of interocular suppression has led to the development of a very important 
technique in the study of perceptual awareness and face processing: Continuous Flash 
Suppression (CFS; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). In CFS, one eye is flashed with a montage 
of different sized and coloured rectangles or circles whose luminance and locations vary 
randomly over time. These so-called Mondrian-like patterns are typically updated at a rate 
of 10 Hz and create a strong interocular suppression effect on the other eye, where the 
target image is introduced. Thus, CFS, unlike other masking techniques, can render stimuli 
invisible for up to several seconds.  
There are several paradigms for the study of facial information and awareness that 
employ CFS (Yang et al., 2014), but the most widely used and fruitful one is Breaking 
Continuous Flash Suppression (Gayet et al., 2014; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011), on which 
this section focuses. This paradigm is built on the assumption that stimulus categories 
that overcome suppression faster (thus gaining access to awareness) enjoy prioritised 
processing outside of awareness compared with stimuli that take longer time to overcome 
suppression. In the first published study using b-CFS, Jiang et al. (2007) presented either 
upright or inverted face images to one of the observers’ eyes while their other eye was 
flashed with CFS masks. They asked observers to report the location of the face (left or 
right) as soon as they were able to see it. Upright faces elicited faster response times than 
inverted faces, thus suggesting that upright faces reached awareness faster due to an 
advantage driven by their visual configuration. This effect, known as face-inversion effect, 
has been replicated many times using b-CFS (Akechi et al., 2015; Gayet & Stein, 2017; 
Gray et al., 2013; Kobylka et al., 2017; Moors, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2016; Stein, Hebart, 
et al., 2011; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2007). It is important to note that this 
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face-inversion effect is an instantiation of an effect found in face recognition, where 
upright faces are easier to recognise than inverted faces, as discussed below. Since the 
report by Jiang et al. (2007), b-CFS studies have adopted various tasks to estimate 
breakthrough times, such as stimulus detection and localisation. 
The b-CFS paradigm presents one crucial advantage over other masking 
techniques: it provides breakthrough times, which allows researchers to estimate how long 
a stimulus takes to gain access to awareness. Crucially, breakthrough times can inform 
about two different aspects of awareness: when a stimulus gains access to awareness and 
whether it gains access before another stimulus of interest (or a control stimulus) does. 
This makes b-CFS an attractive choice when the purpose of the researcher is to test for 
prioritised access to awareness between different stimulus categories. Using one measure 
to estimate these two aspects of awareness makes b-CFS experiments immune to the 
methodological issues due to post hoc data selection described above. Having only one 
measure, as in the b-CFS procedure, prevents this problem from happening. The b-CFS 
procedure has other advantages, including a straightforward implementation and results 
that are easy to interpret. Around half of CFS studies have adopted the b-CFS task (Figure 
1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of publications per year using CFS and b-CFS from 2005 until August 
2018. Arrows mark the year when Tsuchiya & Koch (2005) introduced the CFS procedure 
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and when Jiang et al. (2007) introduced the b-CFS variant. Reproduced from Stein (2019) 
with permission. 
 
1.3    The study of awareness in face perception 
Myriad studies have used the methods described above to explore how faces and 
their different features gain access to awareness in perception. Here, I review some of the 
most relevant studies that have been published on the matter, with a special focus on 
studies that have employed brief exposure durations, backward masking, and interocular 
suppression, as they are the most relevant ones for this thesis. Most of the interocular 
suppression studies employed the b-CFS procedure. As a consequence, most of the 
interocular suppression studies described below are b-CFS studies, too. 
1.3.1 Facial configuration and the face-inversion effect 
In order to perceive faces, we need to see beyond their isolated parts. We need to 
integrate their parts into coherent wholes. This visual integration receives the name of 
configural or holistic processing (Piepers & Robbins, 2012; Bruno Rossion, 2013). Faces 
can convey a large amount of high-level information such as emotional states, intentions, 
identity, gender, age, race, ethnicity, health, attractiveness, and personality traits, i.e. 
semantic or conceptual information contained in the integration of visual features.  
One attempt to answer whether faces may enjoy prioritised access to awareness 
was performed by Richler et al. (2009), who explored holistic face processing using brief 
presentations. They presented participants with pairs of composite faces (a study face and 
a test face) that were made by combining the top half of a face with either its bottom half 
or another faces’ bottom half. Both faces were presented in sequence and participants had 
to report whether a cued part of the test face was the same as of the study face. Because 
holistic processing should involve processing the face wholly and not locally, holistic 
processing was inferred from a congruency effect, i.e. better discrimination sensitivity in 
trials where uncued part in study face and cued part in test face were the same than in 
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trials where they were different. Both faces were backward-masked and presented for 
different exposure durations, ranging from 17 ms to 800 ms. The researchers found that 
above-chance discrimination performance arose by 50 ms of exposure and suggested that 
holistic processing therefore emerges with very briefly presented faces. 
Nowadays, the preferred method to study holistic processing of faces, however, 
has been b-CFS as it grants better suppression control than backward masking. CFS 
masking allows researchers to suppress complex visual stimuli from awareness for as long 
as a few seconds and provides with a simple measure of awareness access – a 
breakthrough time indexed by a response time, usually in the context of a detection or 
localisation task. 
A classic and elegant strategy to study the holistic or configural processing of faces 
(i.e. how facial features are perceived as an integrated whole) is turning them upside down 
(Tanaka & Gordon, 2011). Upright faces are much easier to recognise than inverted faces. 
As mentioned above, this phenomenon is known as the face-inversion effect (Farah et 
al., 1995; Goodrich & Yonelinas, 2019; Yin, 1969). The evidence showing that this effect 
relies on high-level information is convergent with other, independent lines of evidence: 
for instance, Valentine & Bruce (1986) found that the inversion effect disrupts the 
recognition of faces much more than the recognition of houses. Furthermore, Searcy & 
Bartlett (1996) changed local elements of faces in order to make them look grotesque (e.g. 
blackening teeth, blurring the pupils) and then asked observers to judge their appearance 
in both orientations. Normal and grotesque faces were judged as different when presented 
upright but similar when presented inverted, a finding that was subsequently supported 
and extended (Leder & Bruce, 1998; Leder & Bruce, 2000). Complementing this, other 
studies have claimed that the fusiform face area (FFA), a key neural structure for face 
perception, is significantly more sensitive to upright faces than inverted faces (Yovel & 
Kanwisher, 2004), thus showing that such preference for upright faces – and therefore 
for faces with their configural characteristics intact – can be found in a very specialised 
neural structure. This finding was expanded by Baroni et al. (2017), who confirmed the 
role of the fusiform gyrus in the face-inversion effect. They presented observers with 
masked and unmasked images of upright and inverted faces and measured local field 
potentials intracranially using electrocorticographic electrodes. By using decoding 
analysis, they found that both ventral and lateral temporal cortices could reliably 
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differentiate between seen and unseen faces and, crucially, that ventral electrodes located 
in the fusiform gyrus could reliably discriminate between upright and inverted faces. 
However, it is important to note that not all configural features contained in faces 
are processed in the same fashion. Researchers have distinguished between first-order 
relational information and second-order information. First-order relational information is 
crucial for the successful identification of a face as a face and not as an object. It consists 
of the spatial relationships between facial features (e.g. eyes, nose, mouth, eyebrows). The 
face-inversion effect (described above) disrupts first-order information. On the other 
hand, second-order relational information is crucial to distinguish between different faces. 
It consists of the size of the spatial relationships between facial features. Whether this 
type of facial information can be disrupted by turning faces upside down is still a matter 
of debate (Civile et al., 2014; Tanaka & Farah, 1993; for a review, see: Tanaka & Simonyi, 
2016). For instance, Rakover & Teucher (1997) demonstrated that isolated facial features 
such as foreheads, eyes, nose, mouth, and chin can exhibit inversion effects on their own, 
a finding that was subsequently expanded by Civile, McLaren, & McLaren (2014), who 
showed that the face-inversion effect can be generated by manipulating local features, too. 
 The fact that presenting faces upside down disrupts their holistic processing has 
been used in consciousness research to determine whether configural face processing 
makes faces gain access to awareness faster, by testing whether upright faces break 
through CFS masking faster than inverted faces (Axelrod et al., 2015). The first b-CFS 
study that addressed this question was done by Jiang, Costello, & He (2007). They 
presented participants with CFS-suppressed face images in an upright or inverted 
orientation. Face images were introduced to the left or right side of the screen and ramped 
up gradually from 0 to 100% contrast within a period of 1 second. Then, their contrast 
remained constant until the participant reported its location (left or right). Crucially, the 
researchers found that upright faces took, on average, about 400 ms less than inverted 
faces to overcome suppression, thus exhibiting a prioritised access to awareness. Because 
upright faces have their holistic information intact, it has been interpreted that said 
prioritised access is driven by holistic processing. 
Many studies have replicated the face-inversion effect employing the b-CFS 
procedure (Akechi et al., 2015; Gayet & Stein, 2017; Kobylka et al., 2017; Moors, 
Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2016; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2010), which appears 
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to be particularly strong for faces in comparison to other visual stimuli. Zhou et al. (2010), 
for example, replicated the inversion effect for faces using a very similar b-CFS procedure. 
Then, they changed the face stimuli for upright and inverted house images. They did not 
find an inversion effect for houses, suggesting that other stimulus categories like houses 
do not contain the same type of high-level information and therefore may not be 
processed holistically, or at least not to the same extent of faces. As a consequence, houses 
may not be prioritised by holistic processing in their access to awareness. More recently, 
Kobylka et al. (2017) showed that the face-inversion effect can be found both when using 
localisation and categorisation b-CFS tasks. However, other reports have claimed that 
basic visual properties in faces, such as convexity, might explain this advantage of upright 
faces over inverted faces in b-CFS tasks (Moors, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2016; Yang & 
Yeh, 2018a). Furthermore, other complex non-face stimuli such as human bodies have 
also been reported to exhibit a significant but smaller inversion effect (Stein et al., 2012). 
Thus, the evidence suggests that the inversion effects found with b-CFS tasks, such as the 
face-inversion effect, may be driven by the complexity and specificity of their 
configurations. 
The advantage of upright faces over inverted faces has also been found in 
categorisation tasks. Sterzer, Jalkanen, & Rees (2009) used magnetoencephalography 
(MEG) to test whether participants’ neural activity could discriminate between faces and 
objects rendered invisible using CFS. They measured: (1) target detection, by asking 
participants to respond whether the target was presented first or second in order; (2) 
object category identification, by asking them whether the target stimulus was a face or a 
house; and (3) the event-related potential M170 (equivalent to N170 in EEG), which 
indexes face processing. N170 is a negative voltage deflection found around 
temporooccipital areas between 140 and 200 ms after stimulus onset. This component is 
believed to have its neural source in the fusiform gyrus, more specifically in FFA, amongst 
other nearby areas (Heisz et al., 2006a; Nguyen & Cunnington, 2014; Bruno Rossion et 
al., 2003; Watanabe et al., 1999; Yovel et al., 2008). Participants performed at chance level 
in both target detection and category identification tasks, thus demonstrating that the 
stimuli were objectively undetectable. However, the M170 was still able to discriminate 
between faces and houses outside of awareness. While it was known that the M170/N170 
component can discriminate between face stimuli and object stimuli categories (Bentin et 
al., 1996; Carmel & Bentin, 2002; George et al., 1996; Halgren et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2000; 
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Lu et al., 1991; Bruno Rossion & Jacques, 2012; Sams et al., 1997), these results suggest 
that complex high-level information such as visual stimuli categories can be processed 
before the stimuli enter awareness. 
Conversely, there is also evidence that awareness may be required for configural 
face processing. For instance, Axelrod & Rees (2014) tested whether unconscious 
processing of a face can improve the identification of its eyes by suppressing the face 
using CFS but not the eye region. In their reasoning, if a face can be processed holistically, 
then its suppressed presentation should improve the identification of its visible eyes. To 
test this, they presented participants with two consecutive composite faces that contained 
visible or invisible eyes while the rest was suppressed from awareness. The two faces 
could be the same or different, whereas both pairs of eyes were always the same. 
Participants were asked to report whether these successive pairs of eyes were the same or 
different. The researchers found that the accuracy at detecting visible eyes was not 
affected by the invisible face in which the eyes were embedded whereas accuracy did 
improve when the face was visible. In a follow-up study, they tested whether a subliminal 
learning task with feedback could improve accuracy when using invisible faces. They 
tested this by adding a correct/incorrect answer indication at the end of every trial during 
learning sessions that had the same design as the experiments. Accuracy, however, did 
not improve with said feedback. Therefore, unlike visible faces, invisible faces did not 
influence perceptual processing of visible eyes, thus suggesting that holistic face 
processing either requires awareness to occur or it can occur an absence of awareness but 
to a limited extent. 
In summary, a number of studies using masking and interocular suppression 
techniques, and especially b-CFS procedures, have suggested that holistic or configural 
features found in faces may be processed before faces gain access to awareness. Inverted 
faces are much more difficult to recognise than upright faces, probably due to the 
disruption of relational facial features that inversion entails. This face-inversion effect has 
been widely employed in b-CFS studies on unconscious face processing to test whether 
holistic facial information can facilitate access to awareness. 
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1.3.2 Emotional expressions 
One question that has received great interest is whether emotional information 
enjoys privileged access to awareness. Most of the classic studies that addressed this 
question employed backward-masked facial expressions presented for brief exposure 
durations. For example, Esteves & Öhman (1993) explored whether observers could 
recognise emotional expressions in exposure durations ranging from 30 to 230 ms. They 
found that confident recognition of backward-masked facial expressions could be 
achieved with exposure durations of 100 ms. In a subsequent study, Esteves et al. (1994) 
presented observers with angry and happy facial expressions for exposure durations of 30 
ms, both backwardly masked by a neutral face also presented for 30 ms. Importantly, 
using a shock unconditioned stimulus, they aversively conditioned angry expressions. By 
measuring skin conductance responses (SCR), they found reliable differential SCR when 
angry faces were conditioned but not when happy faces were conditioned, thus suggesting 
that angry expressions could be processed in absence of awareness. Subsequent studies 
demonstrated that conditioned angry faces modulate the amygdala activity differently 
depending on awareness: if observers are unaware of stimuli, a masked face produces 
enhanced neural activity in the right but not left amygdala, whereas when observers were 
aware, unmasked faces produce enhanced neural activity in the left amygdala instead 
(Morris et al., 1998), a finding that was replicated and expanded by Whalen et al. (1998).  
In addition, a number of studies has provided evidence in favour of unconscious 
emotion processing measuring EEG event-related potentials. For instance, Balconi & 
Mazza (2009) presented observers with different facial expressions for either 30 ms (pre-
attentive condition) or 200 ms (attentive condition) of exposure followed by a mask. In 
both conditions, they found a negative frontal deflection around 200 ms (N2) after 
stimulus onset and a positive parietal deflection around 300 ms (P3) after stimulus onset 
compared with the pre-attentive condition. Importantly, the amplitude of P3 was lower 
for both neutral and sad expressions, a difference that was found in both pre-attentive 
and attentive conditions. These findings were interpreted as evidence of unconscious 
emotion processing. Years later, Mitsudo et al. (2011) employed a similar procedure to 
examine ERP response to emotional expressions with and without awareness in more 
detail. They presented observers with masked faces (neutral or fearful) and masked 
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objects, either shown upright or inverted in orientation, for 20, 30, and 300 ms of 
exposure to create subthreshold, threshold, and suprathreshold conditions, respectively. 
They found that the N170 component, an ERP component found around 
occipitotemporal areas about 170 ms after stimulus onset and normally associated with 
face-specific processing, was significantly smaller in response to faces than to objects in 
the subthreshold condition whereas this same effect but in opposite direction was found 
in both the threshold and suprathreshold conditions. On the other hand, P1, a component 
found around the visual cortex about 100 ms after stimulus onset and associated with 
early visual processing, was higher in amplitude for upright faces over inverted faces in all 
conditions. The authors interpreted these findings as evidence for unconscious face 
processing. Together, these studies suggest that backward masking may be able to 
suppress awareness while keeping aspects of visual processing intact, and that emotional 
content of unseen negative facial expressions is processed by engaging the amygdala 
differently than with seen negative facial expressions. 
But what is the minimal exposure duration required for emotional discrimination 
of faces? Milders et al. (2008) addressed this question by presenting observers with fearful, 
angry, happy, and neutral backward-masked facial expressions. Observers had to 
discriminate between them and rate their awareness of each presented face. Signal 
detection analyses showed that while both sensitivity to expression and awareness ratings 
increased along with exposure durations, above-chance sensitivity was found at each 
exposure duration, ranging from 10 to 50 ms, thus indicating that exposure durations in 
that range are already too long to produce chance performance. I come back to this point 
in section 1.4.1, as it suggests a crucial limitation of this method. 
Many b-CFS studies have tried to shed light on whether emotional expressions 
enjoy prioritised access to awareness. In fact, the second b-CFS study published addressed 
this question: Yang et al. (2007) reported shorter suppression times for fearful expressions 
than for happy and neutral expressions, suggesting an advantage of fearful expressions in 
gaining access to awareness. However, this effect was also found with inverted faces. Since 
turning faces upside down supposedly disrupts high-level information processing, it could 
be argued that said advantage is due to low-level features such as differences in contrast, 
luminance, or spatial frequency. Stein & Sterzer (2012) addressed this problem by 
presenting participants with schematic faces expressing angry, neutral, happy, and sad 
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expressions. Unexpectedly, they found shorter suppression times associated with happy 
expressions. In a series of follow-up experiments, they demonstrated that this effect was 
driven by the curvature of the faces’ mouths, thus suggesting that the advantage of 
emotional expressions in suppression times could indeed be driven by low-level features. 
More recently, though, Yang & Yeh, (2018b) developed an affective-priming task whereby 
they presented facial expressions suppressed by CFS followed by a visible emotional 
word. Participants were asked to judge the face’s and word’s emotional valence (positive 
or negative). They found a congruency effect – reaction times were shorter when judging 
the emotional valence of a word that was preceded by a congruent emotional expression. 
As seen here, the evidence on whether there is an advantage of emotional expressions 
over non-emotional expressions in the access to awareness does not converge on a single 
answer. 
Despite the fact that findings have been inconsistent, as described above, a 
consistent advantage of negative emotional expressions (e.g. fear) could be interpreted as 
a high-level facial feature – one could expect them to rely on visual integration of different 
features such as open eyes, raised eyebrows, open mouth, and tense facial muscles. While 
some studies have indeed suggested that the advantage of emotional expressions over 
non-emotional expressions could be attributed to high-level information processing 
(Yang et al., 2007; Yang & Yeh, 2018a), most studies have suggested that such an 
advantage would be driven by differences in low-level features like contrast, luminance, 
and spatial frequency. For instance, Gray, Adams, Hedger, Newton, & Garner (2013) 
altered salience of faces by manipulating face orientation and luminance polarity (i.e. 
normal or colour-inverted), thereby affecting suppression times in a b-CFS procedure. 
They presented participants with fearful, happy, angry, and neutral expressions. By 
combining face orientation and luminance polarity, they created four stimulus categories 
per expression. Notably, they found that the advantage for fearful expressions over happy 
and neutral ones, originally reported by Yang et al. (2007), was still present even when 
faces were shown upside down, or colour-inverted, or both. Because turning a face upside 
down has demonstrated to disrupt its high-level features, and even more when inverting 
its colours, these findings suggest that the advantage of fearful expressions can be 
explained by differences in low-level features. Indeed, other studies have found that low-
level features can contribute to said advantage of emotion, like differences in spatial 
frequency (Willenbockel et al., 2012), luminance, and contrast (Hedger et al., 2015, 2019), 
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thus suggesting that differences in suppression times between emotional and non-
emotional expressions could be explained by low-level information alone (for a meta-
analysis, see Hedger, Gray, Garner, & Adams, 2016).  
However, other data are still supportive of the idea that emotional information in 
faces is processed during CFS. In another study, researchers found that fear conditioning 
was associated with better performance in a localisation task of fearful expressions, in 
both visible and invisible conditions even when controlling for low-level visual differences 
(Vieira et al., 2017). More recent studies have demonstrated that regardless of what type 
of visual information drives this advantage for suppressed fearful faces, they draw 
attention resource allocation compared to other suppressed expressions. For example, 
researchers have reported that N170 to CFS-suppressed fearful expressions exhibits 
greater amplitude than to neutral expressions. More importantly for this study, they found 
a steady-state visual evoked potential (SSVEP) response to the Mondrian-like masks. The 
SSVEP response exhibited a greater decrease to suppressed fearful expressions than to 
suppressed neutral expressions, between 1 and 1.2 seconds after stimulus onset, 
suggesting that fearful expressions may call for stronger attention resource allocation even 
when processed unconsciously (Jiang et al., 2018). In addition, it has been shown using 
eye-tracking during CFS that fearful expressions attract gaze during suppression while 
angry faces, conversely, turn gaze away (Vetter et al., 2019). Moreover, presenting 
suppressed emotional expressions before a visible target expression in an emotion 
discrimination task was associated with shorter suppression times along with an increase 
in discrimination accuracy. These results were found when both stimuli (suppressed and 
visible) were emotionally congruent in comparison to when they were incongruent, 
suggesting unconscious emotion processing (Ye et al., 2014). 
Irrespective of whether some emotional expressions might (or might not) gain 
access to awareness faster than others, there have been attempts to elucidate the neural 
correlates of unconscious emotion processing. The first report using CFS was published 
by Jiang & He (2006). They used fMRI while participants were presented with images of 
fearful or neutral faces, either intact or scrambled, and either visible or suppressed by 
CFS. Participants were asked to respond to a two-interval forced choice (2IFC) task where 
both intact and scrambled faces were presented. This task was employed as a sanity check 
– to demonstrate that observers were not aware of the faces. The researchers found strong 
33 
 
activation for both visible and invisible faces in the bilateral amygdalae, with stronger 
activation to fearful over neutral expressions. In addition, activity in FFA showed stronger 
activation to intact faces (regardless of their expression) over scrambled faces, both when 
visible and invisible. On the other hand, activity in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) 
only showed strong activation associated with invisible fearful faces but not with invisible 
neutral faces. These results suggest a functional dissociation between FFA and STS in the 
unconscious processing of facial expressions, with the former structure more engaged in 
face processing and the latter more engaged in emotion processing. A follow-up study by 
Jiang et al. (2009) on the neural dynamics of unconscious face processing supported these 
claims: they used EEG event-related potentials and found that both fearful and neutral 
expressions evoke strong P1 and N170 responses compared to scrambled faces. While 
both invisible neutral and invisible fearful expressions evoked strong P1 and N170 
responses compared to scrambled faces, invisible intact faces generated stronger 
modulations of the signal at the 140-200 ms range. In addition, invisible fearful faces 
elicited a significantly larger negative deflection (compared to neutral and scrambled face) 
starting at 220 ms, thus suggesting a temporal sequence of stimulus discrimination, first 
between all invisible intact faces compared to scrambled faces, and secondly, between 
invisible fearful faces compared to neutral and scrambled faces (Jiang et al., 2009). 
Following a different approach, Stein, Seymour, et al. (2014) tested whether the 
unconscious processing of fearful expressions can bypass the visual cortex and reach the 
amygdala first through subcortical projections, possibly through the superior colliculus 
and the pulvinar (Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010). To do so, they created face images that 
differed in spatial frequency and presented them suppressed by CFS on one out of four 
different screen locations. Observers were asked to localise them as quickly and accurately 
as possible as soon as the face or any part of it became visible. Because visually responsive 
neurons in the subcortical route’s input (superior colliculus) receive afferences mainly 
from magnocellular retinal ganglion cells, which are more sensitive to low-spatial-
frequency information, face images with low spatial frequency should be predominantly 
processed by these neurons. Furthermore, because visually responsive neurons in cortical 
areas predominantly receive afferences from parvocellular ganglion cells, which are more 
sensitive to high-spatial-frequency information, face images with high spatial frequency 
should be mainly processed by these neurons (Livingstone & Hubel, 1988; Merigan & 
Maunsell, 1993). Stein, Seymour, et al. (2014) analysed differences in suppression times 
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and found a consistent fear advantage associated with high spatial frequencies, thus 
suggesting that the specific suppression advantage for fearful expressions was due to high-
spatial-frequency information. Interestingly, while these results contradict past findings 
that had suggested that unconscious emotion processing might be mediated by a 
specialised subcortical pathway involving the amygdala (Diano et al., 2017; Morris et al., 
1998; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; Sato et al., 2019; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010), they are 
in line with reports of unconscious fear processing in absence of amygdala (Tsuchiya et 
al., 2009). In conclusion, the prioritised access to awareness that fearful expressions may 
enjoy, as reported in many b-CFS studies, would primarily rely on visual cortical areas 
rather than subcortical structures. Future studies are needed to determine whether this 
finding is specific for CFS-suppressed expressions or generalisable to other masked or 
unmasked expressions.  
The question of whether faces’ emotional information enjoys privileged access to 
awareness has been explored in people who suffer from psychiatric disorders, too. People 
who suffer from schizophrenia, for instance, commonly present difficulties at judging 
emotional information in faces. Kring, Siegel, & Barrett (2014) explored whether such 
issues might bias faces’ access to awareness. They presented participants diagnosed with 
schizophrenia or with schizoaffective disorder with neutral facial expressions that were 
preceded by CFS-suppressed smiling or scowling faces. The participants were asked to 
judge the expression of the neutral face. Both healthy participants and participants 
diagnosed with schizophrenia rated visible neutral faces as more trustworthy and warmer 
when preceded by a CFS-suppressed smiling face and less trustworthy and warm when 
preceded by a CFS-suppressed scowling face. This finding suggests that these elemental 
aspects of affect perception may be intact in people with schizophrenia. 
People who suffer from mood disorders, including major depressive disorder 
(MDD) and type-1 bipolar disorder (t1BD) also exhibit abnormalities in faces’ access to 
awareness when these communicate emotional content. People who suffer from MDD 
present negative cognitive biases that may influence perception (Disner et al., 2011; 
Vermeulen et al., 2019). In a b-CFS experiment, Sterzer et al. (2011) tested whether these 
MDD-related biases could affect how facial expressions gain access to awareness. They 
showed healthy and MDD participants different suppressed emotional expressions: 
neutral, fearful, happy, and sad faces. Among MDD participants, they found significantly 
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shorter suppression times associated with sad expressions relative to neutral expressions 
whereas happy expressions were associated with significantly longer suppression times 
than neutral expressions, hence a mood-congruent information processing bias. In 
addition, suppression times associated with sad faces correlated with self-reported 
changes in depression severity after 4 weeks of treatment, thus indicating an association 
between depressive symptoms and unconscious emotion processing, specifically of sad 
and happy facial expressions. 
Similarly, people who suffer from t1BD present impairments in emotion 
regulation that can affect their social perception. Gruber et al. (2016) explored whether 
invisible emotional expressions can affect the way participants judge visible neutral 
expressions. While they did find that t1BD participants rated neutral faces as more or less 
trustworthy, warm, and competent, depending on whether suppressed happy or angry 
faces were presented before, these results did not differ between t1BD and healthy 
participants, thus suggesting that emotion-related processes in t1BD may be intact at early 
automatic processing stages or, alternatively, that the procedure was not sufficiently 
sensitive to capture emotion-related effects in these patients. 
Different relevant psychopathology-related personality traits modulate how facial 
expressions gain access to awareness as well. For example, individuals high in psychopathy 
typically exhibit deficits in processing fear. Sylvers et al. (2011) reported that psychopathic 
traits (callous-unemotional traits) in children (8-11 years of age) are associated with longer 
suppression times for fearful expressions whereas narcissism, impulsivity, and conduct 
problems are not. Additionally, psychopathic traits were associated with longer 
suppression times for disgusted expressions. In a similar study, Jusyte et al. (2015) 
explored whether psychopathic traits and aggression may affect unconscious emotion 
processing by presenting different emotional expressions to young antisocial violent 
offenders in a b-CFS task. They calculated the difference in suppression times between 
emotional expressions (for each expression) and their neutral counterparts – they took 
the resulting positive scores as index of a positive advantage in unconscious processing. 
Next, they found a correlation between those scores for the fearful-neutral expressions 
difference and psychopathic traits, suggesting that aggressive participants with higher 
unemotional traits exhibit a processing deficit in the unconscious detection of fear, which 
fits theoretical predictions in the study of antisocial behaviour. These results suggest that 
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psychopathic traits associated to affective processing may entail changes in unconscious 
emotion processing. 
 There are other personality traits of relevance for psychopathology that have been 
addressed. For example, Vizueta et al. (2012) tested whether negative affectivity (NA) and 
dispositional fear (DF) could affect neural response to invisible fearful expressions 
relative to invisible neutral expressions. Both NA and DF have been related to a number 
of psychiatric ailments such as anxiety, depression, and general distress (Watson, 2005). 
The researchers presented participants with CFS-suppressed emotional and neutral 
expressions and measured differences in brain reactivity using fMRI. They found that only 
NA was a significant predictor – higher NA was associated with enhanced response in 
STS and right amygdala in the invisible condition, thus suggesting that amygdala reactivity 
may be found in the unconscious emotion processing and, by extension, may be recruited 
differently for individual differences related to anxiety and mood disorders. 
 Finally, anxiety and its relation with unconscious emotion processing has also 
been empirically addressed. Capitão et al. (2014) tested whether trait and state anxiety 
could affect suppression times of different emotional expressions in a b-CFS study. They 
found that trait anxiety positively correlated with how much faster fearful expressions 
were than happy expressions to break through CFS, thus suggesting that trait anxiety may 
entail biases in how facial expressions enter awareness. 
 In summary, multiple studies using backward masking, brief exposure durations, 
and b-CFS have shown that emotional expressions, in particular fearful expressions, enjoy 
prioritised access to awareness. However, some studies have claimed that such advantage 
could be well explained by differences in low-level features between face images, such as 
luminance, contrast, and spatial frequency, especially in the case of b-CFS studies. 
Moreover, a number of studies on the neural basis of unconscious emotion processing 
has shown that unlike what was believed in the past, this processing advantage would rely 
on cortical rather than subcortical pathways. Finally, researchers have also explored 
whether there is a link between psychiatric disorders that involve emotion processing 
symptoms and how facial expressions gain access to awareness. They have found that 
many disorders involve different patterns in breakthrough times, which can be useful to 
understand clinically relevant individual differences in psychiatric disorders. 
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1.3.3 Gaze direction 
Eye-gaze is very informative when detecting faces and understanding other 
people’s intentions (Bayliss et al., 2011; Edwards & Bayliss, 2019; Mundy & Newell, 2007; 
Scaife & Bruner, 1975). While direct-gaze faces draw attention towards themselves, faces 
with an averted gaze draw attention to the place they look at (Dupierrix et al., 2014; 
Farroni et al., 2002; Hood et al., 1998; Senju & Hasegawa, 2005), a phenomenon known 
as joint attention (Mundy & Newell, 2007; Scaife & Bruner, 1975). Several reports have 
suggested that gaze is a relevant cue for the recognition of gender, age, and emotional 
expression in a face (Daury, 2011; Edwards & Bayliss, 2019; Itier & Batty, 2009), especially 
when gaze makes eye contact, as it provides a processing advantage that makes face 
detection faster (Senju & Hasegawa, 2005; Senju & Johnson, 2009a); this advantage is 
known as the eye-contact effect. 
One question that has received special attention is whether gaze direction can be 
processed unconsciously. For instance, Sato et al. (2007) presented observers with faces 
looking either at the left or right side of the screen. These backward-masked faces were 
employed as cues for a target subsequently presented either at the left or right side of the 
screen. Observers were instructed to give a detection response as soon as they became 
aware of the target. Crucially, response times were consistently shorter for valid (gaze 
looking at the same screen side of the target) than invalid gaze cues in both conditions, 
when the face was masked and unmasked, thus suggesting that gaze direction is processed 
in absence of awareness. 
Most studies on this topic, however, have employed CFS to render faces invisible. 
For example, Stein, Senju, Peelen, & Sterzer (2011) reported shorter b-CFS suppression 
times for direct-gaze faces than averted-gaze faces. They concluded that these results may 
be due to an enhanced unconscious representation for direct gaze, probably preparing 
individuals for social interaction. However, they did not find an interaction between gaze 
direction and face orientation, i.e. the advantage of direct-gaze faces over averted-gaze 
faces was not disrupted by turning the face upside down, which may suggest that this 
effect relies on low-level information. In line with this, it has also been observed that gaze 
direction does not affect unconscious emotion processing, again suggesting that gaze 
direction might not involve high-level processing (Caruana, Inkley, et al., 2019). Chen & 
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Yeh (2012) addressed some of these concerns by using schematic faces without eye 
whites. They found shorter suppression times for direct-gaze faces, both with upright and 
inverted face images, and also when showing observers pairs of eyes alone. Again, this 
suggests that high-level information processing may not be driving the effect. 
Interestingly, a similar advantage has been found for faces turned towards the viewer in 
comparison to faces turned away, regardless of their gaze direction, indicating that a 
similar effect can be found with head angle alone (Gobbini et al., 2013). This effect has 
been successfully replicated even in conditions of high perceptual load, too (Xu et al., 
2011). 
Studies have also addressed the advantage of direct-gaze faces over averted-gaze 
faces using neural markers. Yokoyama et al. (2013) measured EEG event-related 
potentials during the presentation of faces with direct and averted gaze, rendered invisible 
using CFS. They reported that visual evoked potentials could discriminate between direct-
gaze and averted-gaze faces 200, 250, and 350 ms after presentation. In addition, 
Madipakkam et al. (2015) presented participants with face images both visible and 
rendered invisible using CFS, with direct and averted gaze, while measuring fMRI signals. 
After presenting suppressed face image for a predefined exposure duration, they asked 
participants to guess the location where the target face was presented and rate their 
response confidence. They found greater neural response to direct-gaze than averted-gaze 
faces when participants reported being aware of the stimulus than when they reported 
being unaware. This finding was significant for activity in the FFA, STS, and intraparietal 
sulcus, all brain regions that have been associated with gaze direction processing (Haxby 
et al., 2002; Nummenmaa & Calder, 2009). 
Making eye contact is commonly impaired among people diagnosed with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) among other limitations in social cue processing. Akechi et al., 
(2014) tested whether the unconscious eye-contact effect (Stein, Senju, et al., 2011) would 
also be absent in adolescents with ASD. After ensuring that both typically developed (TD) 
adolescents and adolescents with ASD could do b-CFS tasks adequately by running a 
contrast discrimination task with Gabor patches, they ran a b-CFS experiment where they 
presented participants with both direct-gaze and averted-gaze faces. Crucially, only the 
control group exhibited a significant advantage of direct-gaze faces in suppression times, 
thus suggesting an impairment in the unconscious processing of gaze direction in ASD 
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participants. Finally, the researchers ran a third experiment, which consisted of the same 
experiment but with no CFS masking. This time, both groups exhibited shorter response 
times for direct-gaze faces than averted-gaze faces. The authors suggest that the absence 
of an unconscious eye-contact effect in the ASD group might indicate that the initial and 
unconscious registration of eye contact is attenuated in people who suffer from ASD. 
More recently, Madipakkam et al. (2019) replicated and extended these findings by 
showing a linear relationship between the level of autistic traits in TD participants and 
their sensitivity to CFS-masked direct-gaze faces – the higher they scored in autistic traits, 
the lower their sensitivity to said faces, thus suggesting a continuum in the relationship 
between autistic traits and eye-contact sensitivity in a subclinical population. 
In another study, Seymour et al. (2016) explored whether participants diagnosed 
with schizophrenia exhibited the unconscious eye-contact effect originally reported by 
Stein, Senju, et al. (2011), in which suppression times were shorter for faces making eye 
contact than for faces looking away. In a b-CFS task, Seymour et al. (2016) found this 
same effect both for the group diagnosed with schizophrenia and the group of healthy 
participants: direct-gaze faces had shorter suppression times than averted-gaze faces, 
suggesting that abnormalities in schizophrenia associated with social cue processing 
(Palmer et al., 2018), commonly described by clinicians, may take place at later processing 
stages, when awareness has already occurred. Interestingly, the face-inversion effect (i.e. 
shorter suppression times for upright over inverted faces) was replicated using the b-CFS 
procedure with people diagnosed with schizophrenia along with the absence of an 
inversion effect when using object images, thus suggesting that configural face processing 
before access to awareness is preserved in people who suffer from this disorder (Caruana, 
Stein, et al., 2019). This finding indicates that while people with schizophrenia present 
social cue processing problems, before and after faces enter awareness, their configural 
processing of faces may be preserved.  
 In summary, the evidence suggests that the eye-contact effect can occur before 
faces gain access to awareness, but that it very likely relies on processing of low-level 
features. Moreover, there are studies that also suggest that people diagnosed with ASD, 
who typically present social cue processing limitations, would not exhibit the eye-contact 
effect, i.e. they would not present the advantage of direct-gaze faces over averted-gaze 
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faces in how they gain access to awareness. In schizophrenia, on the other hand, the eye-
contact effect would be preserved. 
 
1.3.4 Familiarity traits 
Faces with familiar features also enjoy prioritised access to awareness. Geng et al. 
(2012), using a b-CFS procedure, found shorter suppression times for self-faces 
(participants’ own faces) than celebrities’ faces, suggesting that facial information 
containing self-features gains faster access to awareness. Next, they measured EEG event-
related potentials during subliminal (CFS) and supraliminal (no CFS) conditions. They 
found enhanced N170 amplitude to self-faces in the supraliminal condition and a decrease 
in VPP amplitude to self-faces in the subliminal condition, thus suggesting a distinct 
neural modulation associated with familiar faces. Gobbini et al. (2013) expanded on these 
results by finding an advantage for faces of family members compared to faces of 
unknown people when using the b-CFS procedure. It is interesting to note, however, that 
while self-faces have shorter suppression times than others’ faces, this effect could not be 
found when comparing attribute words describing the participant’s characteristics to 
attribute words not describing the participant (Noel et al., 2017), thus suggesting that 
either this effect may be specific for facial information or that people are unable to read 
text suppressed by CFS.  
Race and gender in faces have also been addressed, although research has 
produced contradictory findings. On the one hand, Amihai et al. (2011) reported that 
awareness is necessary for processing race and gender information from faces. They 
presented participants with suppressed faces with unequivocal masculine or feminine 
features in one task, and CFS-suppressed faces with unequivocal Asian or European 
features in another task (adaptors), and then examined whether these stimuli affected the 
results of subsequent gender or race classification of gender- or race-ambiguous faces, 
respectively. While in the visible condition the features of the unequivocal face affected 
the classification of an ambiguous face, leading participants to classify faces in the 
opposite category than that of the adaptor, this effect was not observed in the invisible 
condition, i.e. when the adaptor was CFS-suppressed, thus suggesting that race and 
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gender-related information require awareness to be processed. On the other hand, Stein, 
End, et al. (2014) found shorter suppression times for faces matching the observer’s own 
race or age group, in addition to larger face-inversion effects for own-race and own-age 
faces compared to other-race and other-age faces, suggesting that experience-based face 
information can be processed unconsciously. Similarly, Yuan, et al. (2017) used own-race 
and other-race faces as CFS-suppressed primes for an affective priming task. They found 
that suppressed other-race faces facilitate identification (as indexed by shorter 
breakthrough times) of subsequent unsuppressed negative words whereas suppressed 
own-race faces facilitate identification of unsuppressed positive words, suggesting that 
racial features in invisible faces may affect how faces gain access to awareness. Consistent 
with this, Yuan et al. (2019) found shorter suppression times for own-race faces than for 
other-race faces in a b-CFS task. However, arbitrary visual stimuli that were imbued with 
race-relevance through associative training were not prioritised in their access to 
awareness: observers made quicker and more accurate judgements for own-race match 
versus non-match pairings than for other-race match versus non-match pairings. The 
findings of this study suggest that only own-race faces, but not otherwise arbitrary visual 
stimuli recently learned to represent one’s own race, are prioritised when accessing 
awareness. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that familiarity in the form of own-faces and 
relatives’ faces may enjoy a prioritised access to awareness, whereas findings of familiarity 
in the form of race and gender are contradictory, with some studies finding evidence in 
favour of own-race and own-gender faces having a prioritised access to awareness, and 
some finding evidence against it. 
 
1.3.5 Social information in faces 
People extract information from faces to evaluate social qualities such as 
friendliness and trustworthiness, and then use it to adjust their own social behaviour 
accordingly. Several studies have suggested that two major axes, trustworthiness and 
dominance, predominantly characterise this evaluation process (Oosterhof & Todorov, 
2008; Stirrat & Perrett, 2010). Does this evaluation affect how faces access awareness? 
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Stewart et al. (2012) generated multiple facial expressions that covered a large range of 
possible combinations of trustworthiness and dominance traits. They used CFS to render 
these face images invisible and to test for response times in a b-CFS task. In a series of 
experiments, they found that faces that were either highly dominant or highly trustworthy 
elicited significantly longer suppression times than less dominant or trustworthy faces. 
Interestingly, participants who scored lower in dominance and untrustworthiness took 
longer to become aware of the dominant or untrustworthy faces. The researchers 
interpreted these results as evidence of slowed visual perception resulting from a possible 
passive fear response. However, a more recent study done by Stein et al. (2018) found 
that the results obtained by Stewart et al. (2012) could be explained by low-level visual 
features: They successfully replicated the dominance- and untrustworthiness-related 
longer suppression times, though they found the same effect when turning faces upside 
down and when presenting only the eye region of faces to participants. 
However, a more recent study done by Abir et al. (2018) found compelling 
evidence of social information modulation over faces’ access to awareness in a series of 
b-CFS studies. They replicated the face-inversion effect by presenting participants with 
upright faces and inverted faces and employed a reverse correlation to model the facial 
properties that predicted the breakthrough times obtained. They found a dimension that 
explained a great part of the variance, which in addition correlated with 
power/dominance, thus suggesting that these social traits play an important role in how 
fast faces break through CFS. Crucially, though, the social dimension found could still 
predict breakthrough times when low-level features were controlled for in the model, 
based on the obtained data from scrambled and inverted faces. These findings suggest 
that at least the social dimension power/dominance in faces can be processed in absence 
of awareness. 
Regardless of the nature of the effects found by Stewart et al. (2012), they were 
successfully replicated and expanded by Getov et al. (2015). They explored individual 
differences in grey matter volume (measured with structural MRI) associated with 
suppression times. They found a dissociation: On the one hand, suppression times 
associated with dominance evaluation were negatively correlated with grey matter volume 
in right frontal operculum whereas, on the other hand, suppression times associated with 
untrustworthiness evaluation were negatively correlated with grey matter volume in right 
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temporoparietal junction and bilateral fusiform gyrus, but positively correlated with grey 
matter volume in medial prefrontal cortex, thus suggesting that the evaluation of social 
features in faces depends on at least partially separable neural substrates. 
Taken together, these reports suggest that social information such as power and 
dominance can be evaluated unconsciously, thereby affecting the time it takes for a face 
to break through suppression and enters awareness. The role of low-level features in this 
effect is controversial, nonetheless. 
 
1.3.6 Attractiveness and aesthetic traits 
A classic study that presented unmasked stimuli for predefined exposure 
durations of either 150 ms or 1000 ms found that at both durations, participants’ ratings 
are always highly reliable regarding attractiveness of faces (Goldstein & Papageorge, 
1980). However, do attractive faces gain access to awareness faster than less attractive 
ones? A few studies have claimed that aesthetic facial features such as attractiveness 
enhance faces’ access to awareness. Hung et al. (2016) were the first to report this finding. 
In a series of b-CFS experiments, they showed that faces that had been rated higher in 
attractiveness were associated with shorter suppression times and higher accuracy in an 
orientation discrimination task using Gabor patches if an attractive suppressed face 
preceded it in the same location compared to if a less attractive face did. Additionally, by 
using a staircase procedure, they found that more attractive faces had lower visibility 
thresholds than less attractive ones. These results suggest that suppressed attractive faces 
also draw spatial attention more effectively than suppressed unattractive faces. 
However, this advantage of attractive faces might, like the effects noted in 
previous sections, be due to low-level features. Nakamura & Kawabata (2018) successfully 
replicated this effect of shorter suppression times associated with attractive faces by using 
a b-CFS procedure, but in a series of two additional experiments, they showed that this 
effect could also be found when turning attractive faces upside down, i.e. when disrupting 
faces’ holistic information. Conversely, the effect was absent when they compared intact 
attractive faces to scrambled attractive faces. One explanation is that the advantage effect 
of attractive faces is driven by low-level features such as differences in contrast and spatial 
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frequency, given that the effect was also found with inverted faces. However, the fact that 
the effect disappeared when using scrambled faces (i.e. when destroying all facial 
information contained in face images) suggests that the effect may rely on a minimal 
amount of facial information to occur, perhaps just sufficient to convey that the images 
are face or face-like stimuli. 
These studies indicate convergent evidence of an advantage of attractive faces 
when gaining access to awareness compared to less attractive faces. However, this effect 
could be due to low-level features. 
 
1.3.7 Conclusions 
Many studies have addressed whether different visual features can influence how 
faces gain access to awareness. Among them, we find configural processing such as in 
upright faces compared to inverted faces, emotional expressions such as fearful 
expressions, gaze direction such as in faces making eye contact, familiar features such as 
in observers’ own face and their relatives’, social dimensions such as in qualities like 
friendliness and trustworthiness, and attractiveness. They have all been studied using brief 
exposure durations, backward masking, b-CFS and CFS procedures, sometimes including 
neural measures as well. In summary, it has been claimed that faces gain access to 
awareness faster due to their configural properties, by comparing upright to inverted 
faces. Regarding their emotional expressions, it has been claimed that fearful expressions 
would enjoy a processing advantage in comparison to other expressions such as happy 
and neutral ones. Similarly, other studies have suggested that facial features such as gaze 
direction, familiarity, and attractiveness may be processed unconsciously, thereby 
affecting how fast faces gain access to awareness. 
However, many studies have suggested that these advantages could be explained 
by low-level features such as differences in contrast and spatial frequency. Furthermore, 
some findings are contradictory or have not replicated. More research is needed to clarify 
what facial features do not need awareness to be processed and, therefore, may influence 
how faces gain access to awareness. 
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1.4    Main methodological critiques and limitations 
All the methods and procedures described above suffer from methodological 
issues and limitations, which cast doubt on conclusions derived from the studies that used 
them. Here, I summarise these concerns. 
 
1.4.1 Brief exposure durations 
Using brief exposure durations to test for the minimal exposure duration required 
for visual perception and awareness is a straightforward approach that can directly address 
the main questions of this thesis, i.e. how facial information gains access to awareness and 
whether different facial features, such as orientation or expression, require shorter 
exposure durations – and thus less information accumulation – than others in order to 
reach awareness (suggesting they gain access to awareness faster). However, there are 
hardware limitations that make it extremely difficult to present visual stimuli for 
sufficiently brief exposure durations to assess this possibility. This is due to the low refresh 
rate of most computer monitors, normally between 60 and 120 Hz. For example, Liu & 
Tanaka (2019) presented observers with faces by using predefined exposure durations of 
17, 50, 250, and 500 ms. They found that even 17 ms of exposure were sufficient to 
produce holistic processing. Similar findings were reported in scene categorisation when 
asking observers to categorise natural and manmade environments presented for 26 ms 
of exposure (Joubert et al., 2007). Despite claims indicating that 26 ms of exposure are 
required to get the gist of a scene (Joubert et al., 2007; Rousselet et al., 2005), by such 
exposure duration accuracy is already extremely high (> 90%), as reported in those 
studies, thus supporting the idea that the true minimal exposure duration required for 
visual perception must be significantly lower – and may be lower than computer monitors 
allow to reliably present. Because of monitors’ low refresh rates, this approach is not 
appropriate to study face perception and awareness. In Chapters 4 and 5, however, I 
present a set of experiments that use a newly developed LCD tachistoscope that allows 
stimulus presentations for under 1 ms, thus circumventing the limitations just mentioned. 
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1.4.2 Masking visual stimuli 
Alternatively, researchers have employed masking techniques to interrupt visual 
processing and impede a great variety of stimulus categories from gaining access to 
awareness (Lin & He, 2009). But this approach introduces a different potential confound 
– because we do not know either what aspects of visual processing are being interrupted 
by the mask, or to what extent they are being interrupted, we cannot be certain about 
whether different masked stimulus categories can be compared with each other. If 
masking techniques interrupt different aspects of visual processing besides impeding 
awareness, they could hence confound behavioural or neural effects associated with said 
stimulus categories. Furthermore, masks probably halt and replace stimuli, thus probably 
interacting with the masked image in various ways. In essence, the fact that it is technically 
extremely difficult (or impossible) to determine what backward masking specifically 
suppresses, could introduce unknown potential confounds. 
 
1.4.3 CFS and the b-CFS procedure 
CFS (and by extension b-CFS) enjoys several advantages over backward masking, 
such as longer suppression times. The rationale underlying b-CFS studies is quite 
straightforward – the time a stimulus takes to overcome suppression and thus gain access 
to awareness indexes unconscious processing, more specifically the transition between 
unconscious processing and conscious processing. Thus, by comparing suppression times 
between stimulus categories, we can measure which category gains access to awareness 
first, which reflects faster – and probably more efficient – processing. 
Unfortunately, the case is not that simple. In this section, I will address the main 
critiques that the b-CFS paradigm has received and what could be done in order to 
circumvent them. 
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1.4.3.1 The problem of disentangling detection from 
identification 
Most b-CFS studies ask participants to give a report as soon as the target stimulus 
breaks through suppression by performing a detection or localisation task. The 
assumption is that response times reflect breakthrough times – a faster response for 
detection or localisation should index prioritised unconscious processing. For this 
rationale to be valid, neither reporting the presence of a stimulus nor reporting its location 
on the screen should involve the stimulus category’s identification or classification, let 
alone any more complex recognition processes. For example, if the task is to say whether 
a word is shown, or whether it was shown on the left or right, it should not need to 
involve reading and comprehending the word. It is therefore assumed that participants 
do not waste time reading the word and understanding it before responding – they simply 
press the relevant key as soon as they see any part of it. But is this assumption justified? 
Similarly, it is assumed that when asked to detect or localise a face, participants respond 
as soon as they see any part of it, without wasting any time on identifying whose face it 
is, or what emotional expression or gender it has. However, participants have control over 
the amount of visual information they receive since trials are self-terminated, which makes 
it impossible to determine whether participants’ response times are the result of pure 
detection processes or of a combination of detection and identification processes. If 
identification processes influence response times, not only they could confound the 
results when identification performance differs between experimental conditions, but they 
could also bring additional identification-related post-perceptual confounders – e.g. 
decision criterion differences – into the equation (more on this in the next subsection). 
Thus, disentangling detection from identification is necessary to avoid potential 
confounds, especially since less information is required to detect a stimulus than to 
identify its nature (Kobylka et al., 2017), but we cannot assume that participants are able 
to suppress their identification processes just because identification is task-irrelevant. 
The potentially confounding nature of identification processes in b-CFS studies 
raises the question of how one should interpret findings obtained with this method. For 
example, what is the nature of the face-inversion effect measured with b-CFS response 
times? Classic face perception studies have shown that turning a face upside down 
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disrupts its recognition (Farah et al., 1995; Goodrich & Yonelinas, 2019; McKone & 
Yovel, 2009; Rakover & Teucher, 1997; Yin, 1969), which has been attributed to a 
disruption of its holistic configuration – it is much more difficult to integrate facial 
features when the face is inverted. If turning a face upside down disrupts its holistic 
processing, then why does it affect b-CFS response times when the task is to just detect 
the presence or location of the face? As stated before, many b-CFS studies have found 
shorter response times to suppressed upright faces than inverted faces (Akechi et al., 2014; 
Gayet & Stein, 2017; Jiang et al., 2007; Moors, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2016; Seymour et 
al., 2016; Stein et al., 2012; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011; Yang et al., 
2007). On the one hand, unconscious detection could be partly driven by holistic features, 
as suggested in the literature. On the other hand, this advantage of upright faces over 
inverted faces could be driven by task-irrelevant identification processes that some 
participants are not able to suppress, a feasible possibility given the high between-subject 
variability found for this effect (Gayet & Stein, 2017). Whatever may be the case, this 
highlights the importance of disentangling detection from identification processes. 
This problem can also be found in studies exploring language. For example, Sklar 
et al. (2012) claimed that CFS-suppressed sentences with unusual meanings overcome 
suppression faster than standard sentences, suggesting that semantic processing can 
happen in absence of awareness. However, a series of high-powered studies performed 
by Rabagliati et al. (2018) could not replicated it. The response times obtained by Sklar et 
al. (2012) could have been confounded by identification processes such as reading, which 
is automatic and thus likely to occur – and influence response times – despite the words’ 
content being task-irrelevant. Even if Rabagliati et al. (2018) had replicated their findings, 
it could still be that they occurred because of identification processes. 
 
1.4.3.2 The problem of post-perceptual factors 
In an ideal world, participants’ b-CFS response times would purely reflect changes 
in perceptual sensitivity due to the stimulus overcoming suppression and thus reaching 
conscious awareness. Unfortunately, this may not be the case, as participants may have 
different decision criteria for reporting a stimulus breaking through suppression. Post-
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perceptual factors such as response bias (a preference to give a particular response) and 
decision criterion (the willingness to report a signal) are separate from perceptual 
sensitivity (the ability to discriminate a signal from noise). Importantly, they may 
confound participants’ subjective reports, especially in b-CFS tasks where the main 
dependent variable is response time, and the amount of information collected before 
making a decision is controlled by the participants themselves. In the case of unconscious 
face processing, for example, participants could exhibit a more liberal decision criterion 
for reporting fearful expressions than happy expressions. Therefore, participants would 
need less information to report fearful expressions than happy expressions, leading to 
shorter response times. 
Because b-CFS response times do not distinguish between perceptual sensitivity 
and criterion, two different approaches have been previously proposed to deal with 
potential criterion confounders. One approach is to use a conscious control condition 
that emulates all aspects of the experimental condition except the interocular suppression 
manipulation. Some control conditions try to achieve this by presenting the stimulus 
binocularly or monocularly on top of the CFS masks, thus not suppressing it from 
awareness. The assumption is that such a task should replicate all detection-related post-
perceptual factors that could have affected b-CFS response times, such as decision 
criterion differences. According to this rationale, if the difference in response times to 
different stimulus categories is larger in the experimental condition than in the control 
condition, or if there is a difference in the experimental condition whereas no difference 
is found in the control condition, such effects could be attributed to differences in 
unconscious processing (Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011). For example, this is the case of the 
study by Jiang et al. (2007), who found significantly shorter response times to upright 
faces than inverted faces when the stimuli were suppressed (experimental condition). Such 
an advantage, however, was not found when they presented the target stimuli on top of 
the CFS masks (control condition).  
There are, however, concerns about this approach to controlling for post-
perceptual factors. Perceptual uncertainty is higher when stimuli are suppressed from 
awareness than when they are not, leading to wider response-time distributions and longer 
tails, and making stimuli easier to predict in control conditions (Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011). 
Therefore, as both conditions differ substantially, participants could adopt different 
decision criteria per condition, thereby making the control condition useless. 
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Another approach is to ask participants to perform a task that is orthogonal to the 
experimental manipulation. The assumption is that the experimental manipulation’s 
outcome should be unaffected by differences in post-perceptual factors if these factors 
are unrelated to the task. For example, Gayet et al. (2016) asked participants to identify 
the orientation of suppressed Gabor patches. However, they were interested in the effect 
of the colour of the annulus surrounding the patches (for which associations had been 
created earlier by conditioning), making the task irrelevant to the experimental 
manipulation. Similarly, Salomon et al. (2013) asked participants to identify the orientation 
of suppressed Gabor patches presented inside a hand image, when in fact they were 
interested in the effect of congruency between the position of the hand image and the 
participants’ hand. This approach has also been adopted in studies about unconscious 
face processing. For instance, Yang & Yeh (2018a) presented participants with different 
facial expressions both in upright and inverted orientations. Participants were asked to 
press a key as soon as any part of the face broke through suppression. Next, they were 
asked to report the location of the face on the screen and to rate its emotional valence. 
The detection and localisation tasks were probably not as orthogonal to the experimental 
manipulation (emotional expression) as in the previous two examples, given that 
participants could have guessed the purpose of the study and thereby adjusted their 
decision criterion to it. In fact, we cannot be certain about what specific aspects of the 
stimuli are relevant for each participant’s decision criterion, even in the first two examples. 
As long as participants have control over the amount of information received, we cannot 
know whether their response times are confounded by criterion differences or not, let 
alone whether they reflect differences in perceptual sensitivity. 
 
1.4.3.3 The problem of low-level features, failed replications 
CFS paradigms, and particularly the b-CFS procedure, have been used to explore 
whether high-level facial features can be processed in absence of awareness. For instance, 
emotional expressions, identity, and attractiveness are commonly seen as high-level 
features since their processing allegedly involves integration of visual features and even 
memory recall. However, for this logic to be valid, suppressed face images should not 
differ in any other aspect between each other. Low-level factors such as differences in 
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luminance and contrast (Song & Yao, 2016), spatial frequency (Yang & Blake, 2012), and 
retinal size (Heyman & Moors, 2014) may confound suppression times, thereby increasing 
false positives. 
The problem of low-level features has confounded some b-CFS studies. For 
example, it was originally claimed that semantic relations between an object and its 
surrounding context could be extracted unconsciously by showing that suppressed scenes 
with an incongruent object (e.g. a basketball player tossing a watermelon instead of a 
basketball) broke through suppression faster than congruent scenes (Mudrik et al., 2011). 
However, studies with more stringent low-level control exploring the same effect failed 
to replicate it (Biderman & Mudrik, 2018; Moors, Boelens, et al., 2016). A similar case was 
made for a study about unconscious visual cueing, in which experimenters showed that 
separate fragments organised to elicit a Kanizsa triangle illusion broke through 
suppression faster than when presented in a disorganised way (Wang et al., 2012). A 
subsequent study showed this b-CFS effect to be due to a low-level confounder – the 
presence of collinear edges (Moors, Wagemans, van Ee, et al., 2016). 
Face images are particularly vulnerable to low-level confounding factors. They 
naturally differ from each other (e.g. when comparing different identities and features) 
and, crucially, some of their high-level features may depend on low-level feature 
differences. For instance, emotional expressions differ in spatial frequency (Jennings et 
al., 2017; Kihara & Takeda, 2019; Mermillod et al., 2009; Tian et al., 2018) and importantly, 
certain expressions such as fearful expressions may enjoy prioritised subcortical 
processing thanks to their spatial frequency (Mermillod et al., 2009; Stein, Seymour, et al., 
2014; Vuilleumier et al., 2003). As described above, multiple studies have shown that 
fearful expressions break through suppression faster than other expressions (Sterzer et 
al., 2011; Yang et al., 2007), but subsequent studies have indicated that differences in low-
level features such as contrast could explain differences in breakthrough times (Gray et 
al., 2013; Hedger et al., 2015, 2019). While it may be the case that the visual system could 
have evolved this way, with a preference for high-contrast facial features, even involving 
distinct eye-movement patterns when presented with different expressions (Vetter et al., 
2019), it is essential to account for potential low-level confounders to determine what 
factors drive the effects of interest. This may be a tricky task when studying faces – for 
example, Stein & Sterzer (2012) tried to replicate the advantage effect of emotional 
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expressions over non-emotional ones using schematic faces to avoid low-level 
confounders. But unexpectedly, they found an advantage of happy expressions instead, 
which, as they demonstrated, was due to another low-level confound: a visual relation 
between mouth curvature and face contour. 
As shown, many failed replications occurred when researchers have controlled for 
confounding factors, which casts doubts on the validity of the conclusions reached in b-
CFS studies that did not control for potential confounds. All these failed replications cast 
doubts on the validity of b-CFS findings and thus call for more stringent procedures. 
 
1.4.3.4 Conclusions 
In summary, the b-CFS paradigm has received several methodological critiques, 
which revolve around stimuli-related and participant-related potential confounding 
factors. The former involves the need to control for low-level visual features that could 
confound participants’ breakthrough times, and the latter involve task-irrelevant 
identification processes and post-perceptual factors that could confound participants’ 
response times. 
 
1.5    Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Do upright faces gain access to awareness faster than inverted faces? In other 
words, does holistic processing give faces prioritised access to awareness? Do emotional 
facial expressions gain access to awareness faster than non-emotional facial expressions? 
In other words, does emotional content give faces prioritised access to awareness? As 
reviewed above, these questions have been addressed in several ways, by using brief 
exposure durations, masking techniques, and interocular suppression techniques. 
However, as also argued above, all those approaches suffer from important limitations 
that may have confounded findings. 
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In this thesis, I developed more stringent procedures to address whether different 
facial features can modulate the access of faces to awareness. I focus specifically on faces’ 
holistic configuration, emotional expression, and gaze direction. 
 
1.5.1 Developing a more stringent CFS procedure 
We developed a more stringent CFS procedure that, unlike b-CFS, allowed us to 
measure bias-independent detection sensitivity, response bias, bias-independent 
identification sensitivity, and decision criterion. We achieved this by presenting 
participants with suppressed face images for one of seven predefined exposure durations, 
allowing us, rather than the participants, to control how much information they receive 
on each trial. Importantly, using predefined exposure durations enables us to measure 
decision criterion differences, which is not possible in b-CFS. Next, after face image 
offset, we asked participants to report, in a single response, both the side of the screen 
the face image was presented on, and stimulus content (either gaze direction or emotional 
expression, depending on the experiment). We could therefore address our main 
questions by describing how perceptual sensitivity to suppressed faces increases with 
exposure durations, and whether their orientation (Chapters 2 and 3), gaze direction 
(Chapter 2), and emotional expression (Chapter 3) modulate this sensitivity. Therefore, 
this approach presents several crucial advantages over previous methods: first, it allows 
us to disentangle detection from identification by measuring both during the same task. 
Second, by using signal detection analyses, we could estimate bias-free sensitivity and 
post-perceptual factors (e.g. decision criterion), separately. Third, by using the method of 
constant stimuli – presenting face images for predetermined exposure durations in a 
random order – we could estimate perceptual sensitivity while controlling the amount of 
visual information available for the participant. 
If gaze direction modulates how faces gain access to awareness, we should find 
better perceptual sensitivity to suppressed direct-gaze faces than to suppressed averted-
gaze faces (i.e. an eye-contact effect) at one of the predefined exposure durations, after 
sensitivity scores rise above zero. This question is addressed in Chapter 2. If face 
orientation – due to configural processing – modulates how faces gain access to 
54 
 
awareness, we should find better perceptual sensitivity to suppressed upright faces than 
to suppressed inverted faces (i.e. a face-inversion effect) at one of the predefined exposure 
durations, after sensitivity scores rise above zero. This question is addressed in Chapters 
2 and 3, and also in Chapters 4 and 5 using a different method (see below). 
Do decision criteria vary across these conditions in a consistent way? If they do, 
we should find a consistent difference in participants’ willingness to report faces’ gaze 
direction. For example, a more liberal criterion for identifying direct gaze when faces are 
in an upright orientation than when they are presented upside down. 
Our method also allows us to distinguish whether detection and identification 
vary across conditions. If they do, we should find different effects for each measure, e.g. 
an advantage of direct-gaze faces in identification but not in detection. If identification 
relies on configural facial features rather than local facial features, we should always find 
a face-inversion effect (i.e. better sensitivity for upright over inverted faces) in 
identification tasks (such as distinguishing a fearful expression from a neutral expression), 
even if such an effect is absent in detection. 
If emotional expressions modulate how faces gain access to awareness, we should 
find better perceptual sensitivity to suppressed emotional expressions than to suppressed 
non-emotional expressions across increasing exposure durations. Furthermore, if it is true 
that negative expressions enjoy prioritised access to awareness than other expressions, we 
should find better perceptual sensitivity to suppressed angry or fearful expressions than 
to suppressed happy expressions. 
Do decision criteria vary across these conditions in a consistent way? If they do, 
we should find a consistent difference in participants’ willingness to report faces’ 
emotional identity. If participants exhibit a more liberal criterion for identifying negative 
expressions than for positive ones, we should find a more liberal criterion associated with 
fearful or angry expressions than for neutral and happy expressions. 
Finally, if detection and identification of facial expressions vary across conditions, 
we should find different effects for each measure, e.g. an advantage of emotional 
expressions over non-emotional expressions in identification but not in detection. These 
questions are addressed in Chapter 3, and also in Chapters 4 and 5 using a different 
method (see below). 
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1.5.2 Using an LCD tachistoscope with extremely brief 
presentations 
We also employed the signal detection task described above with unmasked face 
images, by using a newly developed LCD tachistoscope with extremely brief 
presentations. With this new equipment, we circumvented the hardware limitations 
encountered with standard computer monitors when searching for the minimal exposure 
duration required for visual processing. 
Using this new equipment, we addressed very similar questions and hypotheses to 
the ones posed above: do orientation and emotional expression modulate how faces gain 
access to awareness? Equivalent hypotheses are posed regarding perceptual detection 
sensitivity, response bias, identification sensitivity, and decision criterion.  
We also ask an additional question: does metacognitive sensitivity to faces, 
measured through subjective awareness ratings, show an advantage of upright faces over 
inverted faces (face-inversion effect), or for emotional expressions over neutral 
expressions? Unlike perceptual sensitivity (first-level sensitivity), which could increase 
with or without awareness as exposure durations increase, metacognitive sensitivity 
(second-level sensitivity) requires awareness to increase. More specifically, participants 
could show above-chance perceptual performance while feeling that they are guessing, 
but in order to obtain above-chance metacognitive performance, they need to be aware 
of their performance. Therefore, if perceptual sensitivity arises before metacognitive 
sensitivity does, it may indicate unconscious processing. Rather, if perceptual and 
metacognitive sensitivity arise together, it may indicate that the increase in perceptual 
performance was accompanied by awareness. Taking this into consideration, if upright 
faces gain access to perceptual awareness faster than inverted faces, we should find better 
metacognitive sensitivity for the former than the latter as exposure durations increase. 
Furthermore, if emotional expressions gain access to perceptual awareness faster than 
non-emotional expressions, we should find better metacognitive sensitivity for the former 
than the latter as exposure durations increase. These questions are addressed in Chapters 
4 and 5. 
56 
 
Importantly, by measuring all the indices just mentioned as exposure durations 
increase, we can test whether facial features are processed through a sequence of steps 
(e.g. holistic configuration before expression identification) or all at once. These questions 
are addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Finally, to test whether neural systems can process faces and their emotional 
expressions at shorter exposure durations than the ones required for signal detection 
indices, we measured EEG neural markers to explore at shorter exposure durations than 
those sufficiently long for the face-inversion effect and perceptual awareness to arise. If 
this were the case, then neural systems may be able to process faces before participants 
are able to report them. Similarly, we examined whether neural markers are sensitive to 
emotional content in faces with a shorter exposure duration than the one required for 
emotional expressions to be identified. If this were the case, then neural systems may be 
able to discriminate between emotional and non-emotional expressions before 
participants are able to identify them. These questions are addressed in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2 EYE CONTACT FACILITATES THE UNCONSCIOUS 
DETECTION OF FACES DUE TO HIGHER PERCEPTUAL 
SENSITIVITY 
 
2.1    Introduction 
Facial features provide essential information about others’ mental states and 
intentions, and are remarkably effective at capturing attention (Langton et al., 2008) even 
from early in infancy (Goren et al., 1975; Kwon et al., 2016). In fact, a number of reports 
have claimed that some facial features can even be processed unconsciously (Alpers & 
Gerdes, 2007; Doi & Shinohara, 2016; Gobbini, Gors, Halchenko, Rogers, et al., 2013; 
Jiang et al., 2007; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2007), with the implication that 
faces might be special stimuli, which are given unconscious priority. However, while these 
claims about unconscious processing are exciting, concerns about the underlying findings 
have also been raised, both in terms of their replicability (Schlossmacher et al., 2017; Stein 
et al., 2017; Stein & Sterzer, 2012), and their interpretation. In particular, and as explained 
in detail below, even the findings that do replicate may not in fact reflect unconscious 
sensitivity to facial features, but instead could reflect differences in the biases and criteria 
that participants use during face processing tasks. This latter concern is particularly acute 
because the most popular recent method used to study unconscious face processing, the 
Breaking Continuous Flash Suppression technique (b-CFS) is unable to distinguish 
sensitivity from criterion and response bias. In this chapter, we address that issue by 
focusing on two specific claims about unconscious face perception – first, that upright 
faces reach awareness faster than inverted faces, and secondly, that faces with direct gaze 
reach awareness faster than faces with averted gaze. We test these claims using a new and 
more comprehensive method, which avoids the problems inherent in b-CFS and allows 
58 
 
us to assess how faces from different conditions reach awareness, using measures of 
detection sensitivity, response bias, identification sensitivity, and decision criteria. 
A rich body of studies has claimed that facial features such as gaze direction (Chen 
& Yeh, 2012; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011), emotional expression (Hedger et al., 2015; Yang 
et al., 2007), familiarity (Gobbini et al., 2013), and attractiveness (Hung et al., 2016) can 
be processed unconsciously. To render images invisible, these studies have employed 
Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS), a strong interocular suppression procedure 
(Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005), in which a stimulus presented to one eye is suppressed from 
awareness by Mondrian-like masks flashed to the other eye. In the b-CFS variant, 
participants are asked to provide a response as soon as the invisible stimulus breaks 
through suppression into awareness (Yang et al., 2014), with the assumption that stimuli 
which are processed with higher priority will break through into awareness faster (Gayet 
et al., 2014). Accordingly, previous work using this procedure has found that faces break 
through suppression faster if shown in an upright orientation compared to in an inverted 
orientation (Jiang et al., 2007), if expressing fear compared to a neutral expression (Yang 
et al., 2007), or if making eye contact compared to looking away (Stein et al., 2011). 
While b-CFS has been widely used to provide evidence for unconscious 
processing, concerns about the method have been raised. For example, some prominent 
findings obtained in b-CFS studies have failed to replicate. Sklar et al. (2012) reported that 
masked sentences with unusual meanings break through suppression faster than control 
sentences, thus implying that semantic processing could be performed unconsciously. In 
a series of high-powered studies, however, Rabagliati et al. (2018) found that this result 
could not be replicated. Similarly, Mudrik et al. (2011) reported that complex scenes 
containing incongruent objects break through suppression faster than normal scenes, 
suggesting that awareness would not be required to extract semantic object-context 
relations from a scene. These results failed to replicate, though, when controlling for low-
level visual confounders (Biderman & Mudrik, 2018; Moors, Boelens, et al., 2016). 
Similarly, Wang et al. (2012) reported that perceptually-grouped objects (Kanizsa 
triangles) break through suppression faster than matched-but-disorganised stimuli, but 
this finding failed to replicate (Moors, Wagemans, van Ee, et al., 2016). Together, these 
failed replications cast doubts on the validity of b-CFS findings. 
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But beyond the replication failures noted above, there may be an even greater 
problem afflicting b-CFS studies, including those that have replicated successfully: The 
confounding effects of decision criteria. In particular, participants may unconsciously 
process stimuli from different categories in a similar manner and thus possess the same 
perceptual sensitivity to them, but at the same time may have different criteria for 
reporting that they have seen members of these different categories. In b-CFS studies, 
suppressed stimuli do not always emerge immediately into awareness, but instead are 
often seen partially, which means that participants have to make a decision as to whether 
or not to report a partially-perceived stimulus and, importantly, their criteria for making 
these decisions may vary by stimulus. For instance, participants may be inclined to visually 
explore a certain stimulus category more exhaustively than another before deciding to 
commit to a response, thus leading to a more conservative criterion and thereby to a 
slower response. The implication of this is that differences in breakthrough times may 
not be due to differential sensitivity to stimulus categories – which would imply 
differences in unconscious processing – but rather to differential decision criteria (i.e. the 
willingness to report a signal). 
We are not the first to note that criterion issues are a concern in b-CFS studies, 
and indeed some b-CFS studies have tried to control for this problem. For instance, some 
researchers have included a non-rivalrous control condition (where the target stimuli are 
shown binocularly or monocularly on top of the flashing CFS masks) with the assumption 
that post-perceptual effects, such as differences in decision criteria, should have similar 
effects on suppressed and visible stimuli (Akechi et al., 2014; Costello et al., 2009; Jiang 
et al., 2007; Li & Li, 2015; Madipakkam et al., 2015; Mudrik et al., 2011; Paffen et al., 2018; 
Stein & Sterzer, 2012; Zhou et al., 2010). The underlying reasoning is that if a non-
rivalrous condition emulates all processes that are not CFS-specific but contribute to 
differences in response times (RTs), any larger differences between stimulus categories 
found in the rivalrous b-CFS condition (compared to the visible control condition) should 
index unconscious processing differences. However, non-rivalrous conditions do not 
effectively control for decision criteria. Clearly visible targets are easier to distinguish than 
suppressed ones (Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011), meaning there is less uncertainty about them; 
and the level of uncertainty is known to affect decision criteria (Charles et al., 2013) and 
may do so differentially for different stimulus categories. Visible conditions therefore 
differ in a substantive way from CFS conditions, meaning they are not valid controls. 
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Another proposed method for controlling for differences in decision criteria is to 
ask participants to perform a task that is orthogonal to the experimental manipulation. 
For example, rather than ask participants to report when they saw a stimulus, Gayet et al. 
(2016) asked participants to identify the orientation of the stimulus, a feature that was 
irrelevant to their experimental manipulation of stimulus colour. Similarly, Salomon et al. 
(2013) asked participants to identify the orientation of a stimulus presented inside a hand 
image, a feature irrelevant to the experimental manipulation, in which the hand image and 
the participant’s hand were either in the same or different position. The assumption of 
this approach is that participants do not need to make decisions about the experimentally 
critical but task-irrelevant feature, and thus RTs will reflect a pure measure of processing 
that is unaffected by differences in decision criteria. However, such an assumption may 
not be justified: Participants may still perceive (and thus make decisions about) the task-
irrelevant feature, and the time that participants spend collecting information on each trial 
may still be affected by their internal criterion for that feature irrespective of its relevance 
for the task. Crucially, we cannot tell what factors will affect participants’ decision in any 
paradigm where they can freely choose how much perceptual evidence to gather (i.e. how 
long to look at the stimulus in a trial). To more-precisely distinguish perceptual sensitivity 
from decision criterion, we must use a method that does not rely on participants’ 
willingness to commit to a response (e.g. reaction/response times), but rather on 
perceptual measures collected under conditions where perceptual evidence (e.g. exposure 
duration in a trial) is controlled by the experimenter. 
Here we developed and tested a new method that does not suffer from the above 
problems. We used this method to test two well-established b-CFS findings that have 
been successfully replicated: the face-inversion effect and the eye-contact effect.  
Upright faces are easier to recognise than inverted faces (Farah et al., 1995; 
Goodrich & Yonelinas, 2019; Jiang et al., 2007; Stein et al., 2012; Yin, 1969). Similarly, 
the first published b-CFS study found that upright faces overcome suppression faster 
than inverted faces (Jiang et al., 2007). This face-inversion effect has been repeatedly 
replicated with b-CFS procedures (Akechi et al., 2014; Gayet & Stein, 2017; Kobylka et 
al., 2017; Moors, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2016; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011) and has been 
interpreted as evidence of unconscious holistic face processing. 
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In binocular viewing conditions, eye contact draws attention towards the face 
whereas averted gaze draws attention towards the gaze’s direction (Dupierrix et al., 2014; 
Farroni et al., 2002; Hood et al., 1998; Senju & Hasegawa, 2005). Stein, Senju, et al. (2011) 
reported that human faces with a direct gaze break through suppression faster than faces 
with an averted gaze, thus suggesting an unconscious processing advantage driven by eye 
contact. They also showed that upright faces break through faster than inverted faces, 
replicating the aforementioned face-inversion effect. Several other studies have supported 
this claim about eye contact either by directly (Akechi et al., 2014; Madipakkam et al., 
2019; Seymour et al., 2016) or indirectly (Chen & Yeh, 2012; Madipakkam et al., 2015; 
Yokoyama et al., 2013) replicating this finding, or by expanding on its neural correlates 
(Madipakkam et al., 2015; Yokoyama et al., 2013). 
In some of these studies, the task – to report stimulus location (on the left or right 
side of the screen) – was orthogonal to the stimulus category (e.g. direct/averted gaze) 
(Chen & Yeh, 2012; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011). However, as detailed above, participants 
could have exhibited shorter breakthrough times to direct-gaze faces not due to better 
sensitivity, but rather due to a more liberal decision criterion – requiring less evidence 
(and thus less time) to decide to report that they have seen a direct-gaze face. 
To establish the roles of perceptual sensitivity and decision criteria in the b-CFS 
face-inversion effect and eye-contact effect, our new method used CFS-suppressed 
stimuli that were presented for a range of predefined durations. On each trial, participants 
saw faces that either had direct or averted gaze and were presented either upright or 
inverted. Following each display, participants reported the location of the stimulus and its 
identity (direct or averted gaze). We used signal detection analyses to establish how 
stimulus duration and type affect sensitivity and decision criteria. A similar stimulus-
presentation approach was employed by (Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011; Experiment 3), who 
used four predetermined exposure durations and found that participants showed higher 
accuracy in reporting the location of upright versus inverted faces in all durations. 
Notably, however, (Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011) only measured accuracy – they did not 
directly assess perceptual sensitivity and decision criterion using signal-detection 
measures. Furthermore, they did not account for identification processes that might affect 
accuracy or for criterion differences in such identification processes. Here, we report two 
experiments: In the first, we conducted a direct replication of Experiment 2 in Stein, 
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Senju, et al's. (2011) original b-CFS study, to verify we obtained similar results (faster RTs 
to direct than to averted gaze faces, and to upright than to inverted faces). The second, a 
pre-registered experiment2 (Appendix A), used our new method to acquire signal-
detection measures of sensitivity and criterion for both face location (left/right side of 
the screen) and identification (direct/averted gaze) at each of seven exposure durations, 
ranging from 500 ms to 5695 ms. Criterion differences may account for b-CFS findings 
either fully (in which case, we should find more liberal criteria for direct-gaze than averted-
gaze faces, and for upright versus inverted faces, but no effects on sensitivity), partly (in 
which case, we should find both criterion and sensitivity differences) or not at all (in which 
case, we should find greater sensitivity for direct-gaze versus averted-gaze faces and for 
upright versus inverted faces, but no criterion differences). 
 
2.2    Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 was an exact replication of Stein, Senju, et al. (2011; Experiment 
2), testing whether upright faces break through suppression faster than inverted faces, 
whether faces making eye contact break through suppression faster than averted gaze 
faces, and whether the factors of face orientation and gaze direction interact. We used the 
same Matlab scripts and stimuli as the original study but employed a larger sample (32 
instead of 14 participants). The original study found a processing advantage of faces 
making eye contact. Additionally, upright faces broke through suppression faster than 
inverted faces. There was no interaction between these two effects. 
 
 
 
 
2 For Pre-registration, also see here: https://aspredicted.org/qj4wf.pdf  
63 
 
2.2.1 Method 
 
2.2.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-two University of Edinburgh students (21 female; 4 left-handed) of mean 
age 23.8 (SDage = 4.1) provided informed consent and were paid £3 for participation. All 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and reported no history of neurological or 
psychiatric disorders. Both experiments reported here were approved by the University 
of Edinburgh Psychology Research Ethics Committee. 
Past b-CFS studies that have found statistically significant effects of gaze direction 
or face inversion on breakthrough times employed around 16 participants per experiment 
(e.g. Stein, Senju, et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2007). We decided to double this number to 
increase power and allow counterbalancing of experimental blocks with a multiple of 8 
(see Procedure section). A retrospective power analysis, conducted using G*Power 3.1.9.7 
(Faul et al., 2009), to test for a difference between conditions in a repeated-measures 
ANOVA, with a small to medium effect size (ηp2 = .04) and alpha of .05, aiming to 
achieve a statistical power of 95%, determined that a sample of 19 participants would be 
required. If a non-sphericity correction ε of .5 were to be added – as reported in the results 
section, a number of tests violated this assumption – then a sample of 29 participants 
would be required. 
 
2.2.1.2 Stimuli 
In both experiments, stimuli were presented on a 19-inch CRT monitor in a dimly 
lit room, connected to a computer running Matlab 2014a (Mathworks, Inc) using the 
Cogent 2000 toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php). A chin rest and mirror 
stereoscope were positioned 57 cm from the monitor, with a vertical divider splitting the 
display so each eye only saw half of the screen. 
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Figure 2.1a illustrates the display and stimuli. Two red frames containing binocular 
alignment contours (random noise pixels around the inside border of the frame) appeared 
side by side on the screen (squares measuring 10.6° × 10.6°, width 0.8° × 0.8°), supporting 
binocular alignment through the mirror stereoscope such that only a single frame was 
perceived. A red fixation dot (0.7° × 0.7°) was presented in the centre of each frame. 
High-contrast coloured Mondrian-like masks were flashed at 10 Hz to one eye while a 
face stimulus was presented to the other eye. 
We employed the same twelve face stimuli used by Stein, Senju, et al. (2011) and 
others (Akechi et al., 2014; Madipakkam et al., 2015; Senju & Hasegawa, 2005; Seymour 
et al., 2016). In these images, the face is laterally averted either to the left or to the right, 
and the eyes are also averted to either the left or right, giving the impression of either 
averted or direct gaze, depending on whether gaze direction matched head direction. For 
instance, from the viewer’s perspective, in the case of faces averted to the right, eyes 
directed to the left were classified as direct gaze and eyes directed to the right were 
classified as averted gaze. This was done with the intention of ruling out the potential 
confounding influence of greater eye symmetry present in direct-gaze faces with straight 
head direction (see Senju & Hasegawa (2005) for details of stimulus creation). Stimuli 
were cropped to oval shapes (3.3° × 4.6°), equalised for contrast and luminance and the 
edges were blurred into the grey background. Inverted faces were created by turning 
upright faces upside down (180° turn). 
 
2.2.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were instructed to focus on the fixation dot with both eyes open, 
trying to avoid blinking and looking elsewhere. 
At the start of each trial, the red frames, binocular alignment contours, and 
fixation dots were presented for 1 s. The red frames and binocular alignment contours 
were continuously present during the experiment. In each trial, fixation dots were 
presented binocularly; one eye was presented the CFS mask – Mondrian-like patterns 
changing at 10 Hz – and a face was introduced to the other eye; its contrast ramped up 
linearly from 0% to 100% over 1s and then remained constant until either a response was 
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given or 10 s had passed, at which point the face, fixation dots, and mask disappeared 
during a 1.5 s intertrial interval. The eye receiving the mask was the same throughout the 
study but varied randomly among participants. 
Face stimuli were presented either to the left or to the right of the fixation dot 
(horizontal fixation-to-centre distance 2.7°) at a random vertical position (maximum 
centre-to-horizontal-midline distance 2.1°). Participants were instructed to press the left 
or right arrow key on the keyboard to indicate the location of the face as soon as they 
became aware of its presence. 
The experiment consisted of 192 randomly ordered trials, which were evenly 
distributed over the two crossed experimental factors (gaze direction and face inversion), 
with the face appearing on each side of the visual field on half of the trials. A 5-minute 
break was given halfway through the experiment. There were no practice trials. Half of 
the participants viewed a version of the faces with the head averted to the left and the 
other half viewed a version of the faces with the head averted to the right. The full 
experiment took around 20 minutes to complete. 
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Figure 2.1. Schematic description of a trial in Experiment 1 (replication study). (a) The 
mask stimuli were shown at 100% contrast whereas the target stimulus increased in 
contrast linearly from 0 to 100% over 1 s. (b) Example of direct-gaze and averted-gaze 
faces. (c) The trial ended when the participant gave a response (left or right) or after 10 s. 
 
2.2.2 Analysis and Results 
We calculated mean RTs based on trials with correct responses (98.8% of all 
trials). Trials with no response were treated as missing data (< 5% for each participant). 
A preliminary mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) on mean RTs, which included the 
factors of gaze direction (direct or averted) and face orientation (upright or inverted) as 
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within-subject factors, and head direction (left or right) as a between-subjects factor, 
showed no main effect of head direction nor any interaction of this factor with any other 
factor (all relevant p-values > .1), so this factor was collapsed in further analyses. 
To examine whether upright and direct-gaze faces elicit faster breakthrough 
reports than inverted and averted-gaze faces, as Stein, Senju, et al. (2011) found, we 
entered RTs into a 2 (gaze direction: direct, averted) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) 
repeated-measures ANOVA. Critically, there was a main effect of gaze direction, with 
faster RTs for direct-gaze faces (M = 3016.8 [SD = 962.9]) than for averted-gaze faces (M 
= 3436 [1020.3]), (𝐹(1, 31) = 54.14, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .636). There was also a main effect 
of orientation, with faster RTs for upright faces (M = 2996.1 [950.5]) than for inverted 
faces (M = 3456.8 [1030.9]), (𝐹(1, 31) = 75.72, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .710; Figure 2.2). 
Finally, and similar to Stein, Senju, et al. (2011), although the simple effect of gaze was 
numerically larger for upright (Mdifference = 535 ms [900]) than for inverted faces (Mdifference 
= 303.4 ms [1008.8]), and each of these simple effects was significant (𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(61.5) =
 −6.35, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = −1.122; 𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑(61.5) = −3.59, 𝑝 = .004, 𝑑 = −0.635), 
they did not differ significantly from each other, as indicated by the finding that the 
interaction between gaze direction and face orientation did not reach significance 
(𝐹(1, 31) = 3.49, 𝑝 = .071, ηp2 = .101). These results replicate all aspects of Stein, Senju, 
et al.’s (2011) findings. 
To further examine the non-significant interaction, we calculated a Bayes factor 
for this result using JASP (version 0.11.1, by JASP Team (2019)), with a standard Cauchy 
distribution centred on zero with rate = 0.707. This provided a value of 𝐵𝐹01 = 1.343, 
indicating that given the data, the null is only slightly more likely than the alternative 
hypothesis model. The findings are best characterized as “anecdotal evidence”, and do 
not provide strong evidence for either the null or alternative (van Doorn et al., 2019). 
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Figure 2.2. Results of Experiment 1. Bars indicate mean RTs for detection of CFS-
masked faces. Asterisks index statistically significant differences. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals (CI). 
2.2.3 Discussion 
This first experiment replicated Stein, Senju, et al.'s (2011) b-CFS findings: direct-
gaze faces broke through CFS faster than averted-gaze faces. In addition, we found a face-
inversion effect, with upright faces breaking suppression faster than inverted faces, an 
effect that is consistent with many other reports (Gobbini, Gors, Halchenko, Hughes, et 
al., 2013; Gobbini, Gors, Halchenko, Rogers, et al., 2013; Gray et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 
2007; Stein et al., 2016; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 
2010). As in the original study, we did not find a significant interaction between these 
effects, which may have implications for the possible mechanisms behind the eye-contact 
effect in b-CFS; we return to this issue in the General Discussion.  
Faster breakthrough of direct gaze faces has previously been interpreted as 
suggesting that gaze direction affects unconscious processing of faces. As discussed in the 
Introduction, however, such findings do not rule out the potential effects of differential 
criteria. Therefore, having confirmed that eye-contact and face orientation affect reported 
breakthrough times in b-CFS, we next examined whether these factors affect perceptual 
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sensitivity and decision criteria when the duration of exposure to the stimulus is 
controlled. 
 
2.3    Experiment 2 
To de-confound perceptual sensitivity and decision criteria in the b-CFS 
paradigm, we modified the procedure so that participants were now exposed to CFS trials 
whose duration varied in a predetermined manner, thus controlling how much 
information they were exposed to on each trial. Then, after each stimulus presentation, 
participants judged both where on the screen the masked stimulus was shown, and what 
that stimulus was. We used signal detection analyses to assess sensitivity to both stimulus 
location and stimulus identity, as well as criteria for making these judgments. If this 
method reveals differences in sensitivity to stimulus categories, they cannot be attributed 
to differences in decision criterion. Alternatively, we might find effects on decision criteria 
alone, which would suggest that the orientation and eye-contact breakthrough-time 
effects found in Experiment 1 cannot be attributed to differential sensitivity. Finally, we 
could find both sensitivity and criterion differences between stimulus categories, which 
would suggest that both contribute to these breakthrough-time effects. 
 
2.3.1 Method 
 
2.3.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-two University of Edinburgh students who had not participated in 
Experiment 1 provided informed consent and were paid £14 for participation. All had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and reported no history of neurological or 
psychiatric disorders. Three participants were excluded from analysis (see the Analysis 
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section below); the remaining 29 participants (23 female; 3 left-handed) had a mean age 
of 24.6 (SDage = 3.6). 
 
2.3.1.2 Stimuli and Apparatus 
Face stimuli in this experiment were the same as in Experiment 1. The visual 
display differed slightly from that of Experiment 1: instead of red frames and a red fixation 
dot, binocular vergence was maintained by two vertical vergence bars (width 1°, height 
8°) that appeared to the left and right of stimuli in each eye from fixation (horizontal 
fixation-to-bar distance 3.1°), and a black fixation cross (0.7° × 0.7°). 
 
2.3.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were instructed to focus on the fixation cross with both eyes open 
and avoiding blinking during the trials. 
Two textured bars were presented to each eye continuously, to maintain stable 
vergence. Each trial began with a fixation cross presented binocularly, between the 
textured bars, at the centre of each eye’s visual field (Figure 2.3a). 200 ms later, the CFS 
mask (Mondrian-like patterns changing at 10 Hz) was presented to one eye, and a face 
image was introduced to the other eye, ramping up from 0% to 100% contrast over a 1-
second period. On trials in which stimulus presentation was shorter than 1 s (see below), 
termination of presentation curtailed the change in contrast. On longer trials, face contrast 
remained at 100% until the end of the trial. The mask’s contrast was stable across the trial. 
Stimuli were presented for one of seven predefined durations, spaced equally on a log 
scale (500; 750; 1125; 1688; 2531; 3797; 5695 ms). This range of exposure durations was 
determined in piloting sessions that used exposures of 300–6000 ms; importantly, it 
encompasses the mean breakthrough times found in Experiment 1. 
After stimulus offset, a response cue consisting of four question marks was shown 
binocularly in the middle of the field of view, replacing the fixation cross. Participants had 
71 
 
to provide a response within a 2 s response window: They pressed one of four keys (left 
control, left shift, down arrow, or up arrow) to indicate both where the face had been 
shown (left or right) and whether the face’s gaze was directed at them or averted (Figure 
2.3b). This single response thus provides measures of both detection (stimulus location), 
and identification (stimulus gaze). Following this response, a screen showing only the 
vergence bars was presented for an ITI of 1000 ms before the next trial began. 
The experiment consisted of 1120 trials. Face orientation was blocked in a 
counterbalanced ABBABAAB BAABABBA order (70 trials/block, with A and B 
denoting upright and inverted faces, respectively, for half of the participants, or vice versa 
for the other half). Participants were given self-terminated breaks every 70 trials and a 
compulsory 15-minute break halfway through the experiment. Unlike Experiment 1, in 
Experiment 2 all participants viewed faces with the head averted to the left and faces with 
the head averted to the right. For each face orientation, all combinations of face side 
(left/right), gaze (direct/averted), head direction (left/right), and stimulus duration (seven 
possible durations) were presented equally often in randomised order. 
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Figure 2.3. Schematic description of a trial in Experiment 2. (a) Stimulus presentation. 
Stimuli were presented for one of seven possible durations (500 – 5695 ms, equally spaced 
on a log scale). The contrast of the target image increased linearly from zero to 100% 
across the first second and then remained unchanged until the end of the trial. (b) 
Detection/identification response. Immediately following stimulus offset, a response cue 
was presented binocularly. Participants provided a single response to indicate both on 
which side of fixation the face had been shown and whether its gaze was direct or averted. 
 
2.3.1.4 Analysis 
We excluded data from three participants, in line with our pre-registered exclusion 
criteria: one failed to respond on more than 10% of trials and the other two did not show 
any increased accuracy as exposure duration increased (even at the longest duration, in 
which the mask was no longer present by the end of the trial), suggesting that they failed 
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to attend to the task. Trials that received no response (1.7% in total) were treated as 
missing data (< 5% for each participant). 
We used Signal Detection Theoretic (SDT) measures to assess how perceptual 
sensitivity and criteria to visual information changed across display durations. To 
determine each participant’s bias-independent sensitivity to face location (left or right; 
henceforth referred to as location d’) for each combination of duration, face orientation, 
and gaze direction, we employed the calculation for two-alternative forced choice (2-AFC) 
tasks (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004), 𝑑′ location = (
1
√2
) (𝑍(𝐻𝑖𝑡location) − 𝑍(𝐹𝐴location)), where 
Z(Hit) stands for the Z score associated with the probability of a Hit (defined as a trial in 
which a face was displayed on the right and reported on the right), and Z(FA) for that 
associated with the probability of a false alarm (a trial in which a face was displayed on 
the left but reported as being on the right). To estimate each participant’s bias to respond 
left or right (henceforth referred to as response bias) during face localisation, we employed 
the calculation 𝐶location = − (
1
2
) (𝑍(𝐻𝑖𝑡location) + 𝑍(𝐹𝐴location)). Positive and negative values 
for this measure indicate a bias toward responding “left” and “right”, respectively; 
however, as these may cancel out across participants, we converted the results to absolute 
values as a measure of response bias quantity. To determine gaze direction identification 
sensitivity (to direct gaze; henceforth referred to as gaze identification d’), we used the 
calculation of d’ for Yes/No detection tasks, 𝑑′gaze identification = 𝑍(𝐻𝑖𝑡identification) −
𝑍(𝐹𝐴identification), where a hit was defined as correctly reporting a direct-gaze face and an 
FA was defined as incorrectly reporting a direct-gaze face. To estimate each participant’s 
criterion during gaze direction identification, we employed the calculation 𝐶gaze identification =
− (
1
2
) (𝑍(𝐻𝑖𝑡identification) + 𝑍(𝐹𝐴identification)). Lower the value of this measure indicate a 
more liberal criterion (i.e. the participant is more willing to report direct gaze). These 
measures were calculated by-condition for each participant and analysed using ANOVA 
as detailed below. Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted degrees of freedom were used when 
Mauchly’s test indicated a violation of the sphericity assumption. 
Both frequentist (ANOVA) and Bayesian (Bayes factors) statistical analyses were 
performed using Jamovi (The jamovi project, 2020) and JASP (JASP Team, 2020), and 
corroborated using R and SPSS. When an ANOVA indicated a significant interaction, we 
ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons to look for significant effects. 
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Post hoc pairwise comparisons in these statistical packages use estimated marginal means 
based on the variance of the ANOVA model. For Bayes factor analysis, we defined the 
null hypothesis as no difference between conditions by using a standard Cauchy 
distribution centred on zero with rate of 0.707. 
 
2.3.2 Results 
 
2.3.2.1 Location Sensitivity 
Individual participants’ by-condition location d’ scores were entered into a 
preliminary repeated-measures ANOVA, which included gaze direction (direct or 
averted), face orientation (upright or inverted), and head direction (left or right) as within-
subject factors. We found no main effect of head direction (𝐹(1, 28) = 0.123, 𝑝 =
.731, ηp2 = .005) nor any interaction of this factor with any other factor (all p-values > 
.1). Therefore, d’ scores in all further analyses were collapsed across head direction 
conditions. 
To examine how the manipulated factors affected face detection, we entered 
location d’ scores into a 2 (gaze direction: direct, averted) × 2 (face orientation: upright, 
inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. Unsurprisingly, there 
was a main effect of exposure duration (Figure 2.4a), whereby sensitivity increased with 
exposure durations (𝐹(2.58, 72.19) = 164.411, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .854). Importantly, there 
was a main effect of gaze direction (𝐹(1, 28) = 8.626, 𝑝 = .007, ηp2 = .236), confirming 
that participants were more sensitive to the location of direct-gaze faces (M = 1.13 [1.06]) 
than averted-gaze faces (M = 1.05 [1.07]). There was also a main effect of face orientation 
(𝐹(1, 28) = 12.339, 𝑝 = .002, ηp2 = .306), indicating a sensitivity advantage for upright 
faces (M = 1.18 [1.1]) over inverted faces (M = 1.00 [1.03]). The interaction between gaze 
direction and exposure duration was significant (𝐹(4.56, 127.75) = 11.67, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 =
.294) but, surprisingly, Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that the 
advantage for direct-gaze faces over averted-gaze faces only reached statistical significance 
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at one exposure duration: 3797 ms (𝑡(196) =  7.61, 𝑝 < .001). The interaction between 
face orientation and exposure duration reached significance as well (𝐹(4.54, 127.25) =
3.54, 𝑝 = .007, ηp2 = .112). Post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons 
revealed that the advantage of upright faces over inverted faces was driven by significant 
differences at 1688 (𝑡(153) =  2.85, 𝑝 = .007, 𝑑 = 0.529), 2531 (𝑡(153) =
 3.75, 𝑝 = .023, 𝑑 = 0.696) and at 3797 ms (𝑡(153) =  4.45, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.827) 
of exposure. Consistent with the findings of Stein, Senju, et al., (2011) there was no 
interaction between gaze direction and face orientation (𝐹(1, 28) = 0.093, 𝑝 = .763, ηp2 =
.003), and no further three-way interaction with exposure duration (𝐹(4.68, 131) =
0.364, 𝑝 = .861, ηp2 = .013). 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Results of Experiment 2. (a) Location sensitivity. Location d’ increased with 
exposure time. A significant advantage for direct-gaze faces over averted-gaze faces is 
present at 3797 ms of exposure. A significant advantage for upright faces over inverted 
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faces is present at 1688, 2531, and 3797 ms of exposure. (b) Absolute-value response bias 
scores for reporting location (bias toward either left or right). The amount of bias 
decreased as exposure duration increased, but there was no difference in amount of 
response bias between gaze and orientation categories. (c) Identification sensitivity for 
gaze direction. Identification d’ increased with exposure duration. A significant advantage 
in gaze direction identification for upright faces over inverted faces arises by 1688 ms of 
exposure. (d) Criterion scores for reporting direct gaze. Upright faces exhibit a 
significantly more liberal criterion (lower values) than inverted faces during gaze direction 
identification. Asterisks index statistically significant differences between face 
orientations. Daggers indicate statistically significant differences between gaze directions. 
Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
The non-significant interaction between gaze direction and face orientation is 
similar to that found in Experiment 1, but similarly, it does not mean that the null 
hypothesis is necessarily true. We calculated Bayes factors to test whether the obtained 
data supports the absence of an interaction here (null hypothesis model). Bayes factors 
indicated strong evidence in favour of the null hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 = 10.069). In 
other words, the results suggest that the location sensitivity advantage for direct-gaze faces 
did not depend on the orientation of the face.  
These results, obtained with our new method, confirm the pattern of findings 
obtained using b-CFS in Experiment 1 and by Stein, Senju, et al. (2011): Direct-gaze faces 
enjoyed a detection advantage over averted-gaze faces, and upright faces enjoyed an 
advantage over inverted faces. The absence of an interaction between gaze direction and 
face orientation is also similar to that obtained in previous experiments. 
 
2.3.2.2 Location response bias 
We examined whether participants’ response bias for reporting face location 
varied across conditions by entering the absolute values of 𝐶location scores into a 2 (gaze 
direction: direct, averted) × 2 (face orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) 
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repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 2.4b). Response bias significantly decreased with 
exposure duration (𝐹(2.57, 71.99) = 4.44, 𝑝 = .009, ηp2 = .137), indicating that as 
participants’ ability to detect the face increased (shown by higher location d’ scores) they 
became less likely to exhibit a systematic bias in their preference to report one side or the 
other. We did not find main effects of gaze direction (𝐹(1, 28) = 0.149, 𝑝 = .702, ηp2 =
.005), and face orientation (𝐹(1, 28) = 0.117, 𝑝 = .735, ηp2 = .004), nor any interactions 
(all p-values > .09), suggesting that only exposure duration affected response bias. To 
assess whether the obtained data support the absence of an effect of gaze direction and 
face orientation, we estimated Bayes factors for each comparison, which indicated 
substantial evidence for the null hypothesis model of gaze direction (𝐵𝐹01 = 6.899) and 
anecdotal evidence for the alternative hypothesis model of face orientation (𝐵𝐹01 =
0.449). 
 
2.3.2.3 Gaze Direction Identification Sensitivity 
We examined whether participants’ sensitivity to identifying gaze direction varied 
across conditions by entering identification d’ scores – taken over all trials irrespective of 
location response – into a 2 (face orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) 
repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 2.4c). A main effect of exposure duration indicated 
that sensitivity to gaze direction increased with increasing duration (𝐹(2.60, 72.77) =
64.25, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .696). We also found a main effect of orientation, such that gaze 
direction identification sensitivity was significantly higher for upright faces (𝑀 =
0.95 [1.09]) than for inverted faces (𝑀 = 0.69 [0.93];  𝐹(1, 28) = 34.56, 𝑝 <
.001, ηp2 = .552). The interaction between face orientation and exposure duration also 
reached significance (𝐹(4.65, 130.24) = 3.67, 𝑝 = .005, ηp2 = .116). Post hoc Bonferroni-
corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that the advantage in favour of upright faces was 
significant at exposure durations of 1688 ms (𝑡(193) =  3.86, 𝑝 = .014, 𝑑 = 0.717), 
2531 ms (𝑡(193) =  3.63, 𝑝 = .033, 𝑑 = 0.675), 3797 ms (𝑡(193) =  4.62, 𝑝 <
.001, 𝑑 = 0.857), and 5695 ms (𝑡(193) =  3.55, 𝑝 = .044, 𝑑 = 0.660). 
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Thus, these results add interesting nuance to the earlier-described effect of gaze 
direction on location sensitivity, which was not affected by face orientation. Here, our 
findings indicated that orientation does affect the ability to explicitly identify gaze 
direction, which suggests that the identification of gaze direction may rely on high-level 
configural features and may be independent of how eye contact affects breakthrough 
from CFS. We return to this in the General Discussion. 
 
2.3.2.4 Gaze Direction Identification Criterion 
We examined whether participants’ criterion for reporting direct gaze varied 
across conditions by entering 𝐶gaze identification scores into a 2 (face orientation: upright, 
inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 2.4d). Lower the 
value of this measure indicate a more liberal criterion. There was a main effect of face 
orientation, indicating significantly more liberal criteria for upright (M = 1.05 [1.07]) than 
for inverted faces (M = 1.13 [1.06]), (𝐹(1, 28) = 6.78, 𝑝 = .015, ηp2 = .195). Despite an 
overall numerical trend toward more liberal criteria with increasing exposure duration, the 
main effect of exposure duration fell short of significance (𝐹(1.75, 48.95) = 2.53, 𝑝 =
.097, ηp2 = .083). To assess whether the obtained data support the absence of an effect 
of exposure duration, we estimated Bayes factors, which indicated anecdotal evidence for 
the alternative hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 = 0.445), i.e. the results were inconclusive on the 
effect of exposure duration. The interaction between both factors did not reach 
significance either (𝐹(4.13, 115.63) = 1.86, 𝑝 = .120, ηp2 = .062). 
These results indicate a more liberal criterion for reporting ‘direct gaze’ for upright 
than for inverted faces. This criterion difference seems not to change across exposure 
durations. As face inversion disrupts configural processing, our findings indicate that such 
processing plays a role in participants’ criteria for identifying gaze direction. 
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2.3.3 Discussion 
In this second experiment, we measured perceptual sensitivity to gaze direction 
and face orientation. We found a significant advantage in location sensitivity for direct-
gaze faces over averted-gaze faces. Unlike previous claims supporting this effect, our 
findings cannot be attributed to criterion differences between stimulus categories, and 
therefore, we conclude that eye contact enhances perceptual sensitivity to faces. We also 
found a significant advantage in location sensitivity for upright over inverted faces, 
demonstrating that the previously-reported face-inversion effect (Gray et al., 2013; Stein 
et al., 2016; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2010) is, like 
the eye-contact effect, an effect on perceptual sensitivity. 
Although the eye-contact effect (greater sensitivity to the location of direct than 
averted gaze) did not differ between upright and inverted faces, we did find that 
identification of gaze-direction was better for upright than inverted faces. This finding 
suggests that the processes underlying detection and identification are at least partly 
dissociable, in line with various claims that identification is more high-level-processing 
dependent than detection (Gayet et al., 2016; Goodrich & Yonelinas, 2019; Leopold & 
Rhodes, 2010).  
Interestingly, there were no effects of gaze direction on criterion for either 
location or identification. Participants did, however, exhibit a more liberal criterion for 
upright over inverted faces in gaze-direction identification, meaning they were more 
willing to report direct gaze for an upright face than for an inverted face. Although this 
result cannot explain the eye-contact effects found in b-CFS studies, it does demonstrate 
that decision criteria may differ across experimental conditions in studies using perceptual 
suppression. Generally, therefore, it is important to measure and rule out such criterion 
differences as they may impact and thus confound RTs in standard b-CFS studies. 
 These findings confirm the effects of gaze direction and face orientation on 
access to awareness. Crucially, and unlike b-CFS procedures, our procedure enabled us to 
distinguish effects on sensitivity from those on criterion. 
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2.4    General Discussion 
Studies have shown that direct-gaze faces are salient and thus very difficult to 
ignore (Senju & Hasegawa, 2005; Senju & Johnson, 2009a). It has also been claimed that 
faces that make eye contact access awareness faster than faces looking away (Chen & Yeh, 
2012; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011; Yokoyama et al., 2013). However, due to methodological 
limitations, past demonstrations of this effect could be attributed to differences in 
decision criterion rather than perceptual sensitivity. 
To address these limitations, we developed a new method to de-confound 
sensitivity and criterion, providing participants with CFS trials of predetermined length, 
rather than relying on participants’ own judgment to decide when to report that they saw 
a stimulus. As argued in the Introduction, RTs in the b-CFS procedure can be influenced 
by criterion differences as participants decide when they have accumulated enough 
information to make a report, and decision criteria may vary systematically between 
stimulus categories. By measuring sensitivity and criterion, and controlling the amount of 
visual information available to the participant, our method offers a more robust approach 
to testing unconscious processing differences. 
We asked whether eye contact really makes faces reach awareness faster, or 
whether this effect is driven by differences in criterion. Using a traditional b-CFS method, 
Experiment 1 replicated the eye-contact effect originally reported by Stein, Senju, et al. 
(2011), and the face-inversion effect reported in several previous studies (Gray et al., 2013; 
Stein et al., 2016; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2010), 
but with a much larger sample, thus addressing some concerns about statistical power in 
psychological research (Abraham & Russell, 2008). Faces making eye contact did break 
through faster than faces looking elsewhere, however, as argued above, these results could 
still be caused by criterion differences. Therefore, we ran Experiment 2 with our new 
method. If response-time differences found in b-CFS studies are due to sensitivity, then 
greater sensitivity to direct than averted gaze should be found, even when exposure 
durations are the same for both types of stimulus. Indeed, the results of Experiment 2 
showed an advantage for direct gaze in both location detection and gaze-direction 
identification, suggesting that eye contact made faces break through faster due to 
preferential unconscious processing. This effect was statistically significant, but not very 
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large; nonetheless, our results are consistent with the advantage seen in b-CFS studies 
being due to perceptual sensitivity. In addition, participants exhibited a more liberal 
criterion for reporting direct gaze in the gaze direction identification task – i.e. they were 
more willing to report that a face had a direct gaze when it was upright.  
These findings highlight the two main benefits of our method. First, the utility of 
using predetermined exposure durations instead of self-terminated trials to reduce the 
differential effects of criterion and response bias, and secondly, the importance of 
measuring decision criterion to test for variables other than sensitivity that could affect 
responses. 
Interestingly, in both of our studies, the eye-contact effect was not disrupted by 
face inversion, both when measuring RTs (Experiment 1) and location sensitivity 
(Experiment 2). This consistent finding has important implications for understanding the 
nature of the eye-contact effect. Prior work using b-CFS RTs interpreted this result as an 
indication that gaze processing occurs in earlier-stage processing, prior to configural (or 
‘holistic’) processing (Chen & Yeh, 2012; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011). Similarly, we would 
argue that this finding implies that gaze direction influences sensitivity to low-level visual 
features of the images, rather than face-specific processing. This is based on the reasoning 
that turning a face upside down ought to disrupt its high-level configural processing, but 
not the processing of low-level features (Farah et al., 1995; Goodrich & Yonelinas, 2019; 
Jiang et al., 2007; Stein et al., 2012; Yin, 1969). Our results may therefore indicate that 
face detection relies on low-level local features (including those that are associated with 
different gaze directions), and is thus not disrupted by inversion, whereas identification of 
gaze-direction depends on configural processing that is disrupted by inversion. This may 
be explained by the different nature of the tasks – while localisation could simply require 
comparing contrast differences between the two sides of the screen, gaze-direction 
identification requires configural face information to determine where the face is looking. 
Therefore, as we found in the localisation task, the eye-contact effect should be preserved 
regardless of the face’s orientation. 
Unlike prior work on b-CFS, our method also allowed us to separately measure 
both detection of a face and identification of that face (in terms of gaze direction). In 
prior b-CFS work, response-time differences have been commonly taken as an estimate 
of detection processes alone; however, participants in those tasks may not have been able 
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to suppress identification processes when reporting the presence of a stimulus, and this 
therefore makes it difficult to confidently isolate the two processes. Asking participants 
to detect the location of the face and to identify its gaze direction allows us to describe 
more specifically how faces reach awareness and whether any condition exhibits an 
unconscious processing advantage. Crucially, doing so also allowed us to measure 
criterion differences for identification, which, as explained above, might have affected 
breakthrough times in b-CFS procedures. Therefore, our method presents several 
advantages over the b-CFS procedure and may be a better choice when testing for 
differences in unconscious processing of visual stimuli. 
One potential limitation of our method is the fact using a single response to report 
two stimulus features – face location and gaze direction – may have induced greater task 
complexity than the single detection response required in b-CFS studies. Importantly, this 
additional complexity did not seem to have had a detrimental effect on participants’ ability 
to make perceptual judgements, as indicated by the consistent main effects of exposure 
duration and finding both eye-contact and face-inversion effects on localisation. 
A limitation of our study, however, is that we used the same face stimuli employed 
in previous studies that tested for the eye-contact effect (Akechi et al., 2014; Madipakkam 
et al., 2015, 2019; Seymour et al., 2016; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011), limiting the 
generalisability of our results to other face stimuli, especially if they differ from ours in 
low-level local features. Future studies should address this issue by including new stimulus 
sets. 
Finally, as described above, our results suggest that the eye-contact effect may rely 
predominantly on low-level processing, as it does not seem to require holistic face 
processing to happen. These results challenge the notion that perceptual advantages 
related to socially-important features require perceptual integration (Ashwin et al., 2015; 
Palmer et al., 2018; Zaki, 2013; but see Vrancken et al., 2017). Future studies should 
further clarify what the nature of the eye-contact effect is: high-level or low-level. This 
may be especially relevant for studies with clinical populations. For example, b-CFS 
studies have reported that the eye-contact effect is preserved in schizophrenia (Seymour 
et al., 2016) but impaired in autism (Akechi et al., 2014). Determining the nature of this 
effect and its specific underlying neural mechanisms may help clarify the source of this 
impairment. 
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In summary, we developed a new procedure to study unconscious face processing. 
This procedure addresses the limitations of the most popular recent method used for this: 
the b-CFS procedure. Using our method, we found two effects that have also been 
reported with b-CFS: an advantage in detection of direct-gaze over averted-gaze faces 
(eye-contact effect) and of upright over inverted faces (face-inversion effect); but unlike 
with b-CFS, we found these effects by measuring sensitivity directly, controlling for both 
response bias and criterion differences. Critically, the fact that our findings confirm these 
previously-reported effects does not mean that all b-CFS results are reliable; on the 
contrary – it means that all b-CFS findings (including, and especially, the ones that have 
not failed replication attempts) should be submitted to rigorous methods to establish 
whether they are attributable to effects on perceptual sensitivity, decision criterion, or 
both. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3 DISENTANGLING PERCEPTUAL SENSITIVITY FROM 
DECISION CRITERION IN THE DETECTION OF EMOTIONAL 
EXPRESSIONS ACCESSING AWARENESS 
 
3.1    Introduction 
Facility at perceiving faces and interpreting their expressions is a critical social 
attribute, allowing us to quickly identify individuals, attribute mental states, and guess 
intentions behind actions (Grill-Spector et al., 2017; Jack & Schyns, 2015; Little et al., 
2011). In this context, the processing of emotional expressions is particularly key, and a 
number of studies suggest that different emotions are processed in special or distinct 
ways. For example, angry expressions are detected faster than non-threatening 
expressions (Fox et al., 2000; Krysko & Rutherford, 2009) and are more quickly 
discriminated from happy expressions than the other way around (Hansen & Hansen, 
1988). Furthermore, the presence of an angry or fearful face alone can enhance the 
detection of a target stimulus shown nearby (Fox, 2002; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003). A 
more controversial claim, however, is that the processing of emotional expressions can 
also happen without awareness. This claim derives from findings that faces with strong 
emotional expressions are more likely to break through the masking effects of different 
experimental suppression techniques (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007; Carlson & Reinke, 2008; 
Hedger et al., 2015; Sterzer et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2007).  
However, the most common and effective masking procedure used to obtain this 
finding (Breaking Continuous Flash Suppression, or b-CFS) does not distinguish 
perceptual sensitivity (the ability to discriminate between a signal and noise) from decision 
criterion (the willingness to report a signal). In b-CFS tasks, participants are presented 
with masked stimuli and are asked to report them as soon as they break through into 
awareness, thus letting participants decide how much information to be exposed to before 
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deciding to respond. In this chapter, we focus on the specific claim that emotional 
expressions reach awareness faster than neutral expressions. We test this claim by using 
the method we developed in Chapter 2, which addresses the problems inherent in b-CFS 
by assessing detection sensitivity, identification sensitivity, and decision criteria to faces 
presented for predetermined exposure durations. 
 Multiple studies have claimed that faces and their emotional expressions can be 
processed without awareness, based on evidence from Continuous Flash Suppression 
(CFS), a strong interocular suppression procedure that renders stimuli (like faces) invisible 
by presenting them only to one eye, while continuously flashing high-contrast Mondrian-
like masks to the other eye. In the b-CFS variant, participants are asked to report when 
the target stimulus breaks through suppression into awareness, and the time that the 
masked stimuli take to overcome suppression has been taken as an index of unconscious 
processing, with the assumption being that faster breakthrough times indicate faster, more 
efficient, or higher priority unconscious processing. This technique has been used to 
investigate unconscious processing of various aspects of faces, including both low- and 
high-level facial information. Holistic face processing – processing faces as a whole – is 
an example of the latter, and was addressed by Jiang et al. (2007), who found that upright 
faces break through suppression faster than inverted faces, thus suggesting when faces’ 
whole configuration is intact, they are prioritised in their unconscious processing. This 
finding has been replicated multiple times (Akechi et al., 2015; Kobylka et al., 2017; 
Moors, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2016; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011). 
The b-CFS method has provided significant amounts of evidence for unconscious 
processing of another high-level feature: emotional expression. Yang et al. (2007) found 
that fearful expressions broke through suppression faster than neutral expressions, which 
suggests that emotional information can be extracted unconsciously, and this finding has 
been repeatedly replicated as well. For example, Yang & Yeh (2018) also found that fearful 
expressions broke through faster than neutral expressions, and that turning faces upside 
down increased breakthrough times overall. In addition, Capitão et al. (2014) tested 
whether anxiety can affect breakthrough times of fearful, happy and neutral expressions. 
While they found a main effect of expression, they only found an advantage of fearful 
expressions over happy expressions, unlike in the original report by Yang et al. (2007), 
which found an advantage of fearful expressions over neutral and happy expressions. 
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Nevertheless, Capitão et al. (2014) showed an effect of emotion over breakthrough times, 
with shorter breakthrough times for fearful expressions than happy expressions. In 
addition, they found a modulation of anxiety over differences in breakthrough times 
between fearful and happy faces, expressed by a correlation between higher trait anxiety 
scores and an increased speed to detect fearful compared to happy expressions. These 
results suggest differential unconscious emotion processing. Finally, Sterzer et al. (2011) 
tested whether breakthrough times to fearful, happy, sad, and neutral expressions vary 
between healthy participants and participants diagnosed with major depressive disorder 
(MDD). They measured breakthrough times of fearful, happy, sad, and neutral 
expressions. Then, they estimated the differences between each emotional expression and 
neutral expressions for each individual; they found a reduction of breakthrough times of 
sad expressions and an increase in breakthrough times of happy expressions, thus 
exhibiting a different pattern of findings than previous non-clinical b-CFS studies. 
Therefore, their results suggest differential unconscious emotion processing as well, due 
to MDD. Thus, these studies also suggest that emotional information can be extracted 
unconsciously. Furthermore, clinical studies such as Sterzer et al.'s (2011) and Capitão et 
al. (2014), which showed that both anxiety and depressive symptoms can influence 
suppression times, suggest not only that this effect of emotional expression is real but 
also that it interacts with participants’ personal characteristics. 
However, the interpretation of these findings is quite controversial, and not every 
study has replicated the original findings. For example, Stein & Sterzer (2012) found that 
happy expressions broke through suppression faster than neutral, angry, and sad 
expressions when using schematic faces. Importantly, though, their results showed that 
this effect was driven by a low-level confound in the mouth area. By creating positive 
(happy) and negative (sad) schematic faces with maximised mouth-contour congruency 
and incongruency, respectively, they found shorter breakthrough times for happy 
expressions even when the subjective impression of a face was greatly diminished by 
replacing the eyes with another line. These results suggest that this effect is driven by a 
low-level confound, which led the researchers to question whether faster detection in b-
CFS tasks really involves dedicated face- or emotion-specific processes. Several possible 
mechanisms have been suggested to explain what drives findings such as the faster 
breakthrough of fearful than neutral expressions – whether this advantage relies on high-
level information (e.g. emotional content), low-level information (e.g. differences in 
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contrast or line curvature; Gray et al., 2013; Hedger et al., 2015, 2019; Stein & Sterzer, 
2012), or might be a result of decision criteria rather than perceptual sensitivity, as we 
argued in Chapter 2. 
These worries about the validity of b-CFS studies of emotional expressions mirror 
two broader sets of methodological concerns about the b-CFS method. The first concern 
is that many studies using this methodology have failed to replicate, or at least have been 
shown to be highly sensitive to very particular analytic decisions, mirroring broader 
concerns about replicability in psychological science. For example, Sklar et al. (2012) 
claimed that people could unconsciously understand the meanings of sentences and 
perform arithmetic operations; these findings either failed to replicate (Rabagliati et al., 
2018) or when they did replicate were not robust to different analytic strategies (Moors & 
Hesselmann, 2018). Similarly, findings of unconscious perceptual grouping (Wang et al., 
2012) and unconscious context-object integration (Mudrik et al., 2011) have also failed to 
subsequently replicate (Biderman & Mudrik, 2018; Moors, Boelens, et al., 2016; Moors, 
Wagemans, van Ee, et al., 2016). Thus, there are worries about the reliability of the b-CFS 
methodology in general. 
The second concern deals with what, precisely, b-CFS measures. An assumption 
of b-CFS studies is that differences in breakthrough time between conditions are solely 
due to differences in unconscious processing (Gayet et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2014). 
However, differences in breakthrough times could also be caused by differences in the 
criteria that participants use to make decisions about the stimuli, i.e. their willingness to 
report a signal. Notably, breakthrough from CFS unfolds over a brief – but not immediate 
– time period; typically, a small part of the suppressed stimulus breaks through first, and 
visibility then expands to the rest of the stimulus. The amount of breakthrough that a 
participant requires in order to commit to reporting the stimulus may vary by condition. 
For example, participants may possess the same perceptual sensitivity to each emotional 
expression category, but may be more willing (or require the accumulation of less 
information) to report that they have seen a fearful expression than a neutral expression, 
and thus report the former faster, even if both stimuli take the same time to break through 
suppression. 
To account for this, prior studies have used two solutions. One is to include a 
control condition that aims to precisely mimic the experience of a b-CFS task, without 
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actually using CFS, such as by measuring response times to stimuli that are superimposed 
upon Mondrian masks (Akechi et al., 2014; Costello et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2007; Li & 
Li, 2015; Madipakkam et al., 2015; Mudrik et al., 2011; Paffen et al., 2018; Stein & Sterzer, 
2012; Zhou et al., 2010). But these control conditions usually differ from experimental 
conditions in multiple ways, e.g. visible targets are much easier to distinguish than 
suppressed ones (Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011), which is known to affect decision criteria 
(Charles et al., 2013; also see Chapter 2) and may do so differentially for different stimulus 
categories. As a consequence, the masked and unmasked conditions will differ in 
breakthrough time distributions – b-CFS RTs exhibit more spread and longer tails than 
their non-rivalrous counterparts (Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011), suggesting that the central 
assumption of this control – that conditions without suppression are similar to the 
experimental conditions in everything but the suppression – is not valid. 
The second solution is to ask participants to perform a task that is orthogonal to 
the experimental manipulation, with the assumption that participants will ignore task-
irrelevant features and thus their RTs will not be affected by criterion differences (Gayet 
et al., 2016; Salomon et al., 2013). For example, Gayet et al. (2016) asked participants to 
report the orientation of Gabor patches (irrelevant manipulation) whilst testing for an 
effect of the patches’ annulus colours on suppression times. Nonetheless, with this 
approach participants may still integrate aspects of ignored features into their criteria, 
which can impact breakthrough times. It is simply not possible to determine what factors 
will affect participants’ criteria in a task that allows them to decide for themselves how 
much information to collect before committing to a response.  
In Chapter 2, we developed a method to circumvent these issues by specifically 
disentangling perceptual sensitivity from decision criterion in b-CFS tasks. This method 
employs Signal Detection Theoretic (SDT) indices, which allow measurement of both 
detection and identification sensitivity, in addition to decision criteria for each (Macmillan 
& Creelman, 2004). Measuring detection and identification separately allows us to test for 
identification processes that may contribute to performance in a method where detection 
and identification are not measured individually, such as in b-CFS tasks. Our method 
employs predetermined increasing exposure durations, allowing the experimenter to 
control the amount of visual information participants receive. Therefore, unlike b-CFS, 
this method can track changes in different types of sensitivity and criterion as the available 
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amount of information increases, thus providing a more comprehensive view of how 
different stimulus categories enter awareness. 
Here we use this method to explore whether emotional expressions such as 
fearful, happy, and angry expressions break through suppression faster than neutral 
expressions, with an emphasis on the claim that fearful expressions are prioritised over 
neutral expressions (Yang et al., 2007). While the effect of fearful expressions has been 
replicated several times (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007; Capitão et al., 2014; Carlson & Reinke, 
2008; Sterzer et al., 2011; Yang & Yeh, 2018), its interpretation is still unclear: As 
mentioned above, participants could have exhibited shorter breakthrough times for 
fearful faces due to a more liberal criterion rather than a difference in perceptual sensitivity 
– they could simply need less time to commit to report a fearful expression. Moreover, 
the concerns detailed above about the replicability of b-CFS studies mean that it is 
important to replicate this finding under more stringent conditions. 
 Thus, our studies aimed to better-understand the degree to which emotional 
expressions break through CFS faster than non-emotional expressions, and the 
mechanisms by which such an effect occurs. In our task, participants saw faces for 
predetermined exposure durations, and we varied their expression (fearful, angry, happy, 
and neutral) and, in some of the experiments below, their orientation (upright or inverted). 
At the end of each trial, participants reported, with a single keypress, both the location of 
the face (left or right) and its expression (emotional or non-emotional). We used these 
responses to determine participants’ sensitivity and criterion for both face location 
(left/right side of screen – a measure of detection) and expression category 
(emotional/non-emotional expression – a measure of identification). In the first two 
experiments, we tested whether angry (Experiment 3) and fearful expressions 
(Experiment 4) break through suppression faster than happy and neutral expressions. In 
the second pair of experiments, we verified that our method is sufficiently sensitive to 
detect modulatory effects on breakthrough, by replicating the face-inversion effect (FIE) 
we had obtained in Experiment 2 of Chapter 2. The FIE is a detection or identification 
advantage of upright faces over inverted faces (Farah et al., 1995; Goodrich & Yonelinas, 
2019; Rakover & Teucher, 1997), that has repeatedly found with b-CFS studies (Akechi 
et al., 2015; Kobylka et al., 2017; Moors, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2016; Stein, Senju, et al., 
2011). Having verified in Chapter 2 that our method is sensitive enough to detect this 
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effect, we examined whether the FIE is modulated by the emotional content of fearful 
(Experiment 5) and happy (Experiment 6) expressions, compared to neutral faces. In 
these experiments, we measured detection through a two-alternative forced-choice 
(2AFC) task by presenting the stimuli to one of two possible screen locations. In 
Experiment 7, we replaced our 2AFC task with a Yes-No detection task, in order to 
measure detection more closely to how it was measured in original b-CFS reports on 
unconscious emotion processing. Finally, in Experiment 8 we addressed the concern that 
our predetermined durations may be sufficiently distant from each other to miss – 
completely or partially – the relevant window of durations at which an effect of emotion 
arises; to prevent this, we used a staircase procedure to estimate breakthrough thresholds 
for fearful and neutral expressions presented both in upright and inverted orientations. 
In summary, we present a methodologically rigorous assessment of whether 
emotional expressions break through CFS faster, and which factor – sensitivity, criterion, 
or both – might be responsible for such faster breakthrough. If emotional expressions 
reach awareness faster than non-emotional expressions, then we should find better 
sensitivity for the former than the latter. But even if we found such difference in 
sensitivity, it would not necessarily mean that sensitivity fully accounts for b-CFS findings. 
Differences in criterion could influence findings too. If criterion differences account for 
b-CFS findings on unconscious emotion processing, then we should find more liberal 
criteria for fearful and angry expressions than for other expressions, i.e. participants would 
be more willing to report fearful and angry expressions than other expressions. 
Furthermore, if b-CFS findings can be fully attributed to criterion differences, we should 
find no sensitivity differences whereas if they can only be partly attributed to criterion 
differences, we should find both a more liberal criterion and a higher sensitivity for fearful 
expressions when compared to other expressions. In summary, these studies allowed us 
to determine to what extent sensitivity and criterion, measured separately, could have 
contributed to b-CFS findings on unconscious emotion processing. 
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3.2    Experiment 3 
In this experiment, participants saw multiple blocks of faces presented for 
different durations, always masked by CFS. Each block contained either angry and neutral 
expressions, or happy and neutral expressions. If angry expressions genuinely break 
suppression faster, then sensitivity to angry faces should be greater than either happy or 
neutral expressions, probably between 2 and 3 s in average, as shown by breakthrough 
times in b-CFS studies (Gray et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2007). 
 
3.2.1 Method 
 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-four University of Edinburgh students provided informed consent and 
were paid £14 for participation. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
reported no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. Two participants were 
excluded from analysis (see Analysis section below): the remaining 32 participants (17 
female; 2 left-handed) had a mean age of 23.5 (SDage = 3.8). All the studies reported here 
were approved by the Psychology Research Ethics Committee of the University of 
Edinburgh. 
Past b-CFS studies that have found statistically significant effects of emotional 
expression on breakthrough times employed around 16 participants per experiment (e.g. 
Yang, et al., 2007). We decided to double this number to increase power and allow 
counterbalancing of experimental blocks with a multiple of 8 (see Procedure section). A 
retrospective power analysis, conducted using G*Power 3.1.9.7 (Faul et al., 2009), to test 
for a difference between conditions in a repeated-measures ANOVA, with a small to 
medium effect size (ηp2 = .04) and alpha of .05, aiming to achieve a statistical power of 
95%, determined that a sample of 19 participants would be required. If a non-sphericity 
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correction ε of .5 were to be added – as reported in the results section, a number of tests 
violated this assumption – then a sample of 29 participants would be required. 
 
3.2.1.2 Stimuli and Apparatus 
In all experiments, stimuli were presented on a 19-inch CRT monitor in a dimly 
lit room, connected to a computer running Matlab 2014a (Mathworks, Inc) using the 
Cogent 2000 toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php). A chin rest and mirror 
stereoscope were positioned 57 cm from the monitor, with a vertical divider splitting the 
display so each eye only saw half of the screen. 
To maintain binocular alignment, two vertical textured vergence bars (width 1°, 
height 8°) appeared to the left and right of fixation in each eye (horizontal centre-to-centre 
distance 3.1°) such that only one pair of vergence bars was perceived. A black fixation 
cross (0.7° × 0.7°) was presented in the centre of each pair of vergence bars. Grey 
Mondrian-like masks were flashed at 10 Hz to one eye while a face stimulus was 
introduced to the other eye. 
Stimuli were 60 human faces taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional 
Faces (KDEF) database (Goeleven et al., 2008), all seen from a front angle, and classified 
as either angry (20), happy (20), or neutral (20) expressions. Images were cropped to show 
only the internal facial features and transformed to greyscale. Luminance was equated for 
all the resulting images using the Matlab SHINE toolbox (Willenbockel et al., 2010). 
Finally, background colour was replaced with uniform grey matching the screen’s 
background colour (see Appendix B). Stimuli were then sorted into 6 different sets, 2 for 
each facial expression. Using the KDEF norms, we matched sets for expression 
identification, intensity, and arousal, as well as gender. Our stimuli present two advantages 
over those used in prior studies: they are more numerous (previous studies used between 
4 and 8, Capitão et al., 2014; Gray et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2007; Yang & Yeh, 2018) and 
are matched in expression identification (Mangry = 85%; [SDangry = 16.87]; Mhappy = 94.6% 
[6.14]; Mneutral = 83.02% [8.36]) and intensity (Mangry = 5.68; [0.93]; Mhappy = 5.85 [0.69]; 
Mneutral = 5.15 [0.41]; not all b-CFS studies did this (e.g. Capitão et al., 2014 and Yang et 
al., 2007 did not). 
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3.2.1.3 Procedure 
Each trial began with a fixation cross, presented binocularly at the centre of each 
eye’s visual field between two vergence bars, allowing participants to maintain stable 
binocular vergence. After 200 ms, the fixation cross remained superimposed on both 
screens, but a changing Mondrian-like mask was presented to one eye; 200 ms later a face 
image was introduced to the other eye either to the left or to the right side of the fixation 
cross (Figure 3.1a). For half of the participants, their left eye was assigned to receive the 
mask and their right eye to receive the stimulus. Following the procedure developed by 
Yang et al. (2007), the face image’s contrast ramped up linearly from 0% to 25% over 1 
second (s) after which its contrast remained stable. Emotional expression was blocked (70 
trials/block) with block order counterbalanced across participants in an ABBABAAB 
BAABABBA order. Thus, participants went through blocks of angry/neutral and 
happy/neutral expressions. Stimuli were presented for one of seven predefined durations, 
spaced equally on a log scale (600; 900; 1350; 2025; 3038; 4557; 6836 ms), with an equal 
number of trials for each duration. This range of exposure durations was determined in 
piloting sessions that used exposures of 500 – 8000 ms. On trials in which stimulus 
presentation was shorter than 1 s, termination of presentation curtailed the change in 
contrast. On longer trials, face contrast remained at 100% until the end of the trial. The 
Mondrian-like masks consisted of fields of grey circles with randomly differing sizes, grey-
levels, rotation, and position, changing at a rate of 10 Hz. After 1 s, the mask’s contrast 
began decreasing linearly until reaching zero at 6 s (Figure 3.1b). 
Participants were instructed to focus on the fixation cross with both eyes open, 
trying to avoid blinking and looking around. After the end of each stimulus presentation, 
four question marks were presented on the screen, replacing the fixation cross. 
Participants were instructed to report the location of the face image and whether its 
expression was emotional or non-emotional, by pressing one of four keys (left control 
and left shift to report that the face was on the left, down arrow and up arrow to report 
it was on the right; the top or bottom key on each side was used to denote an emotional 
face, with the other denoting a neutral expression. The keys used to identify emotional 
expression were counterbalanced across participants, Figure 3.1c). The next trial began 
after a response was given or, if the participant did not respond, after a 2 s response 
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window. Following this response, a screen showing only the vergence bars was presented 
for an ITI of 1000 ms before the next trial began. Participants were given self-terminated 
breaks every 70 trials and a compulsory 15-minute break halfway through the experiment. 
Before beginning the experiment, participants completed 60 training trials to ensure that 
the stereoscope was properly calibrated and that they had understood the task, as done in 
some past CFS studies (Gayet et al., 2020; Schlossmacher et al., 2017; Wormwood et al., 
2019; Yang et al., 2007; Zhou et al., 2010). 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Schematic description of a trial in experiments 3 through 6. (a) Stimulus 
introduction and CFS. The duration of each display was chosen from seven equally likely 
exposure durations: 600, 900, 1350, 2025, 3038, 4557, or 6836 ms. (b) Changes in contrast. 
The contrast of the target image increased linearly until reaching 25% contrast at 1 s. 
Then, contrast remained unchanged until the end of the display. Mondrian-like patterns 
started at 60% contrast until reaching 1 s, after which contrast linearly decreased until 
reaching 0% at 6 s of exposure. (c) Detection/identification task. Following stimulus 
offset, participants were presented with a binocular response cue composed of question 
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marks. Participants provided a single response to indicate both on which side of the 
fixation the face had been shown and whether its expression was emotional or neutral. 
 
3.2.1.4 Analysis 
We excluded data from two participants, one who failed to respond on more than 
5% of trials, and one who did not become more accurate on the task as exposure time 
increased (accuracy at chance level), suggesting that they failed to attend to the task. Trials 
that received no response were treated as missing data. 
To assess how perceptual sensitivity to visual information and response criteria 
change across display durations, we calculated signal-detection measures.  
First, we examined reports on the faces’ location. To determine each participant’s 
bias-independent sensitivity to face location (location d’) for each combination of 
duration and emotional expression, we employed the calculation for 2AFC tasks 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 2004), 𝑑′ location = (
1
√2
) (𝑍(𝐻𝑖𝑡location) − 𝑍(𝐹𝐴location)), where Z(Hit) 
stands for the Z score associated with the probability of a Hit (defined as a trial in which 
a face was displayed on the right and reported on the right), and Z(FA) for the Z score 
associated with the probability of a false alarm (a trial in which a face was displayed on 
the left but reported on the right). To estimate each participant’s bias to respond left or 
right (henceforth referred to as response bias) during face location, we employed the 
calculation 𝐶location = − (
1
2
) (𝑍(𝐻𝑖𝑡location) + 𝑍(𝐹𝐴location)). Positive and negative values for 
this measure indicate a bias toward responding “left” and “right”, respectively; however, 
as these may cancel out across participants, we converted the results to absolute values as 
a measure of overall amount of response bias.  
Second, we analysed judgments of whether an emotional expression had been 
shown, defining emotional expression (angry or happy, depending on the block) as the 
signal, and neutral expressions as signal-absent. To determine expression identification 
sensitivity, we used the calculation of d’ for Yes/No detection tasks, 𝑑′ identification =
𝑍(𝐻𝑖𝑡identification) − 𝑍(𝐹𝐴identification), where a hit was defined as correctly reporting an 
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emotional expression and an FA was defined as incorrectly reporting a neutral expression 
as emotional. To estimate each participant’s criterion during expression identification, we 
employed the calculation 𝐶identification = − (
1
2
) (𝑍(𝐻𝑖𝑡identification) + 𝑍(𝐹𝐴identification)), where 
positive/negative values indicate a greater bias to report seeing an emotional expression. 
Thus, location d’, response bias, expression identification d’, and emotion decision 
criterion were estimated for each combination of emotional expression and exposure 
duration. Subsequently, a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run on 
each measure to test for differences between emotion conditions as exposure duration 
increased. Wherever Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was 
violated, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates. Where 
null results were of theoretical interest, we calculated Bayes factors to evaluate the strength 
of the evidence for the null. 
Both frequentist (ANOVA and t-tests) and Bayesian (Bayes factors) statistical 
analyses were performed using Jamovi (The jamovi project, 2020) and JASP (JASP Team, 
2020), and corroborated using R and SPSS. When an ANOVA indicated a significant 
interaction, we ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons to look for 
significant effects. Post hoc pairwise comparisons in these statistical packages use 
estimated marginal means based on the variance of the ANOVA model. For Bayes factor 
analysis, we defined the null hypothesis as no difference between conditions by using a 
standard Cauchy distribution centred on zero with rate of 0.707. 
 
3.2.2 Results 
 
3.2.2.1 Location sensitivity 
We calculated mean location d’ scores for angry, happy, and neutral expressions. 
Since we obtained two different d’ scores for neutral expressions as there were twice the 
amount of neutral-expression trials than of angry-expression and happy-expression trials, 
we collapsed neutral expression trials into one condition, making three conditions in total 
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(𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑦 = 1.196 [1.027]; 𝑀ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 = 1.236 [1.053]; 𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 = 1.178 [1.026]). To 
confirm that our decision to collapse neutral trials was justified, we compared whether 
location d’ scores for neutral trials did not differ across the two block types, using a 2 
(neutral-expression trial groups) × 7 (exposure durations) into a repeated-measures 
ANOVA. There was no effect of trial group (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.520, 𝑝 = .476, ηp2 =
.017). However, given that absence of a significant effect cannot be taken as evidence of 
a null effect, we also estimated Bayes factors. The results suggest that the data are 
substantially better explained under the null hypothesis model (BF01 = 9.317), thus 
supporting our decision to collapse neutral trials. 
In the main analysis, we examined whether participants’ sensitivity to the location 
of suppressed faces varied across the emotion conditions and exposure durations by 
entering location d’ data into a 3 (expression: angry, happy, neutral) × 7 (exposure 
durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. As Figure 3.2a shows, location d’ increased with 
increasing exposure duration (𝐹(2.77, 85.74) = 104.537, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .771), such that 
participants were close to ceiling at the longest exposure durations. Our key question, 
however, was whether sensitivity levels would differ across the different facial 
expressions, either overall or in interaction with exposure duration. However, we did not 
find a main effect of expressions, meaning that the emotional expression of the faces did 
not significantly affect participants’ sensitivity (𝐹(1.73, 53.78) = 2.422, 𝑝 = .105, ηp2 =
.072). The interaction between expression and exposure duration did not reach 
significance either (𝐹(7.71, 239) = 0.831, 𝑝 = .572, ηp2 = .026). To quantify whether these 
latter null results provide evidence for the null hypothesis, we used Bayes factors. We 
found very strong evidence for the null hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 = 46.825), i.e. no effect 
of expression on location d’. Thus, this first analysis provided no evidence that faces with 
emotional expressions have preferential access to awareness. 
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Figure 3.2. Results of Experiment 3. (a) Location sensitivity. Location d’ increased with 
exposure duration, but there was no difference among expressions. (b) Response bias. 
Absolute-value response bias scores for reporting location decreased with increasing 
exposure durations, but there was no difference between expressions. (c) Expression 
identification sensitivity. Expression identification d’ increased with exposure duration; 
there was higher sensitivity to happy faces than angry faces at 6836 ms of exposure. (d) 
Expression identification criterion. Identification criterion became more liberal with 
increasing exposure durations; happy faces exhibited a significantly more liberal criterion 
than angry faces. Asterisks index statistically significant differences (p < .05) between 
emotional expressions. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
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3.2.2.2 Location Response Bias 
d’ is a bias-independent measure of discrimination between signal and noise – it 
is not affected by any response bias participants might have, for instance a bias towards 
responding ‘right’. Thus, we next examined whether the stimuli may have affected 
participants’ biases. Specifically, we entered the absolute values of response bias scores 
into a 3 (expression: angry, happy, neutral) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. We found a main effect of exposure duration – response bias significantly 
decreased with increasing exposure durations suggesting that response bias decreases as 
visibility increases (𝐹(1.97, 61.17) = 14.515, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .319), (Figure 3.2b). However, 
we did not find a main effect of emotional expression, suggesting that emotional 
expression did not affect response bias (𝐹(1.88, 58.24) = 1.198, 𝑝 = .307, ηp2 = .037). To 
assess whether the evidence supports this null hypothesis, we estimated Bayes factors, 
which indicated very strong support for the null hypothesis of expression, i.e. no effect 
of emotional expression on response bias (𝐵𝐹01 = 37.885). Similarly, we estimated 
Bayes factors to assess whether the evidence supports a null hypothesis of no interaction. 
We found extreme support for the null hypothesis of no interaction (𝐵𝐹01 > 100). 
 
3.2.2.3 Expression identification sensitivity 
We examined whether participants’ sensitivity to identifying the emotional 
expression of the suppressed face varied across the two emotions assessed and exposure 
duration conditions. Recall that here, identification sensitivity describes the ability to 
distinguish emotional expressions from neutral expressions. We entered identification d’ 
scores to a 2 (emotional expression: angry, happy) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-
measures ANOVA. As Figure 3.2c shows, identification d’ scores increased with 
increasing exposure duration (𝐹(2.69, 83.29) = 81.23, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .724), such that 
participants were close to ceiling at the longest exposure durations. In addition, we found 
a main effect of expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 4.47, 𝑝 = .043, ηp2 = .126): happy expressions 
exhibited an advantage over angry expressions (𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑦 = 0.981 [1.387]; 𝑀ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 =
1.121 [1.619]). The interaction between expression and exposure duration also reached 
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significance (𝐹(4.21, 130.51) = 4.37, 𝑝 = .002, ηp2 = .124). To examine this interaction in 
more detail, we ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons between the two 
expressions at each exposure duration. These tests revealed that the advantage of happy 
expressions over angry expressions was only significant at 6836 ms of exposure 
(𝑡(149) =  −3.672, 𝑝 = .03, 𝑑 = −0.649). Thus, while emotional expressions did 
not affect judgments of where a face was, they did affect the ability to judge what 
expression the face showed: there was greater sensitivity to the emotional content of 
happy expressions than angry expressions at long exposure durations. 
 
3.2.2.4 Expression decision criterion 
As discussed in the Introduction, one potential explanation for past findings that 
emotional expressions have preferential access to awareness, is that emotional expressions 
like anger might enjoy a more liberal identification criterion than positive ones. Thus, we 
tested how participant’s identification criteria varied across expressions and exposure 
durations. We entered identification criterion scores into a 2 (expression: angry, happy) × 
7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. Participants’ willingness to report an 
emotional expression (indexed by lower criterion scores) increased with increasing 
exposure durations, as evidenced by a main effect of exposure duration (𝐹(1.65, 51.03) =
7.66, 𝑝 = .002, ηp2 = .198). Crucially, participants also exhibited a significantly more 
liberal criterion for happy expressions than for angry expressions, as shown by the main 
effect of expression (𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑦 = 0.276 [0.564]; 𝑀ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 = 0.145 [0.549]; 𝐹(1, 31) =
19.80, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .390), (Figure 3.2d). The interaction did not reach significance 
(𝐹(3.95, 122.49) = 1.71, 𝑝 = .153, ηp2 = .052). To assess whether the evidence supports this 
null effect, we estimated Bayes factors, which indicated very strong support for the null 
hypothesis, i.e. no significant interaction between expression and exposure duration 
(BF01 = 63.502). 
These results demonstrate that participants exhibited a more liberal criterion for 
the identification of happy expressions than of angry expressions. 
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3.2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 3 tested whether emotional expressions enjoy priority over non-
emotional ones during unconscious processing, using a methodologically stricter variant 
on the breaking Continuous Flash Suppression paradigm. This method allowed us to 
control for a concern about previous studies which have reported shorter breakthrough 
times for emotional over non-emotional expressions – that these results could be due to 
criterion differences rather than perceptual sensitivity. If that were the case, with this more 
stringent procedure we should expect no difference between emotional and non-
emotional expressions in perceptual sensitivity. On the other hand, a more liberal 
identification criterion should be found for emotional expressions such as angry faces. 
Our data supported this latter prediction: sensitivity to the location of a suppressed face 
did not vary based upon its emotional expression. 
By asking participants to identify each face’s expression, we measured their 
identification sensitivity. Surprisingly, we found that participants exhibited better 
sensitivity for happy expressions than angry expressions, i.e. the former were easier to 
identify from their neutral counterparts than the latter. Based on past b-CFS findings, 
which showed shorter breakthrough times to negative expressions over neutral and 
positive ones, we expected both better identification sensitivity and a more liberal 
criterion for angry expressions than happy ones. However, it is important to note that the 
identification advantage of happy expressions over angry ones only reached significance 
at the longest exposure duration, once CFS masks had disappeared. Hence, this effect 
could have been driven by inherent differences between happy and angry expressions in 
the KDEF stimuli set – despite having minimised these differences during stimuli 
selection, the happy expressions selected had higher emotion recognition than angry ones, 
which fits this stimuli set’s norms (see: Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008; Goeleven et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, the fact that we found a more liberal decision criterion for happy over angry 
expressions – meaning that participants were more willing to report a happy expression 
than an angry expression – reinforces the idea that post-perceptual factors could affect 
detection responses. As argued in the Introduction, b-CFS response times do not 
distinguish between detection and identification – participants decide for themselves 
when to give a response. If their response times are confounded by identification 
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processes, then differences in decision criterion for expression identification may affect 
those response times, too. Thus, our data support the importance of disentangling 
detection from identification by showing that participants can exhibit differences in 
decision criteria. 
Our null finding regarding location sensitivity could indicate that no type of 
emotional expression has preferential access to awareness, however, it is also possible that 
the particular emotional expressions used here – happy versus angry – may not be ideal 
for eliciting the intended effect. In particular, the meta-analysis by Hedger et al. (2016) 
found that fearful expressions presented a more robust and consistent effect in b-CFS 
studies searching for differential unconscious emotion processing. Therefore, we 
replicated this study using fearful expressions rather than angry expressions. 
 
3.3    Experiment 4 
In this experiment, we tested whether fearful expressions make faces break through 
suppression faster than happy and neutral expressions. If fearful expressions enjoy an 
unconscious processing advantage over happy and neutral expressions as repeatedly 
reported in the literature (Capitão et al., 2014; Hedger et al., 2015; Oliver et al., 2015; 
Sterzer et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2007; Yang & Yeh, 2018; Zhan et al., 2015), higher 
detection and/or identification sensitivity should be found for fearful expressions than 
for the other expressions. If b-CFS findings were due to criterion differences, we may 
find more liberal identification criterion (i.e. willingness to report an emotional 
expression) for fearful expressions than for neutral expressions. As in the previous 
experiment, the hypotheses concerning sensitivity and criterion are not mutually 
exclusive. 
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3.3.1 Method 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-two students of the University of Edinburgh (19 female; 3 left-handed), 
with a mean age of 21.4 (SDage = 4.2), participated for a payment of £14. 
 
3.3.1.2 Stimuli and Procedure 
The methods were the same as in Experiment 3, except that fearful faces were 
employed instead of angry faces. These images were again selected from the KDEF 
database and matched to the happy and neutral faces on gender and expression 
identification while minimising differences in expression identification (Mfearful = 71%; 
[7.44]; Mhappy = 96.09% [4.49]; Mneutral = 65.1% [18.25]) and intensity (Mfearful = 5.82; [0.61]; 
Mhappy = 6.13 [0.84]; Mneutral = 4.85 [0.66]; Appendix B). They were all then equated in 
luminance with the Matlab SHINE toolbox, following the same processing procedure as 
in Experiment 3. 
 
3.3.2 Results 
3.3.2.1 Location sensitivity 
As in Experiment 3, we calculated mean location d’ scores for each condition. We 
started off by collapsing neutral trials into one condition as they did not differ between 
each other3. 
 
 
3 Location d’ scores again were entered into a 2 (neutral-expression trial groups) × 7 (exposure durations) 
repeated-measures ANOVA. As expected, we found a main effect of exposure duration (𝐹(2.39, 74.19) =
112.504, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .784), but we did not find a main effect of trial group (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.103, 𝑝 =
.750, ηp2 = .003). We did not find an interaction between trial group and exposure duration either 
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For the main analysis, we examined whether participants’ sensitivity to the 
location of the suppressed face varied across expression (𝑀𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑢𝑙 = 1.674 [𝑆𝐷 =
 0.941]; 𝑀ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 = 1.673 [0.947]; 𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 = 1.663 [0.942]) and exposure duration 
conditions. To this end, we entered location d’ scores into a 3 (expression: fearful, happy, 
neutral) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. As seen in Figure 3.3a, 
location sensitivity dramatically increased with increasing exposure duration (𝐹(2.09, 64.82) =
111.961, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .783). Neither the effect of expression (𝐹(1.84, 57.15) =
0.103, 𝑝 = .887, ηp2 = .003) nor the interaction between expression and exposure 
duration (𝐹(6.81, 211.26) = 1.042, 𝑝 = .402, ηp2 = .033) reached significance. These results 
suggest emotional expressions do not affect participants’ detection sensitivity. To quantify 
whether these latter null results provide evidence for the null hypothesis of expression 
(i.e. no difference between expressions), we estimated Bayes factors. We found very 
strong evidence in favour of the null hypothesis of expression (𝐵𝐹01 = 58.586), i.e. no 
difference among emotional expressions in location sensitivity. We also estimated Bayes 
factors for the null hypothesis model of no interaction between expression and exposure 
duration. We found extreme evidence in favour of the null hypothesis of no interaction 
(𝐵𝐹01 > 100). 
Therefore, these results suggest that emotional expressions do not enjoy higher 
sensitivity than non-emotional ones entering awareness. 
 
 
 
(𝐹(3.84, 119.12) = 0.048, 𝑝 = .995, ηp2 = .002). We also estimated Bayes factors; we defined the null 
hypothesis as no difference between neutral-expression conditions. Again, the results suggest the data are 
substantially better explained under the null hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 = 9.57). We also estimated Bayes 
factors for the null hypothesis of no interaction between trial group and exposure durations and found that 
the data are extremely better explained under it (𝐵𝐹01 > 100). Thus, the decision of collapsing neutral-
expression trials was justified. 
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Figure 3.3. Results of Experiment 4. (a) Location sensitivity. Location d’ increased with 
exposure duration, but there was no difference among expressions. (b) Response bias. 
Absolute-value response bias scores for reporting location decreased with increasing 
exposure durations, but there was no difference among expressions. (c) Expression 
identification sensitivity. Expression identification d’ increased with exposure duration; 
happy faces exhibited higher sensitivity than fearful faces. (d) Expression identification 
criterion. Identification criterion became more liberal with increasing exposure durations; 
happy faces exhibited a significantly more liberal criterion than fearful faces. Error bars 
represent 95% CI. 
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3.3.2.2 Location response bias 
We examined whether participants’ location responses varied across conditions 
by entering the absolute values of response bias scores into a 3 (expression: fearful, happy, 
neutral) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found a main effect 
of exposure duration – response bias significantly decreased with increasing exposure 
durations, suggesting that response bias decreases as visibility increases (𝐹(2.84, 88.13) =
8.001, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .205), (Figure 3.3b). However, we did not find a main effect of 
expression, suggesting that expression did not affect response bias (𝐹(1.74, 53.90) =
0.562, 𝑝 = .550, ηp2 = .018) or an interaction between expression and exposure 
duration (𝐹(8.19, 253.89) = 0.753, 𝑝 = .647, ηp2 = .024). Bayes factors analyses indicated 
very strong support for the null hypothesis of no effect of expression (𝐵𝐹01 = 35.461) 
and extreme support for the null hypothesis of no interaction between expression and 
exposure duration on response bias (𝐵𝐹01 > 100). 
 
3.3.2.3 Expression identification sensitivity 
We examined whether participants’ identification sensitivity varied across the 
expression (𝑀𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑢𝑙 = 1.566 [1.537]; 𝑀ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 = 1.746 [1.661]) and exposure 
duration conditions. We entered identification d’ scores into a 2 (expression: fearful, 
happy) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. Similar to Experiment 3, 
identification d’ scores dramatically increased with increasing exposure duration 
(𝐹(2.41, 74.7) = 76.89, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .713), such that participants were close to ceiling at 
the longest exposure duration (Figure 3.3c). In addition, we found a main effect of 
expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 9.86, 𝑝 = .004, ηp2 = .241), with an advantage of happy 
expressions over fearful expressions. The interaction between expression and exposure 
duration also reached significance (𝐹(5.32, 165.01) = 2.34, 𝑝 = .04, ηp2 = .07). Inspection of 
Figure 3.3c suggests that identification effect was larger at longer durations, but 
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons did not reveal significant differences between 
expressions for any of the exposure durations. Therefore, emotional expressions did 
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affect the ability to judge what expression the face showed: there was greater sensitivity 
to the emotional content of happy expressions than angry expressions. 
 
3.3.2.4 Expression decision criterion 
As in Experiment 3, we tested whether participant’s identification criteria varied 
across expressions and exposure durations. We entered expression criterion scores into a 
2 (expression: fearful, happy) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
Participants’ willingness to report an emotional expression (indexed by lower criterion 
scores) increased with increasing exposure durations, as evidenced by a main effect of 
exposure duration (𝐹(1.44, 44.58) = 7.54, 𝑝 = .004, ηp2 = .196), (Figure 3.3d). We also 
found evidence of a more liberal identification criterion for happy expressions than for 
fearful expressions (𝑀𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑢𝑙 = 0.276 [0.539]; 𝑀ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 = 0.145 [0.546]; 𝐹(1, 31) =
16.08, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .342). The interaction between expression and exposure 
duration did not reach significance (𝐹(5.09, 157.94) = 1.72, 𝑝 = .131, ηp2 = .053). To assess 
whether the evidence supports this null interaction, we estimated Bayes factors, which 
indicated very strong support for the null hypothesis, no significant interaction between 
expression and exposure duration (𝐵𝐹01 = 69.572). 
These results suggest that participants employed a more liberal criterion during 
the identification of happy expressions than of fearful expressions. 
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 4, like Experiment 3, did not find an advantage in location sensitivity 
for emotional expressions, this time using fearful instead of angry expressions. 
Importantly, the fact that neither angry nor fearful expressions gained access to awareness 
faster than happy or neutral expressions suggests that negative threatening faces do not 
enjoy priority in how they enter awareness. 
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However, and perhaps surprisingly, expression identification again exhibited 
higher sensitivity and a more liberal criterion for happy expressions than for fearful 
expressions. These results reinforce the idea that emotional expressions may not affect 
faces’ breakthrough times when suppressed by CFS. 
Similar to Experiment 3, Experiment 4 found better identification sensitivity for 
happy expressions than fearful expressions, and a more liberal decision criterion for happy 
expressions than fearful ones. Again, as argued in Experiment 3, these results stress the 
importance of disentangling detection from identification so post-perceptual factors that 
may affect the latter do not confound the former. 
Whilst the results of experiments 3 and 4 are consistent with each other, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that our procedure may not be sufficiently sensitive to 
capture effects of emotional expression on detection (location sensitivity). In order to test 
whether this is the case or not, we decided to run an experiment that allowed us to 
simultaneously test for an effect of emotional expression while also attempting to capture 
a different face-related effect that has been replicated several times in the b-CFS literature: 
the face-inversion effect (FIE). Multiple b-CFS studies have shown that upright faces 
have shorter breakthrough times than inverted faces (Akechi et al., 2015; Gayet & Stein, 
2017; Jiang et al., 2007; Kobylka et al., 2017; Moors, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2016; Stein, 
Senju, et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2010). Thus, combining a test of emotional expression with 
a test of face inversion can help us to calibrate the sensitivity of our method. 
In summary, our data indicate that location sensitivity increases with exposure 
duration, however, we were not able to replicate the emotion effect – of negative 
expressions (fearful expressions in this experiment) breaking through CFS faster than 
neutral expressions – reported by Yang et al. (2007). In other words, the probability of a 
face to break into awareness increased alongside exposure, but there was no differential 
access to awareness in favour of fearful expressions. To calibrate the sensitivity of our 
procedure and thus make sure it is sensitive to face processing effects, we add a face 
orientation manipulation to test the FIE in the next experiment. 
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3.4    Experiment 5 
In this experiment, we only used fearful and neutral facial expressions, but 
presented both in upright and inverted orientations. If our method is indeed sensitive to 
the properties of these stimuli, then we expect to see inversion affecting location 
judgments. 
3.4.1 Method 
 
3.4.1.1 Participants 
We recruited thirty-two University of Edinburgh students (17 female; 4 left-
handed) of mean age of 23.1 (SDage = 3.9), who were paid £14 for their participation. 
 
3.4.1.2 Stimuli and Procedure 
The methods were the same as in Experiment 3, except that we employed fearful 
(instead of angry) and neutral faces, in upright and inverted orientations. We selected all 
the stimuli images from the KDEF database again to ensure they could be matched on 
the criteria described in Experiment 3 while minimising differences in expression 
identification (Mfearful = 73.1%; [9.82]; Mneutral = 73.06% [13.34]) and intensity (Mfearful = 
5.9; [0.78]; Mneutral = 4.98 [0.54]; Appendix B). 
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3.4.2 Results 
 
3.4.2.1 Location sensitivity 
We examined whether participants’ sensitivity to the location of the suppressed 
face varied between emotional expression (𝑀𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑢𝑙 = 1.511 [0.981]; 𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 =
1.553 [1.011]), orientation (𝑀𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 1.623 [0.981]; 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 1.440 [1.009]), 
and exposure duration conditions. To this end, we entered location d’ scores into a 2 
(expression: fearful, neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 (exposure duration) 
repeated-measures ANOVA. As seen in Figure 3.4a, location d’ scores dramatically 
increased with increasing exposure duration (𝐹(2.05, 63.47) = 185.273, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 =
.857). As in Experiments 3 and 4, we did not find a main effect of expression 
(𝐹(1, 31) = 2.03, 𝑝 = .164, ηp2 = .061), and a Bayes factors suggested strong evidence in 
favour of the null hypothesis (BF01 = 10.551). On the other hand, we did find a main 
effect of orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 50.409, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .619), with an advantage for 
upright faces over inverted faces. Therefore, while we did not find an effect of expression 
on location sensitivity, we did find an effect of the face orientation on this sensitivity. In 
addition, the interaction between orientation and exposure time was significant 
(𝐹(4.53, 140.29) = 3.576, 𝑝 = .006, ηp2 = .103). We ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected 
pairwise comparisons to determine specific significant differences between upright and 
inverted faces per exposure duration, and found such differences at 1350 ms 
(𝑡(209) =  5.182, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.916) and 3038 ms (𝑡(209) =  5.596, 𝑝 <
.001, 𝑑 = 0.989) of exposure. Finally, we did not find an interaction between 
expression and exposure duration (𝐹(4.17, 129.30) = 0.576, 𝑝 = .688, ηp2 = .018), 
expression and orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 2.753, 𝑝 = .107, ηp2 = .082), or between these 
three factors (𝐹(4.77, 147.95) = 0.590, 𝑝 = .70, ηp2 = .019). Bayes factors suggested 
extreme evidence in favour of the null interaction between expression and exposure 
duration (𝐵𝐹01 > 100) and very strong evidence in favour of the null three-way 
interaction (𝐵𝐹01 = 88.297). 
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These results thus replicate the FIE, demonstrating that our method is sensitive 
to holistic face processing, and they continue to suggest that fearful expressions do not 
break through suppression faster than neutral expressions. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Results of Experiment 5. (a) Location sensitivity. Location d’ increased with 
exposure duration. There was an advantage of upright faces over inverted faces, but there 
was no difference between expressions. (b) Response bias. Absolute-value response bias 
scores for reporting location decreased with increasing exposure duration, but there was 
no difference between expressions or between orientations. (c) Expression identification 
sensitivity. Expression identification d’ increased with exposure duration; upright faces 
exhibited higher sensitivity than inverted faces. (d) Expression identification criterion. 
Identification criterion became more liberal with increasing exposure durations; upright 
faces exhibited a significantly more liberal criterion than inverted faces. Asterisks index 
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statistically significant differences (p < .05) between face orientations. Error bars 
represent 95% CI. 
 
3.4.2.2 Location response bias 
We examined whether participants’ location responses varied across conditions 
by entering the absolute values of response bias scores into a 2 (expression: fearful, 
neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. We found a main effect of exposure duration: response bias significantly 
decreased with increasing exposure durations, suggesting that response bias decreases as 
visibility increases (𝐹(2.82, 87.42) = 16.202, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .343), (Figure 3.4b). However, 
we found no main effect of emotional expression on response bias (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.025, 𝑝 =
.874, ηp2 = .001). We did not find a main effect of face orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.151, 𝑝 =
.7, ηp2 = .005), suggesting that face orientation did not affect response bias either. To 
assess whether the evidence supports these null hypotheses, we estimated Bayes factors, 
which indicated strong support for the null hypothesis of emotion expression (BF01 =
13.638) and extreme support for the null hypothesis of face orientation (BF01 =
12.261) on response bias. Unexpectedly, we found a significant interaction between 
expression and exposure duration (𝐹(4.59, 142.38) = 2.426, 𝑝 = .043, ηp2 = .073). 
However, Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons did not reveal significant 
differences between expressions at any exposure duration. Finally, no other interaction 
reach significance: between expression and orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.654, 𝑝 = .425, ηp2 =
.021), orientation and exposure duration (𝐹(4.75, 147.40) = 1.122, 𝑝 = .351, ηp2 = .035), 
or the three-way interaction between expression, orientation, and exposure duration 
(𝐹(4.55, 141.07) = 0.513, 𝑝 = .750, ηp2 = .016). 
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3.4.2.3 Expression identification sensitivity 
We examined whether participants’ identification sensitivity to the expression of 
the suppressed face varied across the face orientation (𝑀𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 =
1.517 [1.528]; 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 1.156 [1.349]) and exposure duration conditions. We 
entered identification d’ scores into a 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 (exposure 
durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found a main effect of exposure duration – 
identification sensitivity significantly increased with increasing exposure duration 
(𝐹(2.54, 78.69) = 88.46, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .740), (Figure 3.4c). We also found a main effect 
of orientation – higher identification sensitivity for upright faces than inverted faces 
(𝐹(1, 31) = 28.38, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .478). Finally, we found a marginal interaction 
between the factors (𝐹(4.37, 135.53) = 2.36, 𝑝 = .051, ηp2 = .071). A Bayes factor analysis 
indicated very strong evidence for the null hypothesis model (BF01 = 39.946). These 
results indicate that participants were more sensitive to the emotional expression in 
upright faces than in inverted faces. 
 
3.4.2.4 Expression decision criterion 
We examined whether participant’s identification criteria varied across orientation 
(𝑀𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 0.355 [0.518]; 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 0.449 [0.502]) and exposure duration 
conditions. We entered expression criteria scores into a 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) 
× 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 3.4d). Participants’ 
willingness to report an emotional expression (indexed by lower criterion scores) 
increased with increasing exposure durations, as evidenced by a main effect of exposure 
duration (𝐹(1.5, 46.57) = 14.34, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .316). We also found a main effect of 
orientation, with a more liberal criterion for upright faces than inverted faces 
(𝐹(1, 31) = 6.93, 𝑝 = .013, ηp2 = .183). The interaction between the two factors also 
reached significance (𝐹(5.17, 160.12) = 2.30, 𝑝 = .046, ηp2 = .069). Although the numerical 
pattern suggests generally larger differences between orientations at longer exposure 
durations, post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons did not reveal significant 
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differences at any specific duration. These results suggest participants exhibited a more 
liberal identification criterion for upright faces than for inverted faces. 
 
3.4.3 Discussion 
The findings of Experiment 5 provided further evidence that there is no 
difference in the speed with which fearful and neutral expressions are unconsciously 
processed. As before, we found no effect of expression on location sensitivity, but this 
time we also found that face inversion affects location sensitivity, which importantly 
suggests that our method is sensitive to the nature of the stimuli used. The FIE was also 
seen in expression identification sensitivity in the direction one would expect, i.e. higher 
identification sensitivity for upright faces than inverted faces. Therefore, the failure to 
find an effect of expression could be taken as evidence of no difference in unconscious 
processing between fearful and neutral expressions. 
One remaining possibility for why we did not find an effect of expression in 
experiment 5 is that we compared fearful expressions to neutral expressions, and neutral 
expressions may not be the best comparison as they can be more ambiguous in terms of 
their expression recognition. Therefore, we ran an additional experiment in which we used 
happy expressions instead of neutral expressions. This allowed us to test for unconscious 
processing comparing between fearful faces as clearly threatening expressions, and happy 
faces as clearly non-threatening expressions. 
 
3.5    Experiment 6 
 We used the same methods as Experiment 5, but comparing fearful and happy 
facial expressions, presented both in upright and inverted orientations. 
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3.5.1 Method 
 
3.5.1.1 Participants 
We recruited thirty-two University of Edinburgh students (25 female; 2 left-
handed) with mean age of 20.1 (SDage = 2.2), who were paid £14 for their participation. 
 
3.5.1.2 Stimuli and Procedure 
The methods were as in Experiment 5, except that we employed fearful and happy 
expressions, in upright and inverted orientations. These images were again selected from 
the KDEF database and matched on gender and expression identification while 
minimising differences in expression identification (Mfearful = 76.38%; [5.55]; Mhappy = 
93.75% [8.71]) and intensity (Mfearful = 6.12; [0.79]; Mhappy = 5.86 [0.97]; Appendix B). 
However, participants gave a slightly different response. Where previously 
participants judged whether an expression was emotional or not, now participants judged 
whether the face presented showed a fearful or happy expression. Trials with fearful 
expressions were considered signal-present, whereas trials with happy expressions were 
considered signal-absent. Therefore, a hit was defined as a trial with a fearful expression 
that was reported as presenting a fearful expression, whereas false alarm was defined as a 
trial with a happy expression that was reported as presenting a fearful expression. 
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3.5.2 Results 
 
3.5.2.1 Location sensitivity 
We examined whether participants’ sensitivity to the location of the suppressed 
face varied across emotional expression (𝑀𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑢𝑙 = 1.697 [1.124]; 𝑀ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 =
1.761 [1.121]), orientation (𝑀𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 1.758 [1.121]; 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 1.700 [1.125]), 
and exposure duration conditions. We entered location d’ scores into a 2 (expression: 
fearful, happy) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-
measures ANOVA. As seen in Figure 3.5a, location d’ scores increased with increasing 
exposure duration (𝐹(2.23, 69.16) = 160.99, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .839) as in our previous 
studies. But two additional results were quite unlike our previous studies. First, unlike in 
Experiment 5, this time the effect of orientation was only marginal (𝐹(1, 31) = 3.511, 𝑝 =
.070, ηp2 = .102). Second, unlike our three previous studies, this time we found a main 
effect of expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 9.406, 𝑝 = .004, ηp2 = .233), driven by higher sensitivity 
to happy than fearful faces. Finally, we found a marginal interaction between emotional 
expression and exposure duration (𝐹(4.99, 154.59) = 2.20, 𝑝 = .058, ηp2 = .066). To 
quantify whether the evidence supports the marginal effect of orientation, we estimated 
Bayes factors. We found substantial evidence in favour of the null hypothesis of 
orientation (𝐵𝐹01 = 9.174), as well as very strong evidence in favour of the null 
hypothesis model of the interaction between expression and exposure duration (𝐵𝐹01 =
50.234). The results from this experiment indicate that sensitivity to the location of the 
face was higher for happy expressions than for fearful expressions, and that upright faces 
only enjoyed a marginal sensitivity advantage over inverted faces. However, Bayes factor 
analysis showed contradictory results in relation to these effects, suggesting they might be 
spurious. 
 
117 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Results of Experiment 6. (a) Location sensitivity. Location d’ increased with 
exposure duration. There was a marginally significant advantage of upright faces over 
inverted faces. There was also an advantage of happy expressions over fearful expressions 
(b) Response bias. Absolute-value response bias scores for reporting location decreased 
with increasing exposure duration, but there was no difference between expressions or 
between orientations. (c) Expression identification sensitivity. Expression identification 
d’ increased with increasing exposure duration; upright faces exhibited higher sensitivity 
than inverted faces. (d) Expression identification criterion. Identification criterion became 
more liberal with increasing exposure durations; upright faces exhibited a significantly 
more liberal criterion than inverted faces. Asterisks index statistically significant 
differences (p < .05) between face orientations. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
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3.5.2.2 Location response bias 
We examined whether participants’ location responses varied across conditions 
by entering the absolute values of response bias scores into a 2 (expression: fearful, happy) 
× 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
We found a main effect of exposure duration – response bias significantly decreased with 
increasing exposure durations, suggesting that response bias decreases as visibility 
increases (𝐹(3.26, 101.13) = 8.411, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .213), (Figure 3.4b). However, we did 
not find a main effect of expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.001, 𝑝 = .974, ηp2 = 0) or of 
orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.018, 𝑝 = .895, ηp2 = .001). Similarly, we did not find an 
interaction between expression and exposure duration (𝐹(4.86, 150.6) = 1.972, 𝑝 =
.088, ηp2 = .06), between expression and orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 1.314, 𝑝 = .261, ηp2 =
.041), or between orientation and exposure duration (𝐹(4.67, 144.85) = 0.762, 𝑝 =
.571, ηp2 = .024). We did not find a three-way interaction either (𝐹(4.02, 124.48) =
0.047, 𝑝 = .996, ηp2 = .002). To assess whether the evidence supports these null 
effects of expression and orientation, we estimated Bayes factors, which indicated strong 
support for the null hypothesis of expression (BF01 = 13.546) and extreme support for 
the null hypothesis of orientation (BF01 = 13.662). 
 
3.5.2.3 Expression identification sensitivity 
We examined whether participants’ identification sensitivity to the expression of 
the suppressed faces varied across the face orientation (𝑀𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 =
2.970 [0.626]; 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 2.875 [0.585]) and exposure duration conditions. We 
entered identification d’ scores into a 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 (exposure 
durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. Expression identification sensitivity significantly 
increased with increasing exposure time (𝐹(2.56, 79.41) = 131.95, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .810), 
(Figure 3.5c). We also found a main effect of orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 4.27, 𝑝 = .047, ηp2 =
.121). The interaction between both factors also reached significance (𝐹(4.84, 150.06) =
5.52, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .151). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed a 
119 
 
marginally non-significant advantage for upright over inverted expressions at 4557 ms of 
exposure (𝑡(147) =  3.449, 𝑝 = .067, 𝑑 = 0.610). These results indicate that 
participants were more sensitive to facial expression in upright faces than in inverted 
faces. 
 
3.5.2.4 Expression identification criterion 
We examined whether participant’s identification criteria varied across orientation 
(𝑀𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 0.757 [0.442]; 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 0.804 [0.413]) and exposure duration 
conditions. We entered identification criterion scores into a 2 (orientation: upright, 
inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found that 
participants were more willing to report a happy face as exposure increased 
(𝐹(2.56, 79.38) = 131.96, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .810), (Figure 3.5c). We also found a main effect 
of orientation, showing a more liberal criterion in expression identification for upright 
over inverted faces (𝐹(1, 31) = 4.27, 𝑝 = .047, ηp2 = .121). The interaction was also 
significant (𝐹(4.84, 150.1) = 5.51, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .151). Post hoc Bonferroni-corrected 
pairwise comparisons revealed a marginally significant more liberal criterion for upright 
than inverted expressions at 4557 ms of exposure (𝑡(147) =  −3.445, 𝑝 = .068, 𝑑 =
−0.610). These results suggest that participants exhibited a more liberal identification 
criterion for upright faces than for inverted faces. 
 
3.5.3 Discussion 
The findings of Experiment 5 suggested that there is no difference in how fearful 
and neutral expressions break through CFS. However, neutral expressions may not be the 
best to compare fearful expressions with given that they can be more ambiguous in terms 
of their emotion recognition. Therefore, we ran Experiment 6 to compare fearful 
expressions to happy expressions, which are less ambiguous in their emotional expression. 
Surprisingly, we found that happy expressions broke through suppression faster than 
fearful expressions. This contradicts b-CFS studies where researchers found shorter 
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breakthrough times for fearful expressions than for happy expressions, with one 
exception where researchers employed schematic faces (Stein & Sterzer, 2012). In 
addition, the FIE was marginal in the localisation task and significant in the expression 
identification task, which may suggest that localisation tasks relied less on holistic face 
processing than the identification tasks. Or rather, that localisation tasks can be performed 
in absence of holistic processing. Whatever the case may be, this poses the question to 
what extent FIEs found in b-CFS studies may have been driven by holistic face 
processing. 
 
3.6    Interim summary 
 We tested whether angry (Experiment 3) or fearful (Experiment 4) expressions 
break through suppression faster than happy or neutral ones. However, we did not find 
any detection advantage for either of those emotional expressions. One possible 
explanation is that emotional expressions are not prioritised in unconscious emotion 
processing. Another one is that our method is not sensitive to the properties of face 
stimuli. To test this possibility, we ran Experiment 5, which tested whether fearful 
expressions broke through suppression faster than neutral expressions both presented in 
upright and inverted orientations. This orientation manipulation allowed us to test for the 
face-inversion effect (FIE) – a repeatedly reported detection advantage of upright faces 
over inverted faces. As expected, we found sensitivity to the location of upright faces to 
be higher than for inverted faces, but again we did not find an advantage of fearful 
expressions over neutral expressions. These results again may suggest that emotional 
expressions do not enjoy prioritised unconscious processing. However, another 
possibility is that comparing fearful expressions to neutral expressions is not an ideal test 
given that neutral expressions are more ambiguous in terms of their emotion recognition. 
Therefore, we ran Experiment 6 to compare fearful expressions with happy expressions. 
We presented them in both upright and inverted orientations to test again whether our 
method is sensitive to the properties of face stimuli. We found a marginally significant 
effect of orientation. However, as in our previous experiments, we did not find an 
advantage of emotional expressions over non-emotional ones.  
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 So far, our experiments have employed a 2AFC procedure, where participants had 
to judge the location of the face out of two possible options. However, original b-CFS 
procedures employed a detection task where participants simply had to press a key as 
soon as they became aware of the face. Therefore, participants did not have to make a 
choice reaction. To make our task more similar to original b-CFS studies, we turned our 
procedure into a Yes-No detection task. Like in our previous experiments, we used 
predefined exposure durations instead of self-terminated trials. Half of the trials, however, 
did not present a face. By asking participants to report the presence (or absence) of a face 
stimulus, we calculated their sensitivity to the presence of face stimuli. 
 
3.7    Experiment 7 
In Experiment 7, we measured sensitivity to emotional expressions by asking 
participants to judge the presence or absence of a face on the screen. As in Experiment 
5, we used fearful and neutral expressions presented in upright and inverted orientations. 
Faces were presented either on the left or on the right side of the screen as in our previous 
experiments, but this time they were presented on only half of the trials, and participants 
were simply required to respond ‘Yes’ (without indicating the side) if they thought a face 
was shown and ‘No’ if they thought no face was shown. Importantly, this task did not 
involve an expression identification report, thus bearing a closer resemblance to original 
b-CFS experiments that tested for unconscious emotion processing. If fearful expressions 
break through suppression faster than neutral expressions, we should find higher 
detection sensitivity for fearful expressions than for neutral expressions. If decision 
criterion can contribute to explaining past b-CFS results showing an advantage of fearful 
over neutral expressions, we should find evidence that participants are more willing to 
report fearful expressions as present than neutral expressions. If we found an effect on 
detection sensitivity, with higher sensitivity to fearful expressions than to neutral 
expressions, but no effect on decision criterion, we could suggest the advantage of fearful 
expressions over neutral expressions can be fully explained by sensitivity. Conversely, if 
we found an effect of decision criterion, with a more liberal criterion for fearful 
expressions, but no effect on sensitivity, we could suggest the advantage of fearful 
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expressions over neutral expressions can be fully explained by decision criterion. As in 
the previous experiments, these possible effects are not mutually exclusive. 
 
3.7.1 Method 
 
3.7.1.1 Participants 
We recruited thirty-two students of the University of Edinburgh (21 female; 2 
left-handed) with a mean age of 23.2 (SDage = 3.1), who were paid £14 for their 
participation. 
 
3.7.1.2 Stimuli and Procedure 
The same stimuli from Experiment 5 were employed: fearful and neutral 
expressions in upright and inverted orientations. As in previous experiments, the total 
number of trials was 1120. However, half of the trials presented a face and other half did 
not present a face. In half of the face-present trials the face had a fearful expression, and 
in the other half it had a neutral expression. Expression was blocked as described in 
Experiment 5, maintaining the proportion 50/50 between face-present and face-absent 
trials. Participants were instructed to only report on the presence or absence of a face 
image (up arrow to report that the face was present, down arrow to report it was absent; 
the keys were counterbalanced across participants). They were informed that half of the 
trials would contain a face image while the other half would not. 
 
 
123 
 
3.7.2 Results 
 
3.7.2.1 Detection sensitivity 
We examined whether participants’ sensitivity to the detection of the suppressed 
face varied across emotional expression (𝑀𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑢𝑙 = 2.422 [1.207]; 𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 =
2.402 [1.204]), orientation (𝑀𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 2.460 [1.110]; 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 2.364 [1.228]), 
and exposure duration conditions. We entered detection d’ scores into a 2 (expression: 
fearful, neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-
measures ANOVA. Detection sensitivity scores dramatically increased with increasing 
exposure duration (𝐹(2.54, 78.67) = 141.812, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .821), (Figure 3.6a). 
However, we did not find a main effect of expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.560, 𝑝 = .460, ηp2 =
.018) or of orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 2.191, 𝑝 = .149, ηp2 = .066). We estimated Bayes 
factors to see whether the evidence supported these null effects. We found substantial 
evidence for the orientation null hypothesis (BF01 = 4.947) and strong evidence for the 
emotion null hypothesis (BF01 = 13.102). These results show that detection sensitivity 
only increased as a function of exposure duration. 
 
Figure 3.6. (a) Detection sensitivity. Sensitivity increased as a function of exposure 
duration only. (b) Decision criterion. Criterion decreased with increasing exposure 
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duration with a significantly more liberal criterion for neutral expressions. Error bars 
represent 95% CI. 
 
3.7.2.2 Detection decision criterion 
We had predicted that if b-CFS reports showing shorter breakthrough times to 
fearful expressions than neutral expressions were fully or partly due to a more liberal 
criterion for reporting fearful expressions than neutral expressions, we should find in this 
experiment a more liberal criterion for fearful than neutral expressions. To test this, we 
examined whether participant’s decision criteria varied across expression (𝑀𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑢𝑙 =
0.504 [0.585]; 𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 = 0.467 [0.603]), face orientation (𝑀𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 =
0.495 [0.580]; 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 0.477 [0.607]) and exposure duration conditions. We 
entered criterion scores into a 2 (expression: fearful, neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright, 
inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found that criteria 
turned more liberal across increasing exposure duration (𝐹(2.37, 73.60) = 115.271, 𝑝 <
.001, ηp2 = .788), (Figure 3.6b). We also found a main effect of expression 
(𝐹(1, 31) = 6.554, 𝑝 = .016, ηp2 = .175), but we did not find a main effect of orientation 
(𝐹(1, 31) = 0.165, 𝑝 = .688, ηp2 = .005). While this main effect of expression may 
suggest that fearful expressions were associated with more conservative decision criteria 
than neutral expressions, the effect was small and probably mostly driven by a couple of 
higher scores obtained at 2025 and 3028 ms of exposure. 
 
3.7.3 Discussion 
In this experiment, we asked participants to judge the presence or absence of a 
face on the screen and assessed how emotional expressions affect sensitivity and criterion 
of those judgments. Neither expression nor orientation affected sensitivity, suggesting 
neither the manipulation of emotional expression (fearful expressions versus neutral 
expressions) nor the manipulation of holistic face processing (upright faces versus 
inverted faces) affected unconscious processing. Thus, when we used a task that was 
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perhaps better-matched to traditional b-CFS tasks, we still found no evidence that 
emotional expressions broke through awareness faster. 
There are different factors that could explain these unexpected results. First, the 
fact that we obtained rather high sensitivity scores across all exposure durations may 
suggest that the simpler nature of this task decreased its perceptual difficulty, thus 
increasing the chance of break through CFS at shorter exposures. If this were the case, it 
could also be expected that effects found in previous experiments would be diluted 
between exposure durations that are now excessively long for the task. The fact that we 
found a numerical trend towards better sensitivity for upright faces may support this view. 
However, not having found a significant effect of orientation undermines the sensitivity 
of our procedure in this specific experimental setting, meaning that the fact that we did 
not find an effect of expression could be simply due to lack of sensitivity of our procedure 
rather than due to a non-existent effect. 
Despite not having found effects in perceptual sensitivity, we did find an effect in 
decision criterion, with fearful expressions associated with a more conservative criterion 
than neutral expressions. As argued in the Introduction, if b-CFS findings are due to a 
more liberal criterion for fearful expressions, we should have found a more liberal 
criterion for fearful expressions. These results suggest that criterion might have played a 
role in b-CFS studies, but perhaps not in a way that explains those previous findings. 
In our final study, we addressed one final potential objection to our method: 
Perhaps the predetermined exposure durations used were unsuitable for measuring 
unconscious processing? We cannot rule out that the distances between our exposure 
durations may have been too large to capture sensitivity differences between stimulus 
categories, or that we might have missed the right range of durations. This may be 
particularly the case of Experiment 7, where participants only had to report whether a 
face was shown. Although b-CFS findings have typically shown differences between facial 
expressions for response times of around 2.5 to 3 seconds (Gray et al., 2013; Yang et al., 
2007), this might be an overestimate of the time at which breakthrough may occur, due 
to the lag involved in preparing and executing a motor response. The fact that in 
Experiment 7 detection d’ scores at the shortest exposure durations were already 
sufficiently high to index above-chance detection supports this interpretation. To account 
for this possibility, we designed a staircase procedure to estimate detection threshold for 
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each stimulus category. If there were effects of expression and of orientation on yes/no 
detection that our predefined exposure durations could not capture, we may be able to 
find them with a staircase procedure. 
 
3.8    Experiment 8 
 In this experiment we assessed how emotional expressions affected the 
presentation time that elicited threshold detection of stimuli. Participants were presented 
with faces in the same way as in experiments 3 through 6. But unlike in those experiments, 
exposure durations changed depending on the participant’s performance, following a 
staircase procedure, as detailed below. 
 A similar approach was taken by Stein, Hebart, et al. (2011; Experiment 6), who 
tested – using a similar 2AFC task to ours – whether (neutral) upright faces evoked shorter 
breakthrough thresholds than (neutral) inverted faces. They tested this in two conditions: 
one presenting faces rendered invisible with CFS, and a control condition in which the 
faces were presented binocularly on top of the masks. Their results show shorter 
thresholds for upright (around 1200 ms) than inverted faces (around 1450 ms) in the CFS 
condition, but no significant threshold difference in the control condition. We developed 
a similar but methodologically stricter staircase procedure: ours contained both an 
ascending staircase starting at the shortest possible exposure duration, and a descending 
staircase starting at the longest duration, each of which was run twice. Thus, our 
procedure yielded 16 staircases: 2 expressions × 2 orientations × 2 staircase types 
(ascending and descending) × 2 repetitions, thereby providing more robust threshold 
estimates. Additionally, we employed 32 participants whereas Stein, Hebart, et al. (2011) 
had only 13. 
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3.8.1 Method 
 
3.8.1.1 Participants 
We first recruited twenty University of Edinburgh students. However, their data 
were not used given that an error was found in the experiment code that prevented 
staircases from replacing their exposure duration vector after reaching five reversals (see 
below). After fixing the issue, we recruited a new group of thirty-three students (23 female; 
4 left-handed) with a mean age of 22.7 (SDage = 2.8) who were paid £14 for their 
participation. 
 
3.8.1.2  Stimuli and Procedure 
A staircase procedure with 23 possible exposure durations was employed, 
following a 1-up, 2-down rule, meaning that two consecutive correct responses decreased 
the exposure duration by one step, and one incorrect answer increased the exposure 
duration by one step, with the constraint that exposure durations were not allowed to fall 
below 50 ms or to exceed 6826 ms. The 23 steps of the initial exposure duration vector 
were spaced equally on a log scale from 200 to 6326, each step 1.17 times bigger than the 
one before. The experiment comprised 1120 trials, which were sorted into 16 different 
staircases, each defined by a combination of the stimuli’s facial expression (fearful or 
neutral), orientation (upright or inverted), and staircase direction (ascending and 
descending), with two repetitions for each staircase. Ascending staircases started with an 
exposure duration of 200 ms whereas descending staircases started at 6326 ms. After 
reaching five reversals, the exposure duration vector was replaced by a new vector of 23 
values where the value of the fifth reversal was defined as exposure duration number 12 
(the median of the possible durations), and the rest of the values were defined with a step-
size of 50 ms. After this change, the staircase remained unchanged for the rest of the 
procedure. 
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Participants were told that each trial would contain a face. They were instructed 
to report the location of the face on the screen (either left or right of fixation). They were 
not given details about the staircase procedure. 
 
3.8.1.3 Analysis 
The final five reversal values (durations at which the staircase changed direction) 
were averaged for each individual staircase. Then, the means were collapsed into four 
categories: fearful upright, fearful inverted, neutral upright, and neutral inverted faces. 
The threshold means were entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA described below. 
 
3.8.2 Results 
 
3.8.2.1 Detection threshold estimates 
We examined whether the time at which suppressed faces reached detection 
threshold varied across expression and orientation conditions. To this end, we entered 
threshold means into a 2 (expression: fearful, neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) 
repeated-measures ANOVA. We did not find a main effect of expression (𝐹(1, 32) =
0.309, 𝑝 = .582, ηp2 = .010) nor a main effect of orientation (𝐹(1, 32) = 0.153, 𝑝 =
.698, ηp2 = .005; Figure 3.7). The interaction did not reach significance either 
(𝐹(1, 32) = 0.126, 𝑝 = .725, ηp2 = .004). These results suggest that detection thresholds 
did not differ between expressions or orientations. To test whether the evidence supports 
these two null effects, we estimated Bayes factors. They indicated substantial evidence for 
the null effect of expression (BF01 = 5.403) and of orientation (BF01 = 4.544), and 
for the null model of an interaction between them (BF01 = 3.979). These results indicate 
that neither expression nor orientation had an effect on detection threshold estimates. 
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Figure 3.7. Mean location detection threshold estimates in ms. Error bars show 95% CI. 
 
3.8.2.2 Face-inversion effect consistency between 
participants 
 Surprisingly, we did not find an effect of orientation in Experiment 7 and 8. It 
could be the case that the FIE is not very consistent among participants and therefore 
may be diluted in our data. To assess the FIE’s consistency among participants, we 
estimated the area under the curve (AUC) of each psychometric function in the 
experiments that involved orientation manipulation. We subtracted AUC values of 
inverted faces from AUC values of upright faces (Figure 3.8). To test for evidence in 
favour of the FIE, we then ran a series of one-sample t-tests against zero. If the AUC 
subtraction scores are significantly above zero it would indicate evidence in favour of FIE. 
AUC differences were significantly above zero in Experiment 5 (𝑡(31) =  7.62, 𝑝 <
.001, 𝑑 = 1.347), but marginally significantly above zero in Experiment 6 (𝑡(31) =
 2.01, 𝑝 = .053, 𝑑 = 0.355), and not significant in Experiment 7 (𝑡(31) =
−0.187, 𝑝 = .853, 𝑑 = −0.0331) and Experiment 8 (𝑡(31) = −0.391, 𝑝 =
.698, 𝑑 = −0.068). Then, to see if this inconsistency was present in identification (a task 
that allegedly cannot be done without engaging in holistic processing), we replicated this 
same analysis but on AUC differences based on identification-related psychometric 
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functions. We found that the AUC differences were significantly above zero in both: 
Experiment 5 (𝑡(31) = 5.35, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.945) and 6 (𝑡(31) = 2.37, 𝑝 =
.024, 𝑑 = 0.419). 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Face Inversion Effect (FIE) distribution across observers. Experiment 5: (a) 
Location sensitivity; (b) Emotion identification sensitivity. Experiment 6: (c) Location 
sensitivity; (d) Emotion identification sensitivity. Experiment 7: (e) Location sensitivity. 
Experiment 8: (f) Location detection threshold. In Experiments 5-7, these values were 
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determined by calculating the area under the curve (AUC) of each psychometric function. 
Then AUC values of inverted faces were subtracted from AUC values of upright faces. 
In Experiment 8 (f), however, means of detection thresholds of upright faces were 
subtracted from the means of inverted faces. 
 
3.8.3 Discussion 
We did not find differences in detection threshold estimates for either expression 
or orientation. These results suggest that neither expression nor identification modulate 
detection thresholds of suppressed faces. 
It could be the case that most participants adopted a very liberal criterion and 
decided to report the presence of a face on the correct side based only on differences in 
contrast between screen sides. In such a case, these detection threshold estimates would 
correspond to low-level features thresholds (e.g. related to the faces’ oval shape or 
contrast) rather than to high-level facial features (e.g. emotional expression). However, if 
this were the case, then why have b-CFS studies found effects of expression and 
orientation? Another possibility is that the way we selected and processed our stimuli 
decreased visual differences between faces that may have been driving said effects. For 
example, it has been shown that low-level features may explain shorter breakthrough 
times of fearful expressions over other expressions (Gray et al., 2013; Hedger et al., 2015; 
Stein & Sterzer, 2012). 
Finally, it was unexpected not to have found an effect of orientation, which Stein, 
Hebart, et al. (2011) found, given that our procedure was stricter – it employed a higher 
number of trials, staircases, and it controlled for stimuli low-level features. 
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3.9    General discussion 
Do emotional expressions enter awareness faster than non-emotional ones? Past 
studies using CFS to render facial expressions invisible have claimed that they do (Capitão 
et al., 2014; Hedger et al., 2015; Oliver et al., 2015; Sterzer et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2007; 
Yang & Yeh, 2018; Zhan et al., 2015). However, those studies used RTs as a measure of 
unconscious processing – participants had to press a key as soon as they became aware 
of the target stimulus. Importantly, using RTs in a b-CFS procedure as measure of 
unconscious processing entails methodological issues. It does not isolate detection from 
irrelevant identification processes. Therefore, identification-related criterion differences 
could affect detection RTs. For example, if participants exhibited more liberal criteria to 
emotional expressions than to non-emotional expressions, shorter RTs for emotional 
expressions could be attributed to criterion differences rather than to sensitivity 
differences. Here, we employed a recently developed procedure (see Chapter 2) to address 
this problem. First, by using predefined exposure durations we controlled the amount of 
visual information available per trial, unlike in the b-CFS procedure, where participants 
get to decide how much information they receive before committing to a response. 
Second, by asking them to report both the location and the emotional expression of the 
face presented, we could estimate sensitivity and criterion. 
Our new method allowed us to understand how emotional expressions affected 
breakthrough from CFS in a more controlled manner, that pulled apart sensitivity to 
location, response bias, sensitivity to the emotional identity of the face, and criterion when 
judging identity. Over 6 studies, emotional expressions only affected location sensitivity 
once, and when it did so (Experiment 6) it showed the opposite pattern from prior reports 
(i.e. we found advantage for happy expressions, whereas they found advantage for fear 
(Capitão et al., 2014; Gray et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2007; Yang & Yeh, 2018), though see 
Stein & Sterzer (2012), who found an advantage of happy faces). Nonetheless, emotional 
expressions did affect expression identification, showing that happy expressions were 
better discriminated from their neutral counterparts compared with angry (Experiment 3) 
or fearful expressions (Experiment 4). We found a similar case regarding face orientation. 
Face orientation affected location sensitivity twice (significantly in Experiment 5 though 
only marginally in Experiment 6, out of 4 studies), but it did affect expression 
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identification by showing fearful expressions were better discriminated from their neutral 
counterparts when presented in upright orientation (Experiments 5 and 6, the only ones 
that asked to identify the expression while varying orientation). 
Our approach used a range of exposure durations that capture location sensitivity 
from near-chance to high sensitivity (Experiments 3-6). However, we did not find a 
consistent advantage of emotional expressions over neutral expressions in sensitivity. This 
absence of effect was also supported by Bayes factors analysis. Some more recent studies 
have suggested that the advantage of emotional expressions over non-emotional 
expressions found with the b-CFS procedure may have been due to low-level visual 
features like spatial frequency and contrast (Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2016; Gray et al., 2013; 
Schlossmacher et al., 2017; Stein et al., 2018). In such a case, the fact that we only 
controlled luminance and still did not find an advantage of emotional expressions may 
suggest that differences in low-level features are not the only cause of previously found 
effects. 
With the idea that an effect of emotional expression could be taking place between 
predetermined exposure durations, or diluted by between-subjects variability, we adapted 
our procedure into a staircase procedure (Experiment 8) to estimate thresholds for 
location detection. However, we found no difference between fearful and neutral 
expressions. 
Nevertheless, using our procedure, we did replicate the FIE (albeit inconsistently), 
which has been interpreted as an index of holistic face processing (Axelrod & Rees, 2014; 
Farah et al., 1995; Goodrich & Yonelinas, 2019; Rakover & Teucher, 1997; Tanaka & 
Gordon, 2011). Arguably, the FIE relies on high-level facial information just like 
emotional expressions given that both may require integrating local facial features. The 
fact that our procedure was sufficiently sensitive to capture the FIE may suggest that it 
may also be sufficiently sensitive to capture an advantage of emotional over non-
emotional expressions, if it exists (for a summary of these two effects, see Table 1). 
Interestingly, the FIE for expression identification was present in both experiments that 
involved an orientation manipulation and an expression identification estimation. 
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Table 1. Summary of effects on location sensitivity across experiments. 
 Type of effect 
 Effect of exposure Effect of expression Effect of orientation 
 𝐹 p ηp2 𝐹 p ηp2 𝐹 p ηp2 
Exp. 3 104.5 < .001* .771 2.42 .097 .072 - - - 
Exp. 4 111.9 < .001* .783 0.104 .887 .003 - - - 
Exp. 5 250.8 < .001* .857 2.03 .164 .061 50.4 < 
.001* 
.610 
Exp. 6 160.9 < .001* .839 9.406 .004* .233 3.511 .07ɸ .102 
Exp. 7 141.8 < .001* .821 0.560 .460 .018 2.191 .149 .066 
Exp. 8 - - - 0.309 .582 .001 0.153 .698 .005 
Note. Report of F tests, p-values, and partial eta-squared effect sizes. The single significant 
effect of expression indicated an advantage of happy expressions over fearful expressions. 
Both the significant and marginal effects of orientation indicated an advantage of upright 
over inverted faces. 
* Significant effects  ɸ Non-significant marginal effects - Not applicable 
 
In Experiments 5 and 6, we found that most participants exhibited at least a slight 
advantage of upright faces over inverted faces, whereas in Experiments 7 and 8 such 
advantage seemed non-existent or at least highly heterogeneous among participants and 
therefore statistically meaningless (see Figure 8). The difficulty that we had in repeatedly 
replicating the FIE is interesting because it chimes with a recent argument by Heyman et 
al. (2019) that the magnitude of the FIE might have been overestimated in previous 
studies. One possibility is that the FIE is inconsistent among participants because it relies 
on high-level information in a task that allegedly could be done by only using low-level 
information – some participants may report mainly based on stimulus configural 
information whereas others may report mainly based on perceived contrast differences 
between screen locations. On the one hand, our results show that the FIE was always 
present in the expression identification task, a task that requires observers to integrate 
facial features holistically. On the other hand, it was inconsistent in the localisation task 
(Table 1). The localisation task could be answered by comparing differences in contrast 
between the two sides of the screen, whereas the expression identification task requires 
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visual integration. Our results may suggest that the FIE for location sensitivity, when 
present, may have been driven by identification processing that participants were not able 
to inhibit. Crucially, if this were the case, one could ask whether b-CFS studies testing for 
emotional expression effects can distinguish between detection and identification. Their 
findings may be due to residual identification processes that participants could not inhibit. 
Interestingly, we did find an effect of decision criterion in expression 
identification. Surprisingly, however, this effect was consistent across experiments and in 
the opposite direction to what we had expected – happy expressions enjoyed a more 
liberal criterion than fearful and angry expressions during the expression identification 
task. This finding demonstrates that participants may have consistent decision criteria 
during identification tasks, which stresses the importance of disentangling detection from 
identification. 
In conclusion, our results suggest that emotional expressions such as angry and 
fearful expressions do not enjoy an advantage over neutral expressions in their path to 
awareness. However, while we found consistent differences in identification criteria 
during expression identification, these could not explain why b-CFS studies found shorter 
breakthrough times for fearful expressions than for neutral expressions. Furthermore, the 
FIE was consistent when measuring expression identification sensitivity, but it was 
inconsistent when measuring location sensitivity. It may be the case that the FIE for 
detection reported in b-CFS studies was due to identification processing that participants 
could not inhibit. Future studies should use more stringent procedures to address how 
consistent and high-level-based the FIE is, and how much of unconscious emotion 
processing can actually be attributed to high-level features. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4 MINIMAL REQUIRED EXPOSURE REVEALS GRADED 
ACCESS TO AWARENESS OF FACIAL CONFIGURATION 
AND EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION 
 
4.1    Introduction 
Faces communicate important information about others’ mental states and 
intentions (Grill-Spector et al., 2017; Jack & Schyns, 2015; Little et al., 2011). They are 
remarkably effective at capturing attention (Fox, 2002; Langton et al., 2008; Phelps et al., 
2006; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003), especially when communicating emotional states. For 
example, fearful and angry expressions are detected faster than neutral and happy 
expressions (Fox et al., 2000; Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Krysko & Rutherford, 2009). Face 
processing is also relevant to emotional disorders. For instance, depression often 
enhances salience of sad expressions (Burkhouse et al., 2017; Lazarov et al., 2018) whereas 
anxiety enhances salience of fearful and angry expressions instead (Bishop et al., 2007; 
Ladouceur et al., 2009), indicating that face processing can be affected by personal 
characteristics. A more controversial claim, however, is that faces, and in particular 
emotional expressions, enjoy prioritised access to awareness. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, 
we investigated whether holistic face processing and emotion processing modulate how 
faces gain access to awareness. As detailed below, here we employed a complementary 
approach to investigate how faces gain access to awareness – we measured the minimal 
exposures required for holistic face processing, emotion processing, and perceptual 
awareness, by using a newly developed LCD tachistoscope that enables extremely brief 
visual presentations with submillisecond precision. This tool allowed us to directly test 
whether the orientation (enabling holistic processing or not) and emotional content (facial 
expression) of a face modulate the minimal exposure required to perceive them. Notably, 
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this approach allows us to present stimuli without any form of masking, avoiding the 
potential confounds that arise with stimulus-mask interactions. 
Multiple claims have been made about how faces gain access to awareness. Some 
researchers have claimed that emotional facial expressions enjoy prioritised access to 
awareness in comparison to non-emotional ones. For example, Yang et al. (2007) found 
shorter response times to suppressed fearful expressions than to suppressed neutral 
expressions. This claim derives from a long list of findings using masking techniques to 
suppress visual information from awareness, such as Continuous Flash Suppression 
(CFS), a strong interocular suppression technique that renders stimuli shown to one eye 
invisible by flashing high-contrast Mondrian-like patterns to the other eye. In fact, as 
described in previous chapters, it has been claimed that faces expressing negative 
emotions overcome suppression – and thus enter awareness – faster than faces expressing 
positive emotions and no emotion (Capitão et al., 2014; Hedger et al., 2015; Sterzer et al., 
2011; Yang et al., 2007; Yang & Yeh, 2018a), though this effect has failed to replicate a 
number of times (see Chapter 3). Similarly, it has been claimed that upright faces 
overcome suppression faster than inverted faces. For example, Jiang et al. (2007) found 
shorter response times to suppressed upright faces than to suppressed inverted faces, 
suggesting that upright faces gain access to awareness faster due to their configural or 
holistic properties, an effect that has been repeatedly replicated (Akechi et al., 2015; 
Kobylka et al., 2017; Moors, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2016; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011). 
However, the usefulness of masking and interocular suppression techniques hinges on 
their ability to interrupt visual processing; and because it is impossible to determine the 
extent of this interruption – unless relative to a control condition – said techniques cannot 
provide with minimal exposures required for holistic face processing or emotion 
processing, let alone with the minimal exposure required for perceptual awareness. 
Crucially, by measuring the minimal required exposures of upright and inverted faces, and 
of emotional and non-emotional expressions, we can directly test whether there is an 
inherent hierarchy in how faces are perceived. Are all facial features processed together 
or do they involve different bottlenecks in processing? 
 Several approaches have been taken to determine minimal required exposures in 
visual perception. The main limitation, though, is that the shortest exposure durations 
that have been employed seem to be sufficiently long for visual detection and 
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identification to occur. In a classic study, Intraub (1981) presented observers with 
sequences of unmasked pictures at 114, 172, or 258 milliseconds (ms) of exposure per 
picture. The target was specified by name (e.g. giraffe), by superordinate category (e.g. 
animal), or by negative category (e.g. the picture that is not food). Participants were asked 
to press a key as soon as they saw the cued picture and to describe it briefly. They were 
able to detect the pictures even in the most difficult condition, when the exposure 
duration was the shortest. Similarly, Thorpe et al. (1996) presented observers with brief 
unmasked pictures and asked them to perform a categorisation task (to indicate whether 
the picture contained an animal or not) while measuring electroencephalography (EEG). 
By measuring event-related potentials (ERP) and reaction times to pictures that could 
contain or not an animal in a go/no-go categorisation task, they showed that successful 
visual categorisation was possible even at 20 ms of exposure. Later, in a follow-up study, 
researchers showed that even using novel scenes (i.e. never-before seen by the observers) 
did not decrease categorisation performance, even with 20 ms of exposure (Fabre-Thorpe 
et al. 2001). Similar findings were reported in scene categorisation when asking observers 
to categorise unmasked natural and manmade environments presented for 26 ms (Joubert 
et al., 2007). These results demonstrate that with an exposure duration of 20 ms the visual 
system receives sufficient information to discriminate elements contained in unmasked 
pictures. Therefore, despite claims indicating that 26 ms of exposure are required to get 
the gist of a scene, by such exposure duration accuracy is already extremely high (> 90%), 
as reported by Joubert et al. (2007) and Rousselet et al. (2005), thus implying that the true 
minimal exposure duration required for visual perception must be shorter. Additionally, 
these results obtained using unmasked pictures may raise the potential issue of afterimages 
– it is difficult to determine whether visual processing stopped after stimulus removal. 
 Technically, it has been difficult to present stimuli at briefer exposures than 16 
ms, because most studies over the last few decades have presented stimuli on computer 
monitors, which (at least until recently) have typically had a refresh rate of around 60 Hz. 
Even newer monitors that have a refresh rate of more than 60 Hz, such as monitors with 
100 Hz, 120 Hz, and 144 Hz cannot present stimuli at briefer exposures than 10, 8.33, 
and 6.94 ms, respectively. Therefore, subsequent attempts to determine the minimal 
exposure required for visual perception had to employ masking techniques to interrupt 
visual processing. But this introduces a potential confound, because it will always be 
unclear if differences in minimal exposure are due to differences in the time necessary to 
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process relevant stimulus properties, or in the degree to which visual masking affected 
processing of those properties. For example, Greene & Oliva (2009) determined through 
a scene classification task that participants needed exposure durations of between 19 and 
67 ms to exhibit 75% correct-response thresholds, with high between-subject variability 
and, importantly, with shorter exposure durations for detection of scenes’ global 
properties (i.e. identifying the kind of landscape) than their basic properties (i.e. 
identifying objects in the image). However, because they used a dynamic masking 
paradigm to limit sensory processing following image presentation, it is impossible to 
determine whether these differences in threshold reflect the speed with which these 
properties could be identified, or the degree to which the masking interfered with 
processing these properties. Indeed, masking has been demonstrated to significantly 
affect visual processing with brief presentations: Codispoti et al. (2009), for example, 
presented observers with pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant pictures, masked and 
unmasked, across exposure durations ranging from 25 to 6000 ms, and measured their 
emotional reactivity using various techniques such as electromyography, EEG, skin 
conductance, and both pleasure and arousal ratings. Crucially, when masked images were 
employed, they found no evidence of emotional engagement with any measure with 25 
ms of exposure, and some evidence for such processing with 80 ms of exposure (at this 
point, some participants could reliably rate pictures as pleasant or unpleasant); but when 
unmasked images were employed, they found reliable evidence of emotion processing at 
all exposure durations. Importantly, even when masked images gained sufficient visibility 
as with 80 ms, their physiological responses differed from responses found with 
unmasked pictures shown for 25 ms, suggesting that masking may not only suppress but 
also alter visual processing. Together, these studies indicate that exposure durations of 25 
ms and above are sufficiently long to reveal visual processing of scenes and faces. 
Essentially, because it has not been determined what specific aspects of visual processing 
are disrupted by backward masking – e.g. image processing, afterimage processing – we 
simply cannot determine whether findings obtained using masked and unmasked stimuli 
can be compared. Therefore, even when masked stimuli are perceived, they may still not 
be comparable to perceived unmasked stimuli, as shown by Codispoti et al. (2009), who 
reported that physiological responses also differ between perceived masked and 
unmasked pictures. 
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Another approach that researchers have taken to investigating visual processing 
with minimal exposure is to test whether visual perception can occur in the absence (or 
near absence) of attention. For example, Li et al. (2002) trained a group of participants on 
a demanding letter discrimination task. They gradually shortened the exposure duration 
of the stimuli every time participants’ performance improved, until they individually 
reached a duration at which they could no longer improve (the researchers took this as 
evidence that the task was exhausting attentional resources). The researchers found that 
letter discrimination could be performed at around 77% performance requiring between 
133 ms and 240 ms of exposure. Importantly, even at the briefest possible duration for 
the letter task, when the researchers added peripheral images, observers were still able to 
reliably make discriminations about them (e.g. whether they contained an animal), 
indicating that these durations still enabled perception across the visual field, even when 
attentional resources were exhausted by the main task. Reddy et al. (2004) reported similar 
results using masked human faces. They asked observers to simultaneously perform a 
face-gender discrimination task in the screen periphery and a letter discrimination task in 
the centre of the screen. They found better discrimination for upright faces than inverted 
faces in near absence of attention (when attention was fully employed by the fixated 
stimuli), with exposure durations ranging between 133 and 160 ms per participant. 
However, these studies may have failed to deplete attention. For example, Evans & 
Treisman (2005) reported that classification tasks could widely vary in difficulty 
depending on their nature (detection or identification) and stimulus complexity (number 
of elements in a scene). Thus, one could question whether tasks used to deplete attention 
were sufficiently demanding. Cohen et al. (2011) went one step further and found that 
when the distracting task is sufficiently demanding, perception of natural scenes is fully 
impaired, thus casting doubts on the efficacy of this approach. In addition to these 
limitations, because these studies employed backward masking, they are subject to the 
same limitations described in the previous paragraph. 
In summary, due to hardware limitations, previous studies examining fast visual 
processing had to employ exposure durations that while brief, were sufficiently long for 
participants to exhibit both above-chance detection and discrimination of scenes and 
faces, in addition to differential psychophysiological reactivity to hedonic images. 
Alternatively, researchers have also employed masking techniques to either assess the 
minimal required exposure of visual processing or to prevent conscious processing and 
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thus assess unconscious processing. However, these two approaches suffer from the same 
problem: they cannot determine how much of the findings is due to processing of the 
masks themselves, given that we cannot determine what aspects of visual processing are 
being interrupted, nor to what extent they are interrupted. 
 Here we present a novel solution to determine the minimal required exposure of 
visual perception, using a newly developed LCD tachistoscope that enables sub-
millisecond presentations to study visual discrimination, emotion processing, and 
awareness in face perception. In two experiments, participants had to discriminate the 
location (Experiment 9) and presentation order (Experiment 11) of a face from that of a 
scrambled face, in extremely brief presentations (without a mask) ranging in exposure 
duration from 0.8 to 6.2 ms in the former, and from 0.6 to 6 ms in the latter. To 
accomplish this, we used an adapted version of the procedure described in Chapters 2 
and 3. This procedure allowed us to measure how perceptual sensitivity to the location of 
the intact face and to its emotional expression changed across this range of exposure 
durations. We also asked participants to rate the clarity of their visual experience, which 
allowed us to estimate metacognitive sensitivity, i.e. how sensitive participants’ subjective 
experience is to objective discrimination. As explained below, metacognitive sensitivity 
can be a useful and reliable measure of perceptual awareness. 
 
4.2    Experiment 9 
 In Experiment 9, we measured how perceptual sensitivity and decision criterion 
to the location and emotional expression of human faces changed across exposure 
durations. To do so, we adapted the procedure we developed in Chapter 2. We selected 
seven exposure durations, equally spaced on a linear scale, that encompass the range of 
values from 0.8 to 6.2 ms. After each stimulus presentation, participants judged both 
where on the screen the stimulus was presented and what the stimulus was (an emotional 
or neutral expression). Next, participants judged in the perceptual awareness scale (PAS) 
how clear their visual experience of the face was. The PAS is a 4-point scale that allows 
participants to rate their subjective experience by selecting one of the following 
142 
 
alternatives: “no experience”, “vague impression”, “almost clear experience”, and “clear 
experience” (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004; Sandberg & Overgaard, 2015). Signal Detection 
Theory (SDT) distinguishes between type-1 indices, which assess how well an observer 
can discriminate between stimuli (e.g. between a signal and noise), and type-2 indices that 
assess how well an observer’s confidence (or awareness) ratings can discriminate between 
their own correct and incorrect stimulus classifications. We used type-1 signal detection 
analyses to assess their sensitivity to stimulus location (location d’) and expression 
(identification d’), as well as their criteria for making these judgments. Then, because 
perceptual sensitivity alone does not necessarily reflect changes in awareness – e.g. an 
observer could exhibit above-chance performance in a visual discrimination task without 
being aware of the stimuli employed (e.g. Weiskrantz et al., 1974) – we used type-2 signal 
detection analyses to assess how sensitive their subjective awareness was to their 
perceptual sensitivity (i.e. metacognitive sensitivity or meta-d’) as exposure durations 
increased. 
 
4.2.1 Methods 
 
4.2.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-five students of the Université Libre de Bruxelles provided informed 
consent and were paid €10 for participation. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and reported no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. Three participants were 
excluded from the analysis (see Analysis section). The remaining 32 participants (17 
female; 4 left-handed) had a mean age of 22.6 (SDage = 2.7; range: 18 – 26). The studies 
reported here were approved by the Université Libre de Bruxelles ethics committee. 
Past studies that have found statistically significant effects of emotional 
expression on unconscious visual processing employed around 16 participants per 
experiment (e.g. Yang, et al., 2007). We decided to double this number to increase power 
and allow counterbalancing of experimental blocks with a multiple of 8 (see Procedure 
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section). A retrospective power analysis, conducted using G*Power 3.1.9.7 (Faul et al., 
2009), to test for a difference between conditions in a repeated-measures ANOVA, with 
a small to medium effect size (ηp2 = .04) and alpha of .05, aiming to achieve a statistical 
power of 95%, determined that a sample of 19 participants would be required. If a non-
sphericity correction ε of .5 were to be added – as reported in the results section, a number 
of tests violated this assumption – then a sample of 29 participants would be required. 
 
4.2.1.2 Apparatus and stimuli 
We used a custom-made LCD tachistoscope (Figure 4.1), an adapted version of 
the design described by Sperdin et al. (2013). In both versions, two LCD screens are 
employed with one placed upright vertically and the other placed horizontally, aligned to 
the top of the other screen. Both screens are branded Philipps 223V5LHSB2 with a 
resolution of 1920 × 1080 pixels, with a size of 476.6 mm in width and 268.11 mm in 
height, giving a pixel pitch of 0.248 × 0.248 mm. Both screens are fixed in a rigid 
aluminium frame, which is covered both internally and externally by matte-finished 
Plexiglass, which in addition to providing structural support also prevents light reflection. 
Between the two screens, a diagonally placed semi-permeable mirror allows light to pass 
from the vertical screen while it reflects light emitted from the horizontal screen placed 
above it. Therefore, both screens are presented to the observer superimposed on each 
other if their backlights are simultaneously turned on, as when a target stimulus is 
presented with submillisecond precision. This semi-permeable mirror is a Pilkington 
MirroViewTM 50/50 glass of 418 × 504 mm, 6 mm thickness, toughened for robustness 
(to avoid image deformation due to gravity-caused deflection). We can control which 
screen is visible to the observer at each time point with a precision of 2±1 microseconds 
(µs) by controlling the screens’ backlights, which are powered by an independent power 
supply (36V, 108 Watt) with 20 Ohms rheostat in series to dim screen luminosity. The 
semi-permeable mirror is not perfectly 50:50, resulting in one screen being more luminous 
than the other. Rheostats are therefore employed in order to decrease the voltage of the 
more luminous screen, so it matches the screen with lower luminosity and corrects for 
screen disparities. Unlike the design of Sperdin et al. (2013), in our design backlights are 
controlled by a dedicated micro-controller (ATmega328 AVR) instead of using a parallel 
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port. The micro-controller receives the instruction via serial communication (USB 2.0) in 
order to switch on the backlight for the stimulus’ predetermined presentation duration. 
Using a dedicated micro-controller offers two advantages: it prevents hardware 
compatibility issues since parallel ports are becoming very uncommon; and it provides 
higher precision and consistency given that its only function is controlling backlight thus 
it is not affected by computer workload. A minor disadvantage, however, is that the 
absolute stimulus presentation time is affected by the time it takes for the computer to 
send the instructions, which is not constant and can take a few milliseconds. Nevertheless, 
while the onset of stimulus presentation may vary slightly, the exact stimulus presentation 
duration is controlled with a precision of 2±1 µs for presentations under 16 ms and of 20 
µs for stimulus presentations between 16 ms and 10 seconds. The tachistoscope included 
a signal output to synchronise stimulus presentation durations with other hardware (e.g. 
EEG signal triggers). In the experiments presented in Chapters 4 and 5, the vertical screen 
presented all images that did not involve extremely brief exposure durations, including 
fixation, placeholders, response cue, etc., and its backlight was therefore always on, 
whereas the horizontal screen presented the stimuli that involved extremely brief 
exposure durations (described below), and its backlight was therefore off, except during 
stimulus presentations when it came on for a very brief period; during this period, the 
content of both screens was visible to the observer. 
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Figure 4.1. LCD Tachistoscope. (a) Vertical screen (screen 1), horizontal screen (screen 
2), and semi-permeable mirror. (b) Both screens and the mirror assembled together using 
an aluminium structure. (c) The tachistoscope assembled without lid and (d) with lid, 
showing the eyecup through which participants look at the display. 
Stimuli were 20 human faces (10 fearful and 10 neutral, the same 10 identities for 
both, 5 female; see Appendix C) taken from the Radboud Faces Dataset (RaFD; Langner 
et al., 2010), all seen from a front angle. Images were classified as either fearful or neutral 
expressions, and were matched between these categories, using ratings from the stimulus 
dataset, for agreement with the intended emotional expression (Mfearful = 94.9% [SDfearful 
= 4.12]; Mneutral = 97.5% [4.03]) while minimising intensity differences (by definition, 
fearful expressions are higher in intensity than neutral expressions: Mfearful = 4.27 [0.2]; 
Mneutral = 3.69 [0.27]). Images were cropped to remove hair and create a uniform oval 
shape, transformed to greyscale, and equated for luminance using the Matlab SHINE 
toolbox (Willenbockel et al., 2010). Scrambled images were created by selecting an oval-
shaped area that encompassed all relevant facial features (eyes, nose, and mouth; see 
Appendix D). Then, pixels were divided into 40 square patches, which were scrambled by 
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using the Scramble Filter in PhotoshopTM CC 2019. The luminance of both intact and 
scrambled images was equated (mean luminance = 179.8 cd/m2). Background colour was 
replaced with uniform grey (luminance = 220 cd/m2). Images (2.56 × 3.67 in size) were 
presented either to the left or to the right of a fixation cross (horizontal centre-to-centre 
distance 2.82), between two dots that were placed above and below each stimulus 
location, serving as placeholders (see Figure 4.2). The vertical distance between 
placeholder dots was 4.7. 
Exposure durations used in the first experiment were chosen after a pilot study in 
which we tested 20 participants from the same pool with different duration values 
spanning 0.5 to 10 ms (linearly spaced at 0.8 ms intervals, 160 trials per duration), using 
the procedure described below. We measured participants’ sensitivity scores for location 
discrimination at each duration and used these scores to select 7 exposure durations 
(covering chance performance, d’0, to stable high performance, d’2) for use in the 
experiment. 
All the experiments reported here took place in a dimly lit room. Participants 
viewed the display through a rectangular eyecup, positioned 55 cm away from the vertical 
screen. The tachistoscope was connected to a computer running Matlab (version 2018a) 
and the experiments were written using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 
1997). 
4.2.1.3 Procedure 
Each trial began with the presentation of a black fixation cross (0.41 × 0.41) at 
the centre of the screen and a pair of placeholder dots on each side, marking the locations 
where stimuli would be shown (Figure 4.2). Participants were instructed to focus on the 
fixation cross with both eyes open, avoiding blinking during the trials. 300 ms after trial 
onset, two images were displayed, one on each side, for one of seven equally spaced 
exposure durations (range 0.8 – 6.2 ms). One of the images was an intact human face with 
either a fearful or neutral expression, in either an upright or inverted orientation. The 
other image was the face’s scrambled counterpart. After stimulus offset, only the 
placeholder dots remained on the screen for 200 ms; then, a response cue (“????”) was 
presented at the centre of the screen, prompting participants to report the location of the 
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intact face (left or right) and identify its expression (emotional or non-emotional) with a 
single keypress. The ‘left Control’ and ‘Left Shift’ keys of a standard keyboard were used 
for ‘left’ reports, and the ‘up arrow’ and ‘down arrow’ keys were used for ‘right’ reports. 
Mapping of keys to expressions was counterbalanced across participants. The response 
cue remained on the screen until the participant either pressed a key or 2 seconds had 
elapsed. Following response-cue offset and an additional 300 ms, participants were shown 
the question “How clear was your visual experience?” and 4 response options (Perceptual 
Awareness Scale, PAS; Sandberg & Overgaard, 2015), until the participant either pressed 
a key or 3 seconds had passed. Participants were instructed to describe their visual 
subjective experience of a face, irrespective of its location on the screen or expression. 
Mapping of keys to PAS response was counterbalanced across participants. If the 
participant did not give either of the required responses by the end of its response 
window, an 800-ms message (“You have taken too long to respond!”) was displayed. 
Trials that did not receive both responses were not included in the analyses (no-response 
trials constituted < 2.5% for each of the participants included in the analyses). Following 
the PAS response, only a pair of placeholder dots on each side remained on the screen 
for a 1-second intertrial interval. 
Participants performed 40 practice trials with randomly selected stimuli; these 
were followed by 1120 experimental trials. Face orientation was blocked (70 trials/block), 
with block order counterbalanced across participants in an ABBABAAB BAABABBA 
order (70 trials/block, with A and B denoting upright and inverted faces, respectively, for 
half of the participants, or vice versa for the other half). Participants were given self-
terminated breaks every 70 trials and a compulsory 15-minute break after completing 560 
trials. 
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Figure 4.2. Schematic description of a trial in Experiment 9. Stimuli were presented for 
one of seven possible exposure durations (0.8 – 6.2 ms, equally spaced on a linear scale). 
After stimulus offset, participants judged the location of the intact face (left or right) and 
its expression (emotional or non-emotional) by pressing one key. Next, they judged the 
clarity of their visual experience (PAS). 
 
4.2.1.4 Analyses 
We excluded data from three participants: two failed to provide a response on 
more than 5% of trials (missing data) and one showed chance accuracy, with performance 
that did not increase as exposure durations increased, suggesting that the participant failed 
to pay attention. 
We used Signal Detection Theoretic (SDT) measures to assess how perceptual 
sensitivity, metacognitive sensitivity, and decision criteria changed across display 
durations. To determine each participant’s bias-independent sensitivity to face location 
(left or right; henceforth referred to as location d’) for each combination of duration, face 
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orientation, and emotional expression, we employed the calculation for two-alternative 
forced choice (2AFC) tasks for perceptual sensitivity and criterion (type-1 SDT; 
Macmillan & Creelman, 2004), 𝑑′ location = (
1
√2
) (𝑍(𝐻𝑖𝑡location) − 𝑍(𝐹𝐴location)), where Z(Hit) 
stands for the Z score associated with the probability of a Hit (defined as a trial in which 
a face was displayed on the right and reported on the right), and Z(FA) for that associated 
with the probability of a false alarm (a trial in which a face was displayed on the left but 
reported as being on the right). To estimate each participant’s bias to respond left or right 
(henceforth referred to as response bias) during face location, we employed the 
calculation 𝐶location = − (
1
2
) (𝑍(𝐻𝑖𝑡location) + 𝑍(𝐹𝐴location)). Positive and negative values for 
this measure indicate a bias toward responding “left” and “right”, respectively; however, 
as these may cancel out across participants, we converted the results to absolute values as 
a measure of response bias quantity. To determine how sensitive each participant’s 
awareness judgment (PAS ratings) was to their location sensitivity performance 
(metacognitive sensitivity; henceforth referred to as meta-d’) and the bias in such 
judgments (metacognitive bias; henceforth referred to as meta-bias), we employed the 
maximum likelihood estimation procedure developed by Maniscalco & Lau (2012, 2014, 
2016; see http://www.columbia.edu/~bsm2105/type2sdt/). 
To determine emotional identification sensitivity (to fearful expressions versus 
neutral expressions; henceforth referred to as identification d’), we used the calculation of 
d’ for Yes-No detection tasks, 𝑑′ identification = 𝑍(𝐻𝑖𝑡identification) − 𝑍(𝐹𝐴identification), where a hit was 
defined as correctly reporting a fearful expression and FA was defined as incorrectly 
reporting a fearful expression. To estimate each participant’s identification criterion 
during emotion expression identification, we employed the calculation 𝐶 identification =
− (
1
2
) (𝑍(𝐻𝑖𝑡identification) + 𝑍(𝐹𝐴identification)). These measures were calculated by-condition for 
each participant and analysed using analysis of variance (ANOVA) as detailed below. 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted degrees of freedom were used when Mauchly’s test 
indicated a violation of the sphericity assumption. 
Both frequentist (ANOVA and t-tests) and Bayesian (Bayes factors) statistical 
analyses were performed using Jamovi (The jamovi project, 2020) and corroborated using 
JASP (JASP Team, 2020) and R. When an ANOVA indicated a significant interaction, we 
ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons to look for significant effects. 
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Post hoc pairwise comparisons in these statistical packages use estimated marginal means 
based on the variance of the ANOVA model. For Bayes factor analysis, we defined the 
null hypothesis as no difference between conditions by using a standard Cauchy 
distribution centred on zero with rate of 0.707. 
 
4.2.2 Results 
 
4.2.2.1 Location sensitivity 
To examine how the manipulated factors affected location discrimination, we 
entered location d’ scores into a 2 (expression: fearful, neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright, 
inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found a main effect 
of exposure duration, whereby sensitivity increased with increasing exposure duration 
(𝐹(4.90, 151.98) = 15.331, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .331). Crucially, as shown in Figure 4.3a, 
location d’ scores went from showing no sensitivity (chance performance) at the shortest 
exposure duration to showing high sensitivity at the longest exposure durations, indicating 
that changes in exposure duration in the order of a few milliseconds had a great impact 
on participants’ ability to discriminate an intact face from a scrambled face. Importantly, 
there was a main effect of face orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 34.198, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .530), 
indicating a sensitivity advantage for upright faces (𝑀 = 1.169 [𝑆𝐷 = 0.905]) over 
inverted faces (𝑀 = 0.963 [0.701]): a face-inversion effect. However, the effect of 
expression was only marginally significant (𝐹(1, 31) = 3.633, 𝑝 = .066, ηp2 = .105), with 
a slight numerical advantage of neutral expressions (𝑀 = 1.088 [0.977]) over fearful 
expressions (𝑀 = 1.043 [0.966]). Importantly, the interaction between face orientation 
and exposure duration was significant (𝐹(4.90, 151.98) = 15.331, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .331). To 
see at what specific exposure duration upright faces enjoyed significantly better sensitivity 
over inverted faces, we ran post hoc pairwise comparisons, which revealed an advantage 
of upright faces at 4.4 ms (𝑡(184) =  5.987, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 1.058), 5.3 ms 
(𝑡(184) =  8.164, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 1.443), and 6.2 ms of exposure (𝑡(184) =
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 5.477, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.968). Therefore, 4.4 ms of exposure were sufficient to exhibit 
a face-inversion effect. We did not find an interaction between expression and face 
orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.002, 𝑝 = .970, ηp2 = 0), or between expression and exposure 
duration (𝐹(5.10, 158.13) = 0.912, 𝑝 = .476, ηp2 = .029), or a three-way interaction 
(𝐹(4.96, 153.87) = 15.033, 𝑝 = .400, ηp2 = .032). Thus, expression had no direct or 
modulatory effect on location sensitivity. 
Although we did not find any effect involving expression, absence of evidence is 
not necessarily evidence of absence. Therefore, we calculated Bayes factors to test 
whether the obtained data support the absence of an effect of expression (null hypothesis 
model). Bayes factors indicated strong evidence in favour of the null hypothesis model 
(𝐵𝐹01 = 10.571), suggesting that these data are 10.571 times more likely to be observed 
under the null hypothesis model of expression. This analysis suggests that fearful 
expressions are not prioritised for perceptual discrimination when compared to neutral 
expressions. 
Finally, to determine the minimal required exposure for above-chance 
performance (d’ > 0), we ran a series of uncorrected one-sample t-tests against zero. We 
found that the earliest exposure duration that elicited above-chance discrimination was 
1.7 ms for upright neutral (𝑀 = 0.166 [0.381];  𝑡(31) =  2.47, 𝑝 = .019, 𝑑 =
0.436), inverted fearful (𝑀 = 0.228 [0.396];  𝑡(31) =  3.25, 𝑝 = .003, 𝑑 = 0.575), 
and inverted neutral faces (𝑀 = 0.268 [0.363];  𝑡(31) =  4.17, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 =
0.738), and 2.6 ms for upright fearful faces (𝑀 = 0.627 [0.463];  𝑡(31) =  7.66, 𝑝 <
.001, 𝑑 = 1.354). Thus, our results suggest that above-chance discrimination of an 
intact face stimulus from its scrambled counterpart requires around 2 ms of visual 
exposure. 
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Figure 4.3. Results of Experiment 9. (a) Location sensitivity. Location d’ increased with 
increasing exposure duration, departing from chance around 2 ms. A significant advantage 
for upright faces over inverted faces is present at 4.4, 5.3, and 6.2 ms of exposure. (b) 
Absolute-value response bias scores for reporting location (bias toward either left or 
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right). The amount of response bias decreased as exposure duration increased, with 
slightly (but significantly) greater bias for inverted faces over upright faces. However, 
there was no statistically significant difference between fearful and neutral expressions (c) 
Identification sensitivity for expression. Identification d’ increased with exposure 
duration. A significant advantage in expression identification for upright faces over 
inverted faces arises by 5.3 ms of exposure. (d) Criterion scores for reporting expression. 
Although we did not find main effects of exposure duration and face orientation, we did 
find a significant interaction between these two factors. However, post hoc comparisons 
did not reveal significant differences between orientations at any exposure duration. (e) 
Awareness-based metacognitive sensitivity. Meta-d’ increased with exposure duration. 
Upright faces enjoyed higher scores than inverted faces overall, suggesting awareness 
ratings were more sensitive to face discrimination when faces were in an upright 
orientation than in an inverted orientation. (f) Metacognitive bias scores for reporting 
subjective awareness. Lower scores denote a more liberal bias to report higher confidence. 
Meta-bias increased as exposure duration increased, suggesting that participants were 
more willing to report lower confidence than in shorter exposure durations. Asterisks 
index statistically significant differences between face orientations. Error bars represent 
95% CI. 
 
4.2.2.2 Location response bias 
We examined whether participants’ response bias for reporting face location 
varied across conditions by entering the absolute values of 𝐶location scores into a 2 
(expression: fearful, neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) 
repeated-measures ANOVA. Response bias significantly decreased with exposure 
duration (𝐹(1.73, 53.66) = 18.754, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .377), indicating that as participants’ 
ability to discriminate the face increased (shown by higher location d’ scores) they became 
less likely to exhibit a systematic bias in their preference to report one side or the other 
(Figure 4.3b). We did not find a main effect of expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.026, 𝑝 =
.872, ηp2 = .001), but we did find an effect of face orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 5.718, 𝑝 =
.023, ηp2 = .156), indicating slightly greater bias for inverted faces (𝑀 =
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0.454 [0.177]) over upright faces (𝑀 = 0.388 [0.210]). To assess whether the 
obtained data support the absence of an effect of expression, we estimated Bayes factors, 
which indicated strong evidence for the null hypothesis model  (𝐵𝐹01 = 10.380). No 
interaction reached significance (all p > .078). 
 
4.2.2.3 Expression identification sensitivity 
We examined whether participants’ sensitivity at identifying emotional expression 
varied across conditions by entering identification d’ scores – taken over all trials 
irrespective of location response – into a 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 (exposure 
durations) repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 4.3c). A main effect of exposure duration 
indicated that sensitivity to expression increased with increasing exposure duration 
(𝐹(4.22, 130.93) = 12.89, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .294). We also found a main effect of face 
orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 19.54, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .387), such that expression identification 
d’ was significantly higher for upright faces (𝑀 = 0.243 [0.235]) than for inverted faces 
(𝑀 = 0.088 [0.111]). The interaction between face orientation and exposure duration 
also reached significance (𝐹(4.75, 147.15) = 3.12, 𝑝 = .012, ηp2 = .091). To determine the 
minimal exposure duration that elicited the advantage of upright faces over inverted faces 
in expression identification, we ran post hoc pairwise comparisons. They revealed a 
significant advantage of upright faces over inverted faces at 5.3 ms (𝑡(209) =  3.563,
𝑝 = .041, 𝑑 = 0.630) and 6.2 ms  (𝑡(209) =  4.762, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.842) of 
exposure. 
To determine the minimal required exposure that exhibited above-chance 
performance (d’ > 0), we ran a series of uncorrected one-sample t-tests against zero. We 
found that the earliest exposure duration that elicited above-chance identification was 3.5 
ms for upright (𝑀 = 0.220 [0.349];  𝑡(31) =  3.57, 𝑝 = .001, 𝑑 = 0.631) and 4.4 
ms for inverted faces (𝑀 = 0.137 [0.291];  𝑡(31) =  2.67, 𝑝 = .012, 𝑑 = 0.471). 
These results indicate that sensitivity to expression identity requires about 5.3 ms 
of exposure to exhibit a face-inversion effect, thereby suggesting that this minimal 
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required exposure was sufficient for the successful integration of facial features in 
expression identification. 
 
4.2.2.4 Expression identification criterion 
We examined whether participants’ criteria for reporting fearful expression varied 
across conditions by entering 𝐶identification scores into a 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 
(exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 4.3d). The lower the value of 
this measure, the more willing a participant is to report a fearful expression (liberal 
criterion). We did not find a main effect of exposure duration (𝐹(1.55, 48.11) = 2.05, 𝑝 =
.150, ηp2 = .062) or of face orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 3.11, 𝑝 = .088, ηp2 = .091). 
However, we did find a significant interaction between these two factors (𝐹(3.51, 108.74) =
3.16, 𝑝 = .021, ηp2 = .092). To determine differences between face orientations per 
each exposure duration, we used post hoc pairwise comparisons, but no comparison of 
relevance reached significance. We calculated Bayes factors to test whether the data 
support this absence of an orientation effect. Surprisingly, Bayes factors indicated 
substantial evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 = 0.0003), thus 
suggesting that participants may have exhibited a more liberal criterion when reporting 
fearful expressions. We also calculated Bayes factors to test whether the data support this 
absence of an effect of exposure duration. Bayes factors indicated strong evidence in 
favour of the null hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 = 15.959), confirming that criterion scores 
did not vary across exposure durations. These results suggest that identification criterion 
did not become more liberal across increasing exposure duration but might have been 
more liberal for the identification of fearful faces when the face was presented in an 
upright orientation than in an inverted orientation. 
 
4.2.2.5 Awareness-based metacognitive sensitivity 
We examined whether awareness scores were sensitive to participants’ location 
sensitivity scores by estimating meta-d’, a measure of metacognitive sensitivity. To 
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examine whether metacognitive sensitivity varied across conditions, we entered meta-d’ 
scores into a 2 (expression: fearful, neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 
(exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 4.3e). A main effect of 
exposure duration indicated that meta-d’ increased with increasing exposure duration 
(𝐹(3.69, 114.38) = 12.922, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .294). We also found a main effect of face 
orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 6.475, 𝑝 = .016, ηp2 = .173), which indicates better 
metacognitive sensitivity to upright faces (𝑀 = 0.540 [0.328]) than inverted faces 
(𝑀 = 0.339 [0.271]). However, we did not find a main effect of expression 
(𝐹(1, 31) = 0.110, 𝑝 = .742, ηp2 = .004), suggesting that emotional expression did not 
affect metacognitive sensitivity. We did not find an interaction between face orientation 
and exposure duration (𝐹(4.11, 127.48) = 0.512, 𝑝 = .732, ηp2 = .016), between expression 
and exposure duration (𝐹(4.80, 148.72) = 0.588, 𝑝 = .702, ηp2 = .019), between face 
orientation and expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 1.048, 𝑝 = .314, ηp2 = .033), and no three-way 
interaction either (𝐹(4.48, 138.77) = 0.321, 𝑝 = .882, ηp2 = .01). These results suggest 
upright faces reach conscious access faster than inverted faces. 
As described, we did not find a main effect of expression, therefore we calculated 
Bayes factors to test whether the obtained data support this absence of an effect. Bayes 
factors indicated strong evidence in favour of the null hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 =
13.320), confirming that neither facial expression is prioritised by metacognitive 
sensitivity. 
Finally, to determine the minimal required exposure that exhibited above-chance 
metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’ > 0), we ran a series of uncorrected one-sample t-tests 
against zero. We found that the earliest exposure duration that elicited above-chance 
discrimination was 1.7 ms for upright fearful (𝑀 = 0.325 [0.427];  𝑡(31) =  4.31, 𝑝 <
.001, 𝑑 = 0.762) and upright neutral faces (𝑀 = 0.237 [0.456];  𝑡(31) =  2.94, 𝑝 =
.006, 𝑑 = 0.519), and 2.6 ms for inverted fearful (𝑀 = 0.278 [0.758];  𝑡(31) =  2.07,
𝑝 = .047, 𝑑 = 0.366) and inverted neutral faces (𝑀 = 0.388 [0.632];  𝑡(31) =
 3.47, 𝑝 = .002, 𝑑 = 0.613). Thus, our results suggest that it takes around 2 ms of 
exposure for a face stimulus to reach above-chance metacognitive sensitivity. 
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4.2.2.6 Metacognitive bias 
Metacognitive bias (meta-bias) is the tendency to give high confidence ratings 
regardless of actual performance. In this experiment, however, we used the PAS, a more 
exhaustive measure of awareness than confidence ratings (Sandberg et al., 2010). The PAS 
allows participants to rate their visual experience using four ratings covering from “no 
experience” to “clear experience” reports. Participants described their visual experience 
of a face and, therefore, metacognitive bias describes the tendency to describe one’s visual 
experience as clear. To examine whether metacognitive bias varied across conditions, we 
entered meta-bias scores into a 2 (expression: fearful, neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright, 
inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 4.3f). A main 
effect of exposure duration indicated that as exposure duration increased, meta-bias 
became more conservative (𝐹(3.02, 93.65) = 5.371, 𝑝 = .002, ηp2 = .148), i.e. participants’ 
tendency to give high confidence ratings decreased with exposure duration. However, we 
did not find an effect of orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.749, 𝑝 = .393, ηp2 = .024) or 
expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.003, 𝑝 = .958, ηp2 = 0). No interaction reached significance 
either: between expression and orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.072, 𝑝 = .791, ηp2 = .002), 
expression and exposure duration (𝐹(3.22, 99.88) = 0.469, 𝑝 = .718, ηp2 = .015), 
orientation and exposure duration (𝐹(3.48, 107.84) = 0.275, 𝑝 = .870, ηp2 = .009), and the 
three-way interaction (𝐹(3.41, 105.61) = 0.299, 𝑝 = .850, ηp2 = .01). 
We calculated Bayes factors to test whether the obtained data support this absence 
of an effect of orientation and expression. Bayes factors indicated strong evidence in 
favour of the null hypothesis model of orientation (𝐵𝐹01 = 10.022) and of the null 
hypothesis model of expression (𝐵𝐹01 = 13.329), confirming that metacognitive bias 
was unaffected by emotional expression and face orientation. 
 
4.2.3 Discussion 
 This first experiment found that discrimination between intact and scrambled 
faces increases from no sensitivity (chance performance) to above-chance sensitivity in 
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less than three milliseconds of exposure. Therefore, very little visual information was 
required for stimulus discrimination. In addition, we found a face-inversion effect – 
locations of upright faces were more easily discriminated than inverted faces – which 
required only a little over four milliseconds of exposure to emerge. This finding suggests 
that holistic face processing provided an advantage, starting from 4.4 ms of exposure. 
However, we did not find an advantage of fearful expressions over neutral expressions, 
suggesting that perceptual sensitivity is not enhanced for emotional content. These 
findings were complemented by type-2 signal detection analyses, as we also found a 
metacognitive sensitivity advantage for upright faces over inverted faces, suggesting that 
the former reach higher meta-d’ scores than the latter as exposure duration increases. 
Similar to our type-1 SDT findings, we did not find an advantage of fearful expressions 
over neutral expressions on this measure either, suggesting that emotional content is not 
prioritised for faces’ access to awareness. 
 Expression identification required more visual exposure than location 
discrimination to reach above-chance sensitivity – around four milliseconds. Expression 
identification was accompanied by a face-inversion effect, found (only slightly later) with 
5.3 ms of exposure, suggesting that holistic processing may make a crucial contribution 
to identifying a facial expression as emotional or non-emotional. Indeed, fearful 
expressions were more easily identified when shown in upright orientation. 
Importantly, these findings demonstrate that face discrimination and awareness 
arise together: perceptual performance does not seem to arise earlier (with between 1.7 
and 2.6 ms as indicated by type-1 SDT measures) than awareness (also with between 1.7 
and 2.6 ms as indicated by type-2 SDT measures); overall, we find no convincing evidence 
for unconscious face processing that takes place before faces gain access to awareness. 
 Taken together, these findings demonstrate that face processing requires a 
minimal exposure duration of just a few milliseconds, and suggest that different aspects 
of faces might be processed in a hierarchical sequence: as exposure duration increased, 
participants exhibited evidence first for detection of faces, then for holistic face 
processing, and finally for emotion processing; this was indicated by both type-1 SDT 
measures of perceptual performance and type-2 SDT measures of perceptual awareness. 
Importantly, fearful and neutral expressions gained access to perception and awareness in 
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a similar manner as exposure duration increased, suggesting that emotional content does 
not modulate early visual processing of faces. 
In the absence of masking, however, image processing may not have ended at 
stimulus offset; we cannot rule out a contribution of afterimage processing. The image 
stimuli presented in Experiment 9 could have left a retinal impression (afterimage) for a 
longer duration than the exposure durations we predefined. How much did afterimage 
processing contribute to perceptual sensitivity? We address this question in the following 
control experiment. 
 
4.3    Experiment 10 (Control) 
To test whether perceptual discrimination in Experiment 9 – expressed in 
sensitivity scores – could have been affected by afterimage processing, we developed this 
first control experiment. Afterimages are retinal impressions that persist after stimulus 
removal. They exhibit inverted lightness levels and complementary colours to the stimulus 
that caused it (Shimojo et al., 2001). We thus tested whether stimuli that have these 
properties can elicit the effects found in Experiment 9. To emulate afterimages, we 
inverted the stimuli’s colour and presented participants with those new face images 
instead. To avoid creating a positive afterimage (i.e. an afterimage of the afterimage-like 
stimuli), we used backward masking. In addition, we only used one exposure duration of 
10 ms, an exposure duration that should be sufficiently long to elicit the face-inversion 
effect both with location sensitivity scores and with expression identification sensitivity 
scores, as shown in Experiment 9. If afterimage processing made a substantial 
contribution to the findings reported in Experiment 9, we should find these two face-
inversion effects with these new afterimage-like stimuli. If we do not, we can argue that 
these findings in Experiment 9 could not be attributed to afterimage processing. 
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4.3.1 Methods 
 
4.3.1.1 Participants 
All the participants of Experiment 9 did this control experiment 10 minutes after 
having finished Experiment 9. 
 
4.3.1.2 Stimuli 
 Stimuli were the same as in Experiment 9, but with inverted colours to emulate 
negative afterimages, including both intact and scrambled face images (Figure 4.4; for full 
layout of afterimage stimuli, see Appendix E). 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Examples of afterimage-like stimuli. (Left) Intact face with neutral (top) and 
fearful (bottom) expression. (Right) Their colour-inverted afterimage-like counterparts. 
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4.3.1.3 Procedure 
 The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 9, but with only one exposure 
duration (10 ms); hence this experiment had fewer trials in total (160). In addition, 
backward masking was used to prevent the new stimuli from creating afterimages. To 
achieve this, on each trial we presented the non-colour-inverted scrambled version of the 
face used in that trial. The mask was displayed for 50 ms immediately after stimulus offset 
in both intact and scrambled stimulus locations. Then, as in Experiment 9, participants 
were asked to first judge the location and expression of the intact face stimulus, followed 
by rating their visual experience (PAS). 
 
4.3.2 Results 
 
4.3.2.1 Location sensitivity 
To examine whether face orientation and expression modulate participants’ ability 
to discriminate the location of afterimage-like face stimuli, we entered location d’ scores 
into a 2 (expression: fearful, neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) repeated-
measures ANOVA (Figure 4.5a). We did not find an effect of expression 
(𝐹(1, 31) = 0.038, 𝑝 = .846, ηp2 = .001) or of orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 1.926, 𝑝 =
.175, ηp2 = .058), indicating that neither factor modulated location d’. The interaction 
between these two factors did not reach significance either (F(1, 31) = 0.073, p =
.789, ηp2 = .002), even though stimuli were presented for substantially longer than the 
duration that enabled such discriminations for intact faces. To assess whether the 
obtained data support the absence of an effect of expression and of orientation, we 
estimated Bayes factors, which indicated substantial evidence for the null hypothesis 
model in the former (𝐵𝐹01 = 5.153) and in the latter (𝐵𝐹01 = 4.974). 
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Figure 4.5. Results of Experiment 10 (Control). (a) Location sensitivity. Location d’ 
scores were very low and unaffected by expression or orientation. (b) Identification 
sensitivity for expression. Identification d’ was at chance level both for upright and 
inverted faces. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
To examine whether participants could tell, above chance, on what side the intact 
afterimage-like faces were, we ran a series of uncorrected one-sample t-tests against zero. 
We found that upright fearful  (𝑀 = 0.264 [0.374];  𝑡(31) =  4.00, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 =
 0.707), upright neutral (𝑀 = 0.280 [0.306];  𝑡(31) =  5.18, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 =  0.915), 
inverted fearful (𝑀 = 0.253 [0.382];  𝑡(31) =  3.76, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 =  0.664), and 
inverted neutral faces (𝑀 = 0.263 [0.305];  𝑡(31) =  4.87, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 =  0.860) 
were discriminated above chance, thus indicating that participants could discriminate 
between intact and scrambled afterimage-like faces, though with low sensitivity. 
 
4.3.2.2 Expression identification sensitivity 
To examine whether face orientation modulates participants’ ability to identify the 
expression of afterimage-like face stimuli, we compared identification d’ scores for upright 
and inverted faces by using a paired-sample t-test. We did not find significant differences 
between face orientations in identification sensitivity (𝑡(31) = −0.808, 𝑝 = .787, 𝑑 =
 −0.143). To assess whether the obtained data support the absence of an effect of face 
orientation, we estimated Bayes factors, which indicated substantial evidence for the null 
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hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 = 3.920). These results suggest that participants are not able to 
identify fearful expressions and distinguish them from neutral expressions by using 
afterimage processing (Figure 4.5b). 
 
4.3.3 Discussion 
 In this control experiment, we presented participants with images that resembled 
the afterimages that may have been generated by viewing a face. This approach allowed 
us to test whether afterimage processing could fully or partly explain the findings of 
Experiment 9. Crucially, we did not find face-inversion effects in location or identification 
sensitivity, indicating that holistic face processing was not engaged with afterimage-like 
faces. Therefore, these results suggest that afterimage processing could not explain our 
findings of Experiment 9. Similarly, we found extremely low expression identification 
sensitivity for both upright and inverted faces. These results suggest the findings of 
Experiment 9 cannot be attributed to afterimage processing. 
 
4.4    Experiment 11 
 The visual task used in Experiment 9 presented participants with two images per 
trial, one on each side of the screen. Therefore, visual processing involved in both the 
location and expression identification tasks mainly relied on peripheral vision. In the 
retinal periphery, the concentration of photoreceptors is much lower than in the foveal 
region (i.e. centre of the visual field), thereby enjoying lower resolution than the latter 
(Baden et al., 2020). In Experiment 11, we adapted our task so visual processing depended 
on foveal vision, where resolution is the highest. To accomplish this, we turned the 
previous 2AFC task into a two-interval forced choice (2IFC) task. Intact and scrambled 
face images were presented at the centre of the screen one after the other. Participants 
had to discriminate when (first or second) the intact face image was shown. To anticipate 
the possibility that foveal vision would allow better perceptual performance than 
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peripheral vision, we used shorter exposure durations than in Experiment 9 (0.6 – 6 ms, 
each duration 200µs-shorter than its Experiment 9 counterpart). Importantly, the design 
of this experiment allowed us to examine whether the effect of orientation, observed in 
Experiment 9, would replicate for foveal vision; and whether an effect of expression, 
absent in Experiment 9, might arise when images are presented foveally. Measuring 
perceptual sensitivity in peripheral (Experiment 9) and foveal vision (Experiment 11) 
allows for a more general description of how faces are visually processed and gain access 
to awareness. 
 
4.4.1 Methods 
 
4.4.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-four students of the Université Libre de Bruxelles provided informed 
consent and were paid €10 for participation. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and reported no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. Two participants were 
excluded from the analysis (see Analysis section). The remaining 32 participants (19 
female; 5 left-handed) had a mean age of 24.6 (SDage = 5.5; range: 18 – 28). 
 
4.4.1.2 Stimuli 
 Stimuli were the same as in Experiment 9, but the range of presentation durations 
differed in that each duration in this experiment was 200 µs shorter than its Experiment 
9 counterpart: 0.6, 1.5, 2.4, 3.3, 4.2, 5.1, and 6 ms. 
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4.4.1.3 Procedure 
 The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 9 (Figure 4.6), with the following 
differences: each trial began by presenting a fixation cross at the centre of the screen along 
with one pair of placeholder dots – one above and one below the fixation cross – for 400 
ms. After fixation cross offset, the two placeholder dots were left on the screen for 300 
ms. Then, one stimulus was displayed at the centre of the screen for a predetermined 
exposure duration (fixation cross offset was separated from stimulus onset by 300 ms to 
prevent the possibility that the visual transient of the cross’s disappearance might forward-
mask the stimulus). After stimulus offset, only the placeholder dots were left on the 
screen, for 300 ms. Then, the fixation cross was presented in the centre of the screen 
again for 400 ms. After fixation cross offset, only the placeholder dots were left on the 
screen for 300 ms. The second stimulus was displayed at the centre of the screen for the 
same predetermined exposure duration as the first one. Finally, after the second stimulus’ 
offset, only the placeholder dots were left on the screen for 300 ms, after which the 
response cue was presented at the centre of the screen, prompting participants to report 
the presentation order (whether the intact face had appeared first or second) and identify 
its expression (emotional or non-emotional) with a single keypress using the same keys as 
in Experiment 9: the ‘left Control’ and ‘Left Shift’ keys were used for “first” reports, and 
the ‘up arrow’ and ‘down arrow’ keys were used for “second” reports. Block structure, 
breaks, number of trials, and practice were the same as in Experiment 9. 
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Figure 4.6. Schematic description of a trial in Experiment 11. Stimuli were presented for 
one of seven possible exposure durations (0.6 – 6 ms, equally spaced on a linear scale). 
After stimulus offset, participants judged the presentation order (whether the intact face 
was first or second) and its expression (emotional or non-emotional) by pressing one key. 
Next, they judged the clarity of their visual experience (PAS). 
 
4.4.1.4 Analyses 
 Analyses were the same as in Experiment 9, with one exception: instead of 
location d’ we estimated order d’, i.e. sensitivity to the presentation order of the intact 
faces. A hit was defined as a trial in which a face was displayed first and reported first, 
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and a false alarm was defined as a trial in which a face was displayed second but reported 
as shown first. 
 
4.4.2 Results 
 
4.4.2.1 Order sensitivity 
To examine how the manipulated factors affected face discrimination, we entered 
order d’ scores into a 2 (expression: fearful, neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 
7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found a main effect of exposure 
duration, whereby sensitivity increased with increasing exposure duration (F(2.23, 69.02) =
180.787, p < .001, ηp2 = .854). As in Experiment 9, order d’ scores went from 
showing no sensitivity (chance performance) at the shortest exposure duration to showing 
high sensitivity at the longest exposure durations (Figure 4.7a). We also found a main 
effect of face orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 49.058, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .613), indicating a 
sensitivity advantage for upright faces (𝑀 = 0.970 [0.785]) over inverted faces (𝑀 =
0.709 [0.616]), but did not find a main effect of expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.761, 𝑝 =
.390, ηp2 = .024), indicating no advantage of fearful expressions over neutral 
expressions. Importantly, the interaction between face orientation and exposure duration 
was significant (𝐹(4.98, 154.24) = 10.713, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .257). To see at what specific 
exposure durations upright faces enjoyed significantly better sensitivity over inverted 
faces, and thus answer our main question, we ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons, which revealed said advantage at 3.3 ms (𝑡(187) =  4.737, 𝑝 < .001,
𝑑 = 0.837), 4.2 ms (𝑡(187) =  7.515, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 1.328), 5.1 ms (𝑡(187) =
 6.694, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 1.183), and 6 ms of exposure (𝑡(187) =  4.837, 𝑝 < .001,
𝑑 = 0.855). Crucially, 3.3 ms of exposure were sufficient to elicit a face-inversion effect 
when perceptual discrimination relied on foveal vision. As in Experiment 9, we did not 
find an interaction between expression and face orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.504, 𝑝 =
.483, ηp2 = .016), or between expression and exposure duration (𝐹(5.11, 158.36) =
168 
 
0.328, 𝑝 = .899, ηp2 = .010), or a three-way interaction (𝐹(4.97, 154.08) = 1.313, 𝑝 <
.262, ηp2 = .041). 
To determine the minimal exposure that exhibited above-chance performance (d’ 
> 0), we ran a series of uncorrected one-sample t-tests against zero. We found that the 
earliest exposure duration that elicited above-chance discrimination was 1.5 ms for 
upright fearful (𝑀 = 0.197 [0.299];  𝑡(31) = 3.72, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.658), and 2.4 ms 
for upright neutral faces (𝑀 = 0.450 [0.534];  𝑡(31) =  4.77, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.842), 
inverted fearful faces (𝑀 = 0.358 [0.364];  𝑡(31) =  5.57, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.984), and 
inverted fearful faces (𝑀 = 0.367 [0.534];  𝑡(31) =  3.90, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.689). Our 
results suggest that it takes around 2 ms of exposure for a face stimulus to reach above-
chance discrimination from its scrambled counterpart when relying on foveal vision. 
Like in Experiment 9, we did not find a main effect of expression. Therefore, we 
calculated Bayes factors to test whether the obtained data support the absence of this 
effect (null hypothesis model). Bayes factors indicated strong evidence in favour of the 
null hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 = 11.891). This analysis suggests that fearful expressions 
are not prioritised by perceptual sensitivity over neutral expressions. 
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Figure 4.7. Results of Experiment 11. (a) Order sensitivity. Order d’ increased with 
increasing exposure duration. The face-inversion effect arises by 3.3 ms of exposure. (b) 
Absolute-value response bias scores for reporting presentation order of the intact face 
(bias toward reporting either first or second). The amount of bias decreased as exposure 
duration increased, but there was no difference in amount of response bias between 
expressions and orientations. (c) Identification sensitivity for expression. Identification d’ 
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increased with increasing exposure duration. A significant advantage in expression 
identification of upright faces over inverted faces arises by 4.2 ms of exposure. (d) 
Criterion scores for reporting expression. Upright faces exhibit a significantly more liberal 
criterion (lower values) than inverted faces during expression identification. (e) 
Awareness-based metacognitive sensitivity. Meta-d’ increased with increasing exposure 
duration. Upright faces enjoyed higher scores than inverted faces overall, suggesting 
awareness ratings were more sensitive to presentation order discrimination when faces 
were in an upright orientation than in an inverted orientation. (f) Metacognitive bias 
scores for reporting subjective awareness. Lower scores denote a more liberal bias to 
report higher confidence. Meta-bias increased as exposure duration increased, suggesting 
that participants were more willing to exhibit lower confidence than in shorter exposure 
durations. Asterisks index statistically significant differences between face orientations. 
Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
4.4.2.2 Order response bias 
We examined whether participants’ response bias for reporting the intact face 
presentation order varied across conditions by entering the absolute values of 𝐶order scores 
into a 2 (expression: fearful, neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 (exposure 
durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. As in Experiment 9, response bias significantly 
decreased with increasing exposure duration (𝐹(1.98, 61.31) = 12.581, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 =
.289), indicating that as participants’ ability to discriminate the face increased, they 
became less likely to exhibit a systematic bias in their preference to report one 
presentation order or the other (Figure 4.7b). We did not find a main effect of expression 
(𝐹(1, 31) = 0.014, 𝑝 = .906, ηp2 = 0), or of face orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 1.099, 𝑝 =
.303, ηp2 = .034). No interaction reached significance (all p > .268). 
To assess whether the obtained data support the absence of an effect of 
expression and of orientation, we estimated Bayes factors, which indicated strong 
evidence for the null hypothesis model of expression (𝐵𝐹01 = 13.746) and of orientation 
(𝐵𝐹01 = 10.287). 
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4.4.2.3 Expression identification sensitivity 
We examined whether participants’ sensitivity at identifying expression varied 
across conditions by entering identification d’ scores into a 2 (orientation: upright, 
inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 4.7c). We found 
a main effect of exposure duration, indicating that sensitivity to expression increased with 
increasing exposure duration (𝐹(3.36, 104.12) = 36.20, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .539). We also 
found a main effect of face orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 27.87, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .473), such 
that expression identification sensitivity was significantly higher for upright faces (𝑀 =
0.389 [0.418]) than for inverted faces (𝑀 = 0.155 [0.227]). The interaction between 
orientation and exposure duration also reached significance (𝐹(4.99, 154.54) = 6.08, 𝑝 <
.001, ηp2 = .164). To determine the minimal exposure duration that elicited this face-
inversion effect in expression identification sensitivity, we ran post hoc Bonferroni-
corrected pairwise comparisons. They revealed significant advantages of upright faces 
over inverted faces at 4.2 ms (𝑡(198) =  3.967, 𝑝 = .009, 𝑑 = 0.701), 5.1 ms 
(𝑡(198) =  4.632, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.819), and 6 ms  (𝑡(198) = 6.279, 𝑝 <
.001, 𝑑 = 1.110) of exposure. 
To determine the minimal exposure that exhibited above-chance performance (d’ 
> 0) in expression identification, we ran a series of uncorrected one-sample t-tests against 
zero. We found that the earliest exposure duration that elicited above-chance 
discrimination was 1.5 ms for upright faces (𝑀 = 0.112 [0.262];  𝑡(31) =  2.41, 𝑝 =
.022, 𝑑 = 0.427), and 3.3 ms for inverted faces (𝑀 = 0.169 [0.322];  𝑡(31) =  2.96,
𝑝 = .006, 𝑑 = 0.524). 
 
4.4.2.4 Expression identification criterion 
We examined whether participants’ criterion for reporting fearful expression 
varied across conditions by entering 𝐶identification scores into a 2 (orientation: upright, 
inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We did not find a 
significant main effect of exposure duration (𝐹(1.46, 45.36) = 2.66, 𝑝 = .096, ηp2 = .079), 
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but we did find a main effect of face orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 8.91, 𝑝 = .005, ηp2 = .223), 
indicating a more liberal criterion for upright faces (𝑀 = 0.274 [0.135]) than inverted 
faces (𝑀 = 0.420 [0.102]), i.e. participants were more willing to report a fearful 
expression for an upright face than for an inverted face (Figure 4.7d). The interaction 
between face orientation and exposure duration reached significance (𝐹(3.79, 117.44) =
3.26, 𝑝 = .016, ηp2 = .095). To determine differences between face orientations per 
each exposure duration, we ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons. 
However, no comparison of interest reached significance. To assess whether the obtained 
data support the absence of an effect of exposure duration, we estimated Bayes factors, 
which unexpectedly indicated anecdotal evidence for the alternative hypothesis model 
(𝐵𝐹01 = 0.046), i.e. in favour of an effect of exposure duration. These results suggest 
that identification criterion was only affected by face orientation. However, the data are 
inconclusive regarding whether exposure duration contributed to identification criterion. 
 
4.4.2.5 Awareness-based metacognitive sensitivity 
We examined whether awareness scores were sensitive to participants’ order 
sensitivity scores by estimating meta-d’. To examine whether metacognitive sensitivity 
varied across conditions, we entered meta-d’ scores into a 2 (expression: fearful, neutral) 
× 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA 
(Figure 4.7e). A main effect of exposure duration indicated that meta-d’ increased with 
increasing exposure duration (𝐹(3.41, 105.73) = 29.216, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .485). We also 
found a main effect of face orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 6.176, 𝑝 = .019, ηp2 = .166), which 
indicates better metacognitive sensitivity to upright faces (𝑀 = 0.573 [0.461]) than 
inverted faces (𝑀 = 0.440 [0.370]). However, we did not find a main effect of 
expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 0, 𝑝 = .977, ηp2 = 0), thus suggesting emotional expression did 
not affect metacognitive sensitivity. No other interaction reached significance (all p > 
.298). These results suggest that upright faces reach awareness faster than inverted faces. 
As described, we did not find a main effect of expression, therefore we calculated 
Bayes factors to test whether the obtained data support this absence of an effect. Bayes 
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factors indicated strong evidence in favour of the null hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 =
13.343), thus suggesting that fearful expressions are not prioritised by metacognitive 
sensitivity when compared to neutral expressions. 
Finally, to determine the minimal exposure that exhibited above-chance 
metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’ > 0), we ran a series of uncorrected one-sample t-tests 
against zero. We found that the earliest exposure duration that elicited above-chance 
discrimination was 2.4 ms for upright fearful faces (𝑀 = 0.374 [0.587];  𝑡(31) =
 3.60, 𝑝 = .001, 𝑑 = 0.637), upright neutral faces (𝑀 = 0.307 [0.597];  𝑡(31) =
 2.91, 𝑝 = .007, 𝑑 = 0.514), inverted fearful faces (𝑀 = 0.273 [0.706];  𝑡(31) =
 2.18, 𝑝 = .037, 𝑑 = 0.386), and 3.3 ms for inverted neutral faces (𝑀 =
0.507 [0.535];  𝑡(31) =  5.36, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.948). Thus, our results suggest that it 
takes around 3 ms of exposure for a face stimulus to reach above-chance metacognitive 
sensitivity. 
 
4.4.2.6 Metacognitive bias 
We estimated metacognitive bias as in Experiment 9. To examine whether 
metacognitive bias varied across conditions, we entered meta-bias scores into a 2 
(expression: fearful, neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 7 (exposure durations) 
repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 4.7f). A main effect of exposure duration indicated 
that metacognitive bias became less liberal with increasing exposure duration 
(𝐹(3.21, 99.55) = 4.127, 𝑝 = .007, ηp2 = .117), thus indicating that as participants’ 
metacognitive sensitivity increased, they became less likely to systematically report having 
no experience (or clear experience) of the intact stimulus shown. However, we did not 
find an effect of face orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.420, 𝑝 = .522, ηp2 = .013) or of 
expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.139, 𝑝 = .712, ηp2 = .004). No interaction reached significance 
either (all p > .550). 
We calculated Bayes factors to test whether the obtained data support this absence 
of an effect of orientation and expression. Bayes factors indicated strong evidence in 
favour of the null hypothesis model of orientation (𝐵𝐹01 = 11.326) and of expression 
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(𝐵𝐹01 = 12.287), thus suggesting that neither fearful (compared to neutral) expressions 
nor upright (compared to inverted) faces are prioritised by metacognitive sensitivity. 
 
4.4.3 Discussion 
 In this experiment, we tested how discrimination of face presentation order and 
expression identification increase across increasing exposure durations. Unlike in 
Experiment 9, where we measured sensitivity in a 2AFC task that relied on peripheral 
vision, in Experiment 11 we measured sensitivity in a 2IFC task, which relied on foveal 
vision, where resolution is the highest. We found equivalent results to those reported in 
Experiment 9, in all sensitivity and criterion measures. Interestingly, the face-inversion 
effect was elicited at 3.3 ms, whereas in Experiment 9 it arose at 4.4 ms, suggesting that 
holistic face processing might have benefited from foveal-based visual discrimination. 
 Taken together, findings from both Experiment 9 and Experiment 11 converge 
to show how stimulus discrimination, holistic face processing, and emotion identification 
emerge, in this order, across six milliseconds of visual exposure. Both experiments also 
converge on metacognitive sensitivity by showing that upright faces gain access to 
awareness faster than inverted faces, whereas emotional content in faces does not affect 
either perceptual or metacognitive sensitivity. Importantly, these findings demonstrate 
that face discrimination and awareness arise together: perceptual performance does not 
seem to arise earlier (with between 1.5 and 2.4 ms as indicated by type-1 SDT measures) 
than awareness (with between 2.4 and 3.3 ms as indicated by type-2 SDT measures), taking 
into account that the data were noisy; overall, as in Experiment 9, we find no convincing 
evidence for unconscious face processing that takes place before faces gain access to 
awareness. 
4.5    Experiment 12 (Control) 
 In Experiment 10 (Control), we tested whether findings in Experiment 9 could 
be affected by afterimage processing. Our findings suggested that neither face orientation 
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nor expression could be discriminated with afterimage-like stimuli presented for 10 ms 
(over 3 ms longer than the longest-duration stimuli in Experiment 9). However, that 
approach presented two limitations. First, we used backward masking to prevent those 
afterimage-like stimuli from creating additional afterimages. Yet backward masking could 
have also disrupted perceptual sensitivity, thus making the procedure less reliable. Second, 
we only used one exposure duration, making it impossible to determine whether exposure 
duration modulates the discrimination of intact afterimage-like stimuli from their 
scrambled afterimage-like counterparts. In this second control experiment, we addressed 
these issues with the 2IFC task used in Experiment 11. 
 We employed three exposure durations that covered the range of values used in 
Experiment 11: from when order sensitivity was at chance (0.6 ms), when the face-
inversion effect arose (3.3 ms), and when location sensitivity was very high (6 ms). We 
used the same afterimage-like stimuli of Experiment 10 (Control), but this time we did 
not use any masking. If these stimuli exhibit a modulatory effect of face orientation on 
order sensitivity (a face-inversion effect), it is likely that afterimage processing may have 
contributed to these same effects in Experiment 11. Conversely, if these stimuli do not 
exhibit said effect, it would suggest that the face-inversion effect found in Experiment 11 
cannot be explained by afterimage processing. 
 
4.5.1 Methods 
 
4.5.1.1 Participants 
All the participants of Experiment 11 did this control experiment 10 minutes after 
having finished Experiment 11. 
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4.5.1.2 Stimuli, Procedure, and Analyses 
Stimuli were the same as in Experiment 10 (Control), and procedures were the 
same as in Experiment 11, but with only three exposure durations, hence fewer trials in 
total (480). Analyses were the same as in Experiment 11 for sensitivity and criterion. 
 
4.5.2 Results 
 
4.5.2.1 Order sensitivity 
To examine how the manipulated factors affected order presentation 
discrimination of afterimage-like faces, we entered order d’ scores into a 2 (expression: 
fearful, neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 3 (exposure durations) repeated-
measures ANOVA. Importantly, a main effect of exposure duration was found 
(𝐹(1.70, 52.74) = 114.565, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .787) indicating that order sensitivity increased 
with increasing exposure duration when using afterimage-like faces (Figure 4.8a). 
However, we did not find an effect of expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.011, 𝑝 = .917, ηp2 = 0) 
nor of orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 2.698, 𝑝 = .111, ηp2 = .080), thus suggesting neither 
expression nor face orientation affected sensitivity to afterimage-like faces. Importantly, 
this finding of a null effect of orientation suggests that the orientation effect found in 
Experiment 11 cannot be attributed to afterimage processing. The interaction between 
face orientation and exposure duration reached significance (𝐹(1.94, 60.18) = 4.228, 𝑝 =
.020, ηp2 = .120). However, post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons did 
not reveal significant differences between upright and inverted faces at any exposure 
duration. No other interaction reached significance (all p > .456). To assess whether the 
obtained data support the absence of an effect of expression and of face orientation, we 
estimated Bayes factors, which indicated substantial evidence for the null hypothesis 
model in the former (𝐵𝐹01 = 8.394) and in the latter (𝐵𝐹01 = 5.849). These results 
suggest that discrimination of afterimage-like faces increases with exposure duration 
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similarly as it did with regular images in Experiment 11. However, face orientation did 
not modulate discrimination this time, which may suggest that either afterimage 
processing does not contribute to holistic face processing or that it does but requires 
longer exposure durations to reveal a face-inversion effect. 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Results of Experiment 12 (Control). (a) Order sensitivity. Order d’ increased 
with increasing exposure duration from chance discrimination to high discrimination but 
was unaffected by expression or orientation. (b) Identification sensitivity for expression. 
Identification d’ increased with increasing exposure duration but was unaffected by 
orientation. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
4.5.2.2 Expression identification sensitivity 
To examine how the manipulated factors affected expression identification of 
afterimage-like faces, we compared identification d’ scores for upright and inverted faces 
by entering the data into a 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) × 3 (exposure durations) 
repeated-measures ANOVA. A main effect of exposure duration was found 
(𝐹(1.88, 58.26) = 16.521, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .348), suggesting that expression identification 
sensitivity increased with increasing exposure duration (Figure 4.8b). However, we did 
178 
 
not find an effect of face orientation (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.004, 𝑝 = .952, ηp2 = 0), indicating that 
face orientation did not affect expression identification. Likewise, the interaction between 
these factors did not reach significance (𝐹(1.84, 57.10) = 0.195, 𝑝 = .806, ηp2 = .006). To 
assess whether the obtained data support the absence of an effect of face orientation, we 
estimated Bayes factors, which indicated substantial evidence for the null hypothesis 
model (𝐵𝐹01 = 6.648). These results suggest that expression identification increases with 
increasing exposure duration regardless of face orientation. Because turning faces upside 
down disrupts holistic face processing, these results might rely on discrimination of local 
face features preserved in afterimage-like faces rather than on holistic features. 
 
4.5.3 Discussion 
 When a visual image is presented and then removed, retinal impressions 
(afterimages) can be formed. Because we could not measure, in Experiments 9 and 11, 
whether such afterimages were formed, to what extent they were processed, and whether 
they contributed to participants’ sensitivity, we ran two control experiments to assess 
participants’ sensitivity to afterimage-like images of faces and assess whether the results 
of Experiments 9 and 11 could be attributed – in whole or in part – to afterimage 
processing. In Experiment 10, we used afterimage-like faces to emulate afterimage 
processing by measuring participants’ sensitivity to relatively long presentations of those 
stimuli (compared to the durations used in Experiment 9), and backward masking to 
prevent said afterimage-like stimuli from creating additional afterimages. We found 
above-chance (though weak) location sensitivity; participants were unable to identify 
expressions, though, and the inversion effect seen in Experiment 9 was absent. However, 
our procedure in Experiment 10 was different from that of Experiment 9 – our use of 
backward masking may have interacted with stimulus processing, and the use of a single 
presentation duration did not allow us to measure whether exposure duration modulated 
perceptual sensitivity. 
 In Experiment 12 (Control), we presented participants with unmasked stimuli, 
using three of the exposure durations used in Experiment 11. We found that participants 
could discriminate intact afterimage-like faces from their scrambled counterparts. 
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Crucially, they did not exhibit a face-inversion effect either in order discrimination or 
expression identification. These results suggest that in both Experiment 9 and 
Experiment 11 participants’ sensitivity to faces might have partially relied on information 
coming from afterimage processing, but it is unlikely that such information contributed 
to holistic face processing as indexed by the face-inversion effect. 
 
4.6    General Discussion 
 What is the minimal exposure duration required for face perception? Due to 
hardware limitations, past studies could not employ sufficiently brief exposure durations 
to address this question. Researchers had to rely on different strategies such as using 
masking techniques to interrupt visual processing. However, it is impossible to determine 
what aspects of visual processing masking techniques interrupt, or to what extent they are 
interrupted. In this Chapter, we circumvented the technical limitations of standard 
computer monitors by using a newly developed LCD tachistoscope that allows extremely 
brief visual presentations. This allowed us to present observers with unmasked faces using 
exposure durations ranging from less than one millisecond to around six milliseconds. 
This range of exposure values was sufficiently sensitive to capture changes in face 
discrimination, holistic processing, emotional expression identification, and perceptual 
awareness. By using type-2 signal detection analyses, we could describe changes in 
metacognitive sensitivity, i.e. how awareness discriminated changes in location 
discrimination performance across exposure durations. Thus, using extremely brief 
exposure durations, we obtained signal detection indices that have provided us with a 
convergent description of the sequence of processing steps that unfolds in the early stages 
of face processing. 
We ran two experiments with seven linearly spaced exposure durations to track 
changes in stimulus discrimination and test whether upright faces enjoy an advantage over 
inverted faces, as shown in masking studies by others (Akechi et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 
2007; Kobylka et al., 2017; Moors, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2016; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011) 
and by us (see Chapters 2 and 3). In addition, we tested whether fearful expressions enjoy 
180 
 
an advantage over neutral expressions, as claimed in other studies (Capitão et al., 2014; 
Hedger et al., 2015; Oliver et al., 2015; Sterzer et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2007; Yang & Yeh, 
2018a; Zhan et al., 2015). We found remarkably similar minimal exposure durations for 
face discrimination, both when stimulus discrimination relied on peripheral vision 
(Experiment 9) and on foveal vision (Experiment 11). For holistic face processing, as 
indicated by a discrimination advantage in favour of upright over inverted faces, 4.4 ms 
of exposure were required when relying on peripheral vision (Experiment 9) and 3.5 ms 
of exposure when relying on foveal vision (Experiment 11), where resolution is the 
highest. These results elucidate the minimal required exposure duration for face-specific 
processing. Thus, we found convergent evidence for a minimal exposure duration 
required for holistic face processing. 
 Unlike with upright and inverted faces, we did not find evidence of better location 
(Experiment 9) or order discrimination (Experiment 11) for fearful expressions over 
neutral expressions. This was true for both type-1 and type-2 SDT measures, suggesting 
that emotional expressions are not prioritised for either perceptual processing or for 
access to perceptual awareness. Nonetheless, we did measure the minimal exposure 
duration for above-chance emotional expression identification, finding it to be between 
3.5 ms (for upright faces) and 4.4 ms (for inverted faces) of exposure in Experiment 9 
(peripheral vision). Similarly, we found that between 1.5 ms (for upright faces) and 3.3 ms 
(for inverted faces) of exposure were sufficient for above-chance identification 
performance in Experiment 11 (foveal vision). In addition, we found an advantage in 
expression identification for upright over inverted faces, i.e. a face-inversion effect in 
expression identification, with 4.4 ms of exposure in Experiment 9 and with 3.3 ms of 
exposure in Experiment 11. Therefore, the face-inversion effect for expression 
identification arose at an exposure of between 1 and 3 ms longer than the face-inversion 
effect for stimulus discrimination. These results may contradict past claims about an 
advantage of fearful expressions over neutral expressions in how faces gain access to 
perceptual awareness (Capitão et al., 2014; Oliver et al., 2015; Sterzer et al., 2011; Yang et 
al., 2007; Yang & Yeh, 2018a; Zhan et al., 2015). However, as previously suggested (see 
Chapter 3), those previous findings may have been due to low-level visual confounds 
(Gray et al., 2013; Hedger et al., 2015; Schlossmacher et al., 2017; Stein & Sterzer, 2012). 
Our stimuli, on the other hand, were matched for emotion recognition and equated in 
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luminance and contrast. Therefore, these controls minimise the effects of low-level 
confounders that could provide fearful expressions with a perceptual advantage. 
 So far, our findings have presented a very consistent picture of the sequence of 
events in face processing: stimulus discrimination is followed by holistic processing, and 
then emotional expression identification. Our data provide evidence that the minimal 
durations required for perceptual processing and awareness of basic stimulus 
discrimination are similar. However, is this the case of other aspects of face processing 
and awareness such as holistic processing? In Experiments 9 and 11, we estimated 
metacognitive sensitivity by testing how awareness ratings predicted changes in location 
and order discrimination across exposure durations. While we did find evidence of better 
metacognitive sensitivity for upright over inverted faces overall, this advantage did not 
interact with exposure duration. Therefore, we cannot say whether this face-inversion 
effect occurred at a specific exposure duration. 
 As argued above, our results suggest that both face holistic processing and 
awareness of faces require roughly similar minimal exposure duration. This temporal 
convergence may suggest that the two processes are related. As described in Chapter 1, 
many claims have been made about what cognitive functions can do in absence of 
awareness. Some researchers have claimed that arithmetic operations (Sklar et al., 2012), 
semantic processing (Alsius & Munhall, 2013; Sklar et al., 2012; Yang & Yeh, 2011), 
object-background integration (Mudrik et al., 2011), visual configuration integration 
(Wang et al., 2012), and emotion detection (Capitão et al., 2014; Sterzer et al., 2011; Yang 
et al., 2007; Yang & Yeh, 2018a), do not require awareness, whereas other researchers 
have found that those claimed effects were possibly confounded by other factors or 
simply do not replicate (Gray et al., 2013; Hedger et al., 2015; Moors, Boelens, et al., 2016; 
Moors, Wagemans, van Ee, et al., 2016; Rabagliati et al., 2018). Our results suggest that 
awareness may be necessary for face holistic processing and emotion processing. In 
addition, the fact that both holistic processing and awareness required roughly similar 
minimal exposure durations might suggest that a function of awareness is information 
integration. 
 Our new method presents a crucial advantage over past methods in the study of 
complex visual stimuli. By using minimal exposure durations with sub-millisecond 
precision, we could reveal steps and bottlenecks in visual processing of faces without the 
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problems inherent in other brief-presentation methods. However, employing unmasked 
visual stimuli presents one important limitation: participants could have produced 
negative afterimages, thereby confounding their performance. To see to what extent the 
effects seen in Experiment 9 and Experiment 11 could be attributed to afterimage 
processing, we ran two control experiments to estimate whether participants’ sensitivity 
could have benefited from afterimage processing. In Experiment 10 (Control), we 
presented participants with masked colour-inverted stimuli to mimic the effects of 
afterimages and did not find a face-inversion effect, thus ruling out a contribution of 
afterimage processing on holistic face processing. Because backward masking could have 
disrupted visual processing beyond simply preventing additional afterimages, we ran 
Experiment 12 (Control), where we presented participants with unmasked colour-
inverted stimuli, using three exposure durations. Participants’ discrimination improved 
over increasing exposure duration, but they did not exhibit a face-inversion effect for 
either discrimination or expression identification. In conclusion, our findings suggest that 
afterimage processing could have contributed to stimulus discrimination, but it is rather 
unlikely that it contributed to holistic or expression identification processes. 
  In conclusion, by using an LCD tachistoscope with sub-millisecond precision, we 
were able to describe how faces are processed by presenting them for extremely brief 
exposure durations. Using a range of very brief exposure durations, we identified a 
sequence of processing steps that require different amounts of minimal exposure to occur, 
and clarified that out of two processes that have been claimed to enhance perception – 
holistic processing and emotional processing – only the former does. 
Our findings raise new questions. We found a consistent sequence of processing 
steps for face perception. However, do neural systems engage with this sequence of 
processing steps in the same way? Or does the neural activity that yields behavioural 
performance unfold in ways that are not revealed by behavioural measures? Specifically, 
might neural measures reveal face processing that occurs before (i.e. at shorter exposure 
durations than) conscious face perception? This question is relevant to elucidating 
whether some facial features can be processed in absence of awareness. If, for example, 
neural systems can distinguish between emotional expressions before faces are 
discriminated, we could suggest unconscious emotion processing. On the other hand, if 
neural measures of emotion processing are only present at exposure durations that are 
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similar to or longer than those enabling face discrimination, this would be evidence against 
unconscious emotion processing. We address these questions in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5 MINIMAL REQUIRED EXPOSURE REVEALS GRADED 
NEURAL PROCESSING OF FACIAL CONFIGURATION, 
EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION, AND ACCESS TO AWARENESS 
 
5.1    Introduction 
 Faces convey a wealth of crucial information for communication and social 
interaction, as described in previous chapters. Are all facial features processed in one step 
or in a sequence of steps? We have provided evidence for a sequence of processing steps 
in face perception, by measuring how faces gain access to perception and awareness based 
on peripheral (Experiment 9) and foveal vision (Experiment 11). First, stimulus 
discrimination between intact and scrambled faces, secondly holistic face processing, and 
thirdly holistic expression identification, all of which required less than 6 ms of visual 
exposure to arise. Awareness, indexed by metacognitive sensitivity, also required less than 
6 ms of visual exposure to arise, increasing from no sensitivity to high sensitivity as 
exposure durations increased from below 1 ms to around 6 ms. These results suggest that 
facial features are processed in sequence. However, it could be the case that they are 
processed simultaneously in the visual cortex but transmitted to other brain areas at 
different speeds, resulting in the sequence of behavioural indices described above. 
Measuring neural markers of face processing, emotion processing, and perceptual 
awareness should clarify this.  
 In Chapter 5, we ask three follow-up questions based on the findings summarised 
above: first, do neural systems engage differently with emotional expressions than with 
neutral expressions before they gain access to perceptual awareness? If they do, then 
emotion can be processed in absence of awareness and stimulus integration. Secondly, 
what is the minimal exposure duration required for neural systems to track conscious 
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awareness of faces? Arguably, any neural or behavioural process that can occur before 
neural systems engage with perceptual awareness of faces would unveil unconscious 
processing. And thirdly, do neural systems engage differently with face and non-face 
stimuli before they are processed holistically or gain access to awareness? If they do, then 
face-specific processing may occur or begin in absence of holistic integration and 
perceptual awareness. To address these questions, we conducted two EEG experiments. 
We measured event-related potential (ERP) markers of visual processing, emotion 
processing, and perceptual awareness, and a large-scale neural integration marker. EEG 
presents two important advantages when studying perceptual awareness: due to its high 
temporal resolution, it is sensitive to awareness effects that may be too fast for other 
neuroimaging techniques to capture, and it is a vastly studied technique, with many well 
established markers of perceptual and emotional processes. 
 Probably the most robust and well-studied neural marker of face processing is the 
N170 component, a large negative potential peaking around the occipitotemporal areas, 
bilaterally, between 140 and 200 ms after face stimulus onset, normally accompanied by a 
third potential named the vertex positive potential (VPP), a large positive potential 
peaking around frontocentral areas (Rossion & Jacques, 2012). The N170 is sensitive to 
face and face-like stimuli, and belongs to the N1-component family, a group of potentials 
that respond to different aspects of visual processing. The amplitude of N170 is larger to 
faces than to any other stimulus category, including objects (Eimer, 2011). Source 
estimation studies have suggested that the N170 component (or its equivalent in 
magnetoencephalography or MEG, M170) has its source in the anterior (i.e. fusiform face 
area in BA37), posterior, and middle fusiform gyri (i.e. including the occipital face area in 
BA19; Deffke et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2019; Pizzagalli et al., 2002; Schweinberger et al., 
2002; Shibata et al., 2002), a structure that has been associated with face processing by 
fMRI studies as well (Kanwisher et al., 1997, 1998; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2005). A number 
of studies has suggested that N170’s sensitivity to faces reflects face-specific processing 
(Deffke et al., 2007; Rossion et al., 2000; Tanskanen et al., 2005). For example, studies 
using Mooney faces (black and white distorted images that resemble faces only when seen 
upright) have reported larger N170 responses when the Mooney faces were presented in 
an upright orientation than upside down (George et al., 2005; Jeffreys, 1993). This large 
N170 response to faces is also present when face images are distorted or their local 
features are rearranged, as long as the images can be interpreted as faces. However, 
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isolated local features such as a nose or a mouth produce small-peak responses (Bentin et 
al., 1996; George et al., 1996; Itier & Taylor, 2002). In summary, N170 is a reliable neural 
marker of face processing and seems to be largely driven by an activation of neural 
representations of faces. 
Importantly, there are other visually evoked potentials that respond to face 
stimuli, like the P1, a positive-voltage peak arising around 100 ms after stimulus onset but 
driven by different factors (Pratt, 2011). P1 does not specifically index face processing, 
but rather low-level visual processing associated with early sensory, perceptual, and 
attentional processing in the visual cortex (Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998; Luck, 2014; 
Pratt, 2011). Measuring both P1 and N170 can be useful to describe how face images 
modulate low-level and high-level visual processing. For example, Tanskanen et al. (2005) 
employed MEG to measure M1 (equivalent to P1 in EEG) and M170 (equivalent to N170 
in EEG) responses to face images that were either masked with narrow-band spatial 
frequency noise or not. When face images were masked, and therefore imperceptible, M1 
was maximal in amplitude despite observers not seeing the faces. In contrast, when noise 
was at the lowest or highest spatial frequencies, therefore rendering faces perceptible, M1 
was minimal and the M170 was maximal. These findings stress two ideas: that 
N170/M170 is more closely related to face processing and that P1/M1 is not sensitive to 
face processing per se but rather to low-level visual information. Interestingly, it has been 
claimed that N170 can also index processing of emotional facial expressions, though the 
evidence is inconsistent (against: e.g. Batty & Taylor, 2006; Todd et al., 2008; Curtis & 
Cicchetti, 2011; in favour: e.g. Hietanen & Astikainen, 2013; Qiu et al., 2017; Tian et al., 
2018; Blau et al., 2007). 
Emotion processing has been studied extensively with EEG. Two neural markers 
of emotion have been repeatedly documented: the early-posterior negativity (EPN) and 
the late positive potential (LPP). EPN is a negative-voltage wave found around 
occipitotemporal areas. It arises between 250 and 450 ms after stimulus onset and exhibits 
increased negativity in response to emotionally arousing stimuli compared to neutral 
stimuli (Bradley et al., 2007). This effect has been attributed to a stronger call for 
attentional resources (Herbert et al., 2006; Junghöfer et al., 2001; Kissler et al., 2009; 
Schupp et al., 2003). On the other hand, LPP is a positive-voltage slow wave found around 
parietocentral areas. It arises between 300 and 600 ms after stimulus onset and exhibits 
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increased positivity in response to emotionally salient stimuli (Foti & Hajcak, 2008; 
MacNamara & Hajcak, 2010; Weinberg & Hajcak, 2010). LPP is associated with an 
extensive neural network encompassing the amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex, medial 
prefrontal cortices, parietal cortex, and visual cortex (Liu et al., 2012; Sabatinelli et al., 
2007), and it indexes attentional resource allocation for emotion processing (Hajcak et al., 
2009; Nordström & Wiens, 2012). It is important to note that no ERP component, 
including EPN and LPP, has been found to reflect a specific emotion (Hajcak et al., 2011). 
EPN and LPP mainly respond to emotion intensity and arousal (Eimer & Holmes, 2007; 
Hajcak et al., 2011). Therefore, emotion processing studies involving faces normally 
compare ERP responses to emotional expressions and neutral expressions as a control 
condition. Psychophysiological measures like heart rate, skin conductance, facial muscle 
activity, and pupil diameter are also sensitive to emotion intensity and arousal (Codispoti 
et al., 2007; Codispoti & Cesarei, 2007; Olofsson & Polich, 2007), but ERP components 
present the advantage of having very high temporal resolution and being less vulnerable 
to habituation, making EPN and LPP excellent neural markers for the study of emotion 
processing in briefly presented faces. 
The study of consciousness and perceptual awareness with EEG has a long 
tradition (Koch et al., 2016). Several markers have been proposed. A valid marker of 
perceptual awareness must be sensitive to subjective awareness, which is commonly 
measured using a subjective scale that participants are asked to complete (e.g. the PAS). 
The two most widely studied ERP components that fulfil this criterion are the visual 
awareness negativity (VAN) and the late positivity (LP; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010). The 
VAN is a negative difference wave (aware – unaware) found around occipitotemporal 
areas, bilaterally, between 200 and 400 ms after stimulus onset (Eklund & Wiens, 2018, 
2019; Koivisto & Grassini, 2016; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003). Many studies employing 
masking techniques to suppress visual stimuli from awareness have reported that VAN 
voltage turns more negative, in a linear fashion, as stimuli are subjectively seen more 
clearly (Eklund & Wiens, 2018; Koivisto et al., 2006; Koivisto & Grassini, 2016; Koivisto 
& Revonsuo, 2003; Wilenius & Revonsuo, 2007; Wilenius-Emet et al., 2004). On the other 
hand, LP is a positive difference wave (aware – unaware) found around frontocentral 
areas, between 300 and 600 ms after stimulus onset (i.e. in the P3 wave; Koivisto & 
Revonsuo, 2010). Many studies have reported, using similar masking paradigms, that LP 
correlates with awareness (Wilenius-Emet et al., 2004), in a non-linear fashion (Del Cul et 
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al., 2007; Sergent et al., 2005). However, unlike VAN, which is believed to index changes 
in subjective experience (i.e. phenomenal consciousness), LP has been claimed to index 
conscious access, i.e. the ability to consciously access sensory information (Del Cul et al., 
2007; Genetti et al., 2009; Lamy et al., 2008; Salti et al., 2012; Sergent et al., 2005). While 
it is still a matter of debate what specific aspects of consciousness VAN indexes, there 
seems to be consensus on LP as an index of conscious access. This interpretation of LP 
is based on the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, proposed by Dehaene 
& Naccache (2001), which distinguishes between subliminal, preconscious, and conscious 
processing (Dehaene et al., 2006; Railo et al., 2011). In subliminal processing, a stimulus 
is processed but not consciously accessible. In preconscious processing, conscious access 
to a stimulus is possible but does not occur due to lack of top-down attention. In 
conscious processing, on the other hand, a stimulus is seen and reportable. Because 
perceptual awareness is believed by many to be an all-or-none phenomenon rather than 
a continuous one (Overgaard et al., 2006; Sergent & Dehaene, 2004), proponents of the 
global neuronal workspace model of consciousness have argued that LP – due to its non-
linear modulation – reflects conscious access (Overgaard et al., 2006; Sergent & Dehaene, 
2004; Windey & Cleeremans, 2015). 
Not only ERP components may index holistic processing, nonetheless. 
Functional connectivity markers may index large-scale cortical changes associated with 
holistic processing. Unlike ERP components, functional connectivity markers measure 
statistical relations between multiple physiological signals. One EEG functional 
connectivity marker that has exhibited sensitivity to different conscious states, by 
presenting distinctive signatures for each of them, is the weighted symbolic mutual 
information (wSMI; King et al., 2013; Sitt et al., 2014). wSMI assesses the extent to which 
two EEG signals present joint non-random fluctuations, suggesting that they share 
common sources and share information. wSMI is sensitive to a broad range of functional 
relations and, crucially, it is especially sensitive to non-linear activations (Canales-Johnson 
et al., 2020; Imperatori et al., 2019). Therefore, wSMI is an excellent candidate to search 
for evidence of information sharing across the brain, given its holistic nature. If face and 
non-face stimuli involve differences in information sharing, with extremely brief visual 
presentations, wSMI should capture them. 
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 In this Chapter, we study face processing, emotion processing, and perceptual 
awareness, by measuring EEG response to visual stimuli presented with the LCD 
tachistoscope described in Chapter 4. Therefore, we expand on the effects found in 
Experiment 9 by examining signal detection indices and neural markers associated with 
said processes. 
5.2    Experiment 13 
Our first question in Experiment 13 is whether neural systems engage differently 
with different emotional expressions before these gain access to awareness. Neural 
systems could discriminate facial expressions, based on their emotional content, with a 
minimal exposure duration that is shorter than the minimal exposure duration required 
for awareness as shown in signal detection indices. To test for this possibility, we 
measured EEG neural markers to track changes in face and emotion processing across 
relevant exposure durations. If neural markers of emotion processing require shorter 
exposure durations than behavioural emotion identification sensitivity, this will provide 
evidence for emotion processing in the absence of awareness. 
 Our second question is whether there is a minimal required exposure for neural 
systems to reflect perceptual awareness. A neural marker able to reflect awareness with a 
minimal required exposure that is consistently the same as the minimal exposure required 
for awareness (indexed by metacognitive sensitivity) should be a neural correlate of 
consciousness. If there is a neural marker that fulfils these criteria, what place does it take 
in the sequence of processing steps of face perception found in Chapter 4? If neural 
markers of perceptual awareness require a minimal exposure duration to discriminate 
between awareness reports, then such a duration may convey the minimal visual exposure 
required for perceptual awareness to arise. 
 
 
 
190 
 
5.2.1 Methods 
 
5.2.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-six students of the Université Libre de Bruxelles provided informed 
consent and were paid €30 for participation. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and reported no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. Four participants were 
excluded from the analysis (see Analysis section). The remaining 32 participants (18 
female; all right-handed) had a mean age of 24.3 (SDage = 4.9; range: 18 – 31). 
A retrospective power analysis, conducted using G*Power 3.1.9.7 (Faul et al., 
2009), to test for a difference between conditions in a repeated-measures ANOVA, with 
a small to medium effect size (ηp2 = 0.04) and alpha of .05, aiming to achieve a statistical 
power of 95%, determined that a sample of 19 participants would be required. If a non-
sphericity correction ε of .5 were to be added – as reported in the Results section, a 
number of tests violated this assumption – then a sample of 29 participants would be 
required. This analysis supports our initial decision of aiming at 32 participants per 
experiment. 
 
5.2.1.2 Stimuli 
 Stimuli were 60 human faces (20 fearful, 20, happy, and 20 neutral; the same 20 
identities – 10 female – were used for the three categories; see Appendix F) taken from 
the RaFD. They were selected by applying the same criteria used in Experiment 9; their 
differences in expression identification4 (Mfearful = 92.2%; [SDfearful = 5.33]; Mhappy = 99.15% 
 
 
4 A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare expression identification between emotional expressions 
(fearful, happy, neutral) based on the norms published by Langner et al. (2010). The effect of emotional 
valence was significant (𝐹(2, 57) = 11.13, 𝑝 < .001, η2p = .285). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons revealed that happy expressions were easier to identify than fearful (t(57) = −4.75, 𝑝 <
.001, 𝑑 = 0.1) and neutral expressions (t(57) = 2.73, 𝑝 = .025, 𝑑 = 0.06). However, we did not find a 
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[1.76]; Mneutral = 95.15% [5.73]) and intensity5 (Mfearful = 4.22; [0.21]; Mhappy = 4.20 [0.26]; 
Mneutral = 3.61 [0.25]) were minimised. The same image processing steps were followed, 
too. 
5.2.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure was very similar to that of Experiment 9, with a few differences: 
we used fearful, happy, and neutral expressions. They were all presented in upright 
orientation, and we only used three exposure durations: 1.7, 4.4, and 6.2 ms. We selected 
these exposure durations to measure neural response in the absence (1.7 ms) and presence 
of holistic face processing (4.4 ms), as well as when both holistic and emotion processing 
were very likely to have arisen (6.2 ms), according to the findings of Experiment 9. 
Participants performed 40 practice trials followed by 1680 experimental trials. 
Emotional expression was blocked (105 trials/block), with block order counterbalanced 
across participants in an ABBABAAB BAABABBA order, where each block contained 
an equal number of emotional (fearful or happy, depending on the block) and neutral 
expressions. All face images were presented in upright orientation. Participants were given 
self-terminated breaks between blocks and a compulsory 15-minute break after 
completing 840 trials. 
 
5.2.1.4 EEG recording and pre-processing 
 EEG data were recorded and digitised at a sampling rate of 512 Hz using a 64-
channel Biosemi system with an elastic cap, in which electrodes were integrated at sites 
 
 
significant difference in identification between fearful and neutral expressions (t(57) = −2.01, 𝑝 =
.146, 𝑑 = 0.04). See Appendix G. 
5 A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare emotional intensity between emotional expressions 
(fearful, happy, neutral) based on the norms published by Langner et al. (2010). The effect of emotional 
valence was significant (𝐹(2, 57) = 41.6, 𝑝 < .001, η2p = .593). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons revealed that fearful expressions were rated as more intense than neutral expressions 
(t(57) = 7.99, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.04), but not than happy expressions (t(57) = 0.183, 𝑝 = 1, 𝑑 = 0). 
Likewise, happy expressions were rated as more intense than neutral expressions (t(57) = 7.8, 𝑝 <
.001, 𝑑 = 0.04). See Appendix H. 
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conforming to the 10-20 system. All impedance values were kept below 50 kΩ. Scalp 
electrodes were referenced to Cz. The continuous EEG data was resampled to 256 Hz, 
then filtered leaving frequencies between 0.3 and 40 Hz, and finally epoched from 200 
ms before to 600 ms after stimulus onset. An independent-component analysis (ICA) was 
run on the epoched EEG signal. Components attributed to eye blinks, ocular movements, 
heartbeat, and channel noise were taken out. Trials with voltage exceeding 150 mV were 
excluded from further analysis. On average, 1.8% of trials were removed. The EEG signal 
was then re-referenced to the average across all electrodes. Waveforms were then 
averaged for all electrodes. By eye inspection on canonical sites, we determined the 
following electrodes for each event-related potential (ERP) component of interest: P1 
(Oz), left N170 (PO7), right N170 (PO8), left VAN (PO7), right VAN (PO8), VPP (FCz), 
left EPN (P7), right EPN (P8), LPP (Pz), and LP (Pz). Because emotion processing-
related components (EPN and LPP) mainly respond to emotional intensity rather than 
valence (Hajcak et al., 2010, 2011), and because we wanted to preserve a balanced number 
of trials between conditions, we collapsed all components across trials, separately for 
emotional trials (fearful and happy expressions together) and neutral trials (neutral 
expressions). ERP components were collapsed across trials from the same stimulus 
condition regardless of behavioural performance in the task, except for our pre-registered 
analyses of the VAN and LP6 (see Appendix I). These two components were collapsed 
across two groups of trials according to the trials’ PAS ratings: awareness-present trials 
(PAS ratings of “vague impression”, “almost clear experience”, or “clear experience”) and 
awareness-absent trials (PAS rating of “no experience”). To investigate changes in ERP 
components, mean amplitudes were computed within the following time windows: 105-
135 ms (P1), 170-200 ms (N170 and VPP), 295-325 ms (EPN), 310-430 ms (LPP), 185-
215 ms (VAN), and 320-520 ms (LP). These time windows were determined by eye 
inspection on the grand average plots, in specific time windows informed by previous 
studies, and did not involve exploratory statistical testing, as a way to reduce familywise 
error (Luck, 2014; Luck & Gaspelin, 2017). 
 
 
 
6 For Pre-registration, also see here: https://aspredicted.org/53sv5.pdf 
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5.2.1.5 Signal detection analysis 
Signal detection analysis was performed in the same way as in Experiment 9. 
 
5.2.1.6 ERP analysis 
ERP analysis was performed on mean amplitude values of each ERP component 
at the specific electrodes and time windows stated above. We reconstructed each ERP’s 
cortical source using Brainstorm (Tadel et al., 2011; latest version, released October 2019). 
To estimate the cortical source of an ERP component, we need to model the 
electromagnetic properties of the head and of the sensor array (forward model), and then 
estimate the brain sources that produced the EEG signal of interest (inverse model). The 
forward model was calculated using the OpenMEEG Boundary Element Method 
(Gramfort et al., 2010) on the cortical surface of a template MNI brain (ICBM152) with 
1mm resolution. The inverse model was constrained using weighted minimum-norm 
estimation (wMNE; Baillet et al., 2001) to measure source activation in picoampere-
meters. wMNE looks for a distribution of sources with the minimum current that can 
account for the EEG data. We corrected grand-averaged activation values by subtracting 
the mean of the baseline period (-200 to 0 ms before stimulus onset) and spatially 
smoothed with a 5-mm kernel. This procedure was applied separately for each ERP 
component, collapsing all conditions. 
We excluded data from four participants who presented more than 15% of noisy 
electrodes (whose impedance values exceeded 50 kΩ throughout the experiment). They 
were excluded from both signal detection and EEG analyses. One additional participant 
did not provide any “almost clear experience” and “clear experience” PAS ratings and 
therefore their data were excluded from the VAN and LP analyses. 
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5.2.2 Behavioural results 
 
5.2.2.1 Location sensitivity 
Neutral expressions appeared in both fearful and happy expression blocks. We 
entered location d’ scores for neutral-expression trials into a preliminary repeated-
measures 2 (Block-type: neutral-expression in fearful vs happy expression blocks) × 3 
(exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA; there was no significant effect of block 
type (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.358, 𝑝 = .554, ηp2 = .011), nor an interaction of block type with 
exposure duration (𝐹(1.945, 60.291) = 1.468, 𝑝 = .239, ηp2 = .045). We also estimated 
Bayes factors: the results suggest the data are substantially better explained under the null 
hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 = 6.440). We therefore collapsed neutral-expression trials into 
one condition, making three conditions in total. 
In the main analysis, we measured location d’ to confirm that these new 
participants displayed similar performance to participants in Experiment 9. To examine 
how conditions affected location discrimination, we entered location d’ scores into a 3 
(expression: fearful, happy, neutral) × 3 (exposure durations) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. We found a main effect of exposure duration, whereby sensitivity increased 
with increasing durations (𝐹(1.68, 52.05) = 342.395, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .917). Importantly, 
we found very similar location d’ scores to the ones reported in Experiment 9 (Figure 
5.1a). As expected, based on the findings of Experiment 9, we did not find a main effect 
of expression (𝐹(1.77, 54.86) = 0.154, 𝑝 = .832, ηp2 = .005), thus suggesting again that 
there is no greater perceptual sensitivity to emotional expressions than to neutral ones. 
The interaction between expression and exposure duration did not reach significance 
either (𝐹(3.54, 109.80) = 1.833, 𝑝 = .135, ηp2 = .056). Thus, location sensitivity 
performance replicated the findings obtained in equivalent conditions in Experiment 9. 
To determine the shortest exposure that exhibited above-chance performance (d’ 
> 0), we ran a series of uncorrected one-sample t-tests against zero. We found that above-
chance identification was already present at the shortest exposure duration, 1.7 ms, for 
fearful expressions (𝑀 = 0.120 [0.285];  𝑡(31) =  2.39, 𝑝 = .023, 𝑑 = 0.420), 
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neutral expressions (𝑀 = 0.172 [0.208];  𝑡(31) =  4.69, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.829), and 
happy expressions (𝑀 = 0.070 [0.204];  𝑡(31) =  1.95, 𝑝 = .060, 𝑑 = 0.345). Thus, 
above-chance performance was found at slightly shorter exposure durations than in 
Experiment 9. 
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Figure 5.1. Behavioural results of Experiment 13. (a) Location sensitivity. Location d’ 
increased with increasing exposure duration. There was no effect of emotional expression. 
(b) Absolute-value response bias scores for reporting location (bias toward either left or 
right). The amount of bias decreased as exposure duration increased, but there was no 
difference in amount of response bias between expressions. (c) Identification sensitivity 
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for expression. Identification d’ increases with increasing exposure duration. A significant 
advantage in expression identification for happy expressions over fearful expressions 
arises by 4.4 ms of exposure. (d) Criterion scores for reporting expression. Criterion 
becomes more liberal with increasing exposure duration. A more liberal criterion for 
happy expressions over fearful expressions arises by 4.4 ms of exposure. (e) Awareness-
based metacognitive sensitivity. Meta-d’ increased with exposure duration but was 
unaffected by expression. (f) Metacognitive bias scores for reporting subjective awareness. 
Metacognitive bias was unaffected by exposure duration and expression. Asterisks index 
statistically significant differences between fearful and happy expressions. Error bars 
represent 95 CI. 
 
5.2.2.2 Location response bias 
We examined whether participants’ response bias for reporting face location 
varied across conditions by entering the absolute values of 𝐶location scores into a 3 (emotional 
expression: fearful, happy, neutral) × 3 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
As in Experiment 9, response bias significantly decreased with increasing exposure 
duration (𝐹(1.09, 33.78) = 20.109, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .393), indicating that as participants’ 
ability to discriminate faces increased, they became less likely to exhibit a systematic bias 
in their preference to report one side or the other (Figure 5.1b). However, we did not find 
a main effect of expression (𝐹(1.93, 59.89) = 2.093, 𝑝 = .134, ηp2 = .063), suggesting that 
response bias was unaffected by the emotional content of the faces. The interaction 
between expression and exposure duration did not reach significance either 
(𝐹(3.38, 104.69) = 0.571, 𝑝 = .656, ηp2 = .018). 
To assess whether the obtained data support the absence of an effect of emotional 
expression, we estimated the Bayes factor for this effect, which indicated strong evidence 
for the null hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 = 16.978). 
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5.2.2.3 Expression identification sensitivity 
We examined whether participants’ sensitivity to identifying emotional 
expressions from their neutral counterparts varied across conditions by entering 
identification d’ scores into a 2 (emotional expression: fearful, happy) × 3 (exposure 
durations) repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 5.1c). As expected, we found a main effect 
of exposure duration (𝐹(1.38, 42.75) = 62.9, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .670), indicating that 
sensitivity to emotional expression increased with increasing exposure duration. We also 
found a main effect of expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 36.3, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .539), showing better 
sensitivity to happy expressions (𝑀 = 0.544 [0.625]) than to fearful expressions (𝑀 =
0.278 [0.321]). The interaction between expression and exposure duration also reached 
significance (𝐹(1.65, 51.01) = 25.6, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .452). To determine at which of the 
three durations we used this advantage was present, we ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected 
pairwise comparisons. They revealed significant advantages at 4.4 ms (𝑡(88.1) =
−3.417, 𝑝 = .014, 𝑑 = −0.604) and 6.2 ms (𝑡(88.1) = −8.90, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 =
−1.573) of exposure. 
To determine the shortest exposure that exhibited above-chance performance (d’ 
> 0), we ran a series of uncorrected one-sample t-tests against zero. We found that the 
earliest exposure duration that elicited above-chance identification was 4.4 ms for fearful 
(𝑀 = 0.186 [0.338];  𝑡(31) =  3.11, 𝑝 = .004, 𝑑 = 0.550) and happy facial 
expressions (𝑀 = 0.412 [0.406];  𝑡(31) =  5.73, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 1.014). Neither 
expression exhibited above-chance performance with 1.7 ms of exposure, therefore we 
estimated Bayes factors to test whether the obtained data support this absence of an 
effect. Bayes factors indicated substantial evidence in favour of the null hypothesis model 
for fearful (𝐵𝐹01 = 4.93) and happy expressions (𝐵𝐹01 = 5.27) presented for 1.7 ms of 
exposure, thus supporting the finding that neither facial expression enjoyed above-chance 
performance when presented for 1.7 ms. 
These findings, along with the metacognitive sensitivity findings reported below, 
will be relevant for our EEG analysis – if we were to find neural evidence of emotion 
processing with 1.7 ms of exposure by measuring neural markers, we could argue that 
such findings are evidence of unconscious emotion processing. 
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5.2.2.4 Expression identification criterion 
We examined whether participants’ criterion for reporting fearful and happy 
expressions varied across conditions by entering 𝐶identification scores into a 2 (expression: 
fearful, happy) × 3 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found a main 
effect of exposure duration (𝐹(1.11, 34.32) = 4.67, 𝑝 = .034, ηp2 = .131), indicating that 
identification criterion became more liberal across increasing exposure duration, i.e. 
participants became more willing to report an emotional expression (fearful or happy) 
than a neutral one as exposure duration increased (Figure 5.1d). We also found a main 
effect of emotional expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 15.42, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .332), indicating that 
happy expressions (𝑀 = −0.097 [0.226]) enjoyed a more liberal identification criterion 
than fearful expressions (𝑀 = 0.079 [0.086]). Finally, the interaction between both 
factors reached significance as well (𝐹(1.62, 50.26) = 17.58, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .362). To 
determine at which exposure durations happy expressions enjoyed a significantly more 
liberal criterion than fearful expressions, we ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons. They revealed significant advantages at 4.4 ms (𝑡(54.7) =  3.637, 𝑝 =
.009, 𝑑 = 0.643) and 6.2 ms of exposure (𝑡(54.7) =  5.873, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 1.038). 
 
5.2.2.5 Awareness-based metacognitive sensitivity 
We examined whether awareness scores were sensitive to participants’ location 
sensitivity scores by estimating meta-d’, a measure of metacognitive sensitivity. To 
examine whether metacognitive sensitivity varied across conditions, we entered meta-d’ 
scores into a 3 (expression: fearful, happy, neutral) × 3 (exposure durations) repeated-
measures ANOVA (Figure 5.1e). A main effect of exposure duration indicated that meta-
d’ increased with increasing exposure duration (𝐹(1.69, 52.54) = 55.970, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 =
.644). However, we did not find a main effect of expression (𝐹(1.87, 58.11) = 1.297, 𝑝 =
.280, ηp2 = .040), suggesting that emotional expression did not affect metacognitive 
sensitivity. To examine the duration interval in which awareness arose, we ran post hoc 
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons between each combination of exposure 
durations (collapsed across expressions). We found that meta-d’ scores obtained with 4.4 
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ms were significantly higher than scores obtained with 1.7 ms (𝑡(62) =  −9.09, 𝑝 <
.001, 𝑑 = −1.607), whereas meta-d’ scores obtained with 6.2 ms were not significantly 
higher than scores obtained with 4.4 ms (𝑡(62) =  −0.143, 𝑝 = .999, 𝑑 = −0.025). 
This may suggest that 4.4 ms of exposure provided sufficient visual information for 
metacognitive sensitivity to exhibit a non-linear increase. Finally, we did not find an 
interaction between expression and exposure duration (𝐹(2.69, 83.32) = 0.934, 𝑝 =
.420, ηp2 = .029). 
As described, we did not find a main effect of expression, therefore we calculated 
Bayes factors to test whether the obtained data support this absence of an effect. Bayes 
factors indicated strong evidence in favour of the null hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 = 12.06), 
thus supporting the finding that no expression was prioritised by metacognitive 
sensitivity. 
To determine the shortest exposure that exhibited above-chance metacognitive 
sensitivity (meta-d’ > 0), we ran a series of uncorrected one-sample t-tests against zero. 
We found above-chance meta-d’ was already present at the shortest exposure duration, 
1.7 ms, for fearful (𝑀 = 0.130 [0.259];  𝑡(31) =  2.84, 𝑝 = .008, 𝑑 = 0.503) and 
neutral expressions (𝑀 = 0.181 [0.313];  𝑡(31) =  3.27, 𝑝 = .003, 𝑑 = 0.578); meta-
d’ was above chance at 4.4 ms for happy expressions (𝑀 = 1.389 [0.790];  𝑡(31) =
 9.95, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 1.759). Although meta-d’ scores were higher than zero at the 
shortest exposure duration used, they were not higher than location d’ scores at the same 
exposure duration. 
 
5.2.2.6 Metacognitive bias 
Metacognitive bias (meta-bias) is the tendency to give high confidence ratings 
regardless of actual performance.  In this experiment, however, we used the PAS, a more 
exhaustive measure of awareness than confidence ratings (Sandberg et al., 2010). The PAS 
allows participants to rate their visual experience using four ratings covering from “no 
experience” to “clear experience” reports. Participants described their visual experience 
of a face and, therefore, metacognitive bias describes the tendency to describe one’s visual 
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experience as clear. To examine whether metacognitive bias varied across conditions, we 
entered meta-bias scores into a 3 (expression: fearful, happy, neutral) × 3 (exposure 
durations) repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 5.1f). We did not find an effect of 
exposure duration (𝐹(1.05, 32.51) = 0.555, 𝑝 = .470, ηp2 = .018), or of facial expression 
(𝐹(1.94, 60.19) = 1.585, 𝑝 = .214, ηp2 = .049). The interaction between expression and 
exposure duration did not reach significance either (𝐹(1.97, 61.17) = 1.226, 𝑝 = .30, ηp2 =
.038). These results suggest that the participants’ tendency to report high confidence to 
characterise their experience was not affected by any of the conditions. 
 
5.2.3 ERP results 
 
5.2.3.1 Early visual processing (P1) 
We examined how emotional expression and exposure duration conditions 
affected early visual processing by measuring voltage changes in P1. This component is 
measured over occipital regions. We entered mean voltage values into a 2 (expression: 
emotional, neutral) × 3 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found a 
main effect of exposure duration (𝐹(1.14, 35.27) = 154.18, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .833), whereby 
P1 voltage increased with exposure duration, thus indicating that longer exposure 
durations involved greater early visual processing than shorter exposure durations (Figure 
5.2). As expected, given the nature of this component, we did not find a main effect of 
expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 1.21, 𝑝 = .280, ηp2 = .038) and the interaction between 
expression and exposure duration did not reach significance either (𝐹(1.96, 60.68) =
2.03, 𝑝 = .142, ηp2 = .061). To assess whether the obtained data support the absence 
of an effect of emotional expression, we estimated a Bayes factor, which indicated 
substantial evidence for the null hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 = 6.385). These results indicate 
that P1 is sensitive to extremely brief visual exposure durations but is not sensitive to 
emotional expressions. 
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Figure 5.2. Early visual processing indexed by P1. (a) P1 response to emotional and 
neutral expressions across exposure durations. Left: P1 peak with averaged time window 
highlighted in grey (105 – 135 ms); right: voltage means. (b) Topographical distributions 
of P1 for each condition at the relevant time window show an increase in positive voltage 
over visual cortex across exposure durations. (c) Source estimation of P1 visually 
identified on cortical maps. Estimated current sources of P1 are localised around the 
primary visual cortex. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
5.2.3.2 Face processing (N170/VPP) 
We examined how facial expression and exposure duration conditions affected 
face processing by measuring voltage changes in the N170/VPP complex. N170/VPP 
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consists of two negative peaks (left and right N170) found in occipitotemporal areas, 
bilaterally, and one positive peak (vertex positive potential or VPP) found in frontocentral 
areas. We entered mean voltage values into a 2 (expression: emotional, neutral) × 3 
(electrode site: left, right, central) × 3 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
We found a main effect of exposure duration (𝐹(1.10, 34.20) = 43.195, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 =
.582), whereby N170/VPP amplitude changed with increasing exposure duration, thus 
suggesting longer exposure durations involved greater face processing than shorter 
exposure durations (Figure 5.3). We also found a main effect of electrode site 
(𝐹(1.49, 46.24) = 94.125, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .752), which was expected given that left (𝑀 =
−5.404 [1.674]) and right (𝑀 = −5.554 [1.523]) N170 potentials are negative-
voltage peaks whereas VPP is a positive-voltage peak (𝑀 = 4.575 [1.085]). This effect 
confirmed that we measured the N170/VPP complex. We also found a main effect of 
expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 1.696, 𝑝 = .002, ηp2 = .274), indicating that neutral expressions 
(𝑀 = −2.198 [5.303]) had significantly more negative voltage values than emotional 
expressions (𝑀 = −2.058 [5.134]). However, the interaction between expression and 
exposure duration did not reach significance (𝐹(1.57, 48.65) = 0.318, 𝑝 = .676, ηp2 = .01). 
In addition, we found a significant interaction between expression and electrode site 
(𝐹(1.37, 42.32) = 4.716, 𝑝 = .025, ηp2 = .132), which was expected given electrode sites’ 
opposite voltage polarities, and a significant interaction between electrode site and 
exposure duration (𝐹(1.74, 53.95) = 56.074, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .644), also expected given that 
N170 sites and VPP site became more negative and positive, respectively, as exposure 
duration increased. The three-way interaction between expression, electrode site, and 
exposure duration did not reach significance. Together, these results indicate that both 
exposure duration and expression affect N170/VPP – greater duration increases its 
amplitude (more negative for N170 and more positive for VPP), whereas the presence of 
emotion decreases it (less negative for N170 and less positive for VPP). 
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Figure 5.3. Face processing indexed by N170/VPP. (a) N170/VPP response to 
emotional and neutral facial expressions across increasing exposure durations. Left: 
205 
 
N170/VPP peaks with averaged time window highlighted in grey (170-200 ms); right: 
voltage means. (b) Topographical distributions of N170/VPP for each condition at the 
relevant time window show increase in negative voltage around posterior areas across 
exposure durations. (c) Source estimation of N170 visually identified on cortical maps. 
Estimated current sources of N170 are localised around the inferotemporal gyri and lateral 
occipital sulcus. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
5.2.3.3 Early emotion processing (EPN) 
We examined how emotional expression and exposure duration conditions 
affected early emotion processing by measuring voltage changes in the early posterior 
negativity (EPN) component. This component is measured over occipitotemporal 
regions, bilaterally. We entered mean voltage values into a 2 (expression: emotional7, 
neutral) × 2 (electrode site: left, right) × 3 (exposure durations) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. We did not find an effect of exposure duration (𝐹(1.26, 39.18) = 2.884, 𝑝 =
.089, ηp2 = .085), indicating that EPN did not vary across exposure durations overall 
(Figure 5.4). Importantly, however, we found a main effect of expression (𝐹(1, 31) =
6.042, 𝑝 = .02, ηp2 = .163), thus confirming EPN was sensitive to emotional content 
in faces, showing more negative values for emotional (𝑀 = −2.166 [0.374]) than 
neutral faces (𝑀 = −1.981 [0.444]). We did not find an effect of electrode site 
(𝐹(1, 31) = 2.157, 𝑝 = .152, ηp2 = .065), indicating EPN responded to changes across 
conditions similarly in both hemispheres. Crucially, we found a significant interaction 
between emotional expression and exposure duration (𝐹(1.90, 58.86) = 8.675, 𝑝 <
.001, ηp2 = .219), suggesting EPN was sensitive to emotional content at specific 
 
 
7As an exploratory analysis, we tested whether EPN could discriminate between fearful and happy 
expressions. To test this, we entered mean voltage values into a 2 (expression: fearful, happy) × 3 (exposure 
durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found a main effect of expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 8.809, 𝑝 =
.006, ηp2 = .221), indicating that happy expressions had significantly more negative voltage values than 
fearful expressions. We did not find a main effect of exposure duration (𝐹(1.38, 42.63) = 2.839, 𝑝 =
.087, ηp2 = .084). The interaction between expression and exposure duration did not reach significance 
either (𝐹(1.91, 59.07) = 1.91, 𝑝 = .160, ηp2 = .058). These results might suggest that happy expressions are 
more emotionally intense given that they are less ambiguous and thus easier to recognise than negative 
expressions (Hugdahl et al., 1993; Leppänen & Hietanen, 2004; Smith & Rossit, 2018; Wells et al., 2016). 
206 
 
exposure durations. To test at what specific exposure durations EPN was sensitive to 
emotional content, we ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons and 
found that EPN was significantly more negative for emotional expressions (𝑀6.2ms =
−2.793 [2.580]) than neutral expressions (𝑀6.2ms = −2.070 [3.423]) only at the 
longest exposure duration (𝑡(87.6) = −4.009, 𝑝 = .002, 𝑑 = −0.709), when both 
awareness and emotion identification are very likely; therefore, these results suggest that 
emotion processing requires a longer exposure duration than holistic face processing to 
occur. Less importantly, we found a significant interaction between electrode site and 
exposure duration (𝐹(1.49, 46.14) = 5.44, 𝑝 = .013, ηp2 = .149), though no comparison of 
interest (i.e. between electrode sites for each exposure duration) reached significance. The 
three-way interaction between expression, electrode site, and exposure duration did not 
reach significance either (𝐹(2, 61.97) = 0.038, 𝑝 = .962, ηp2 = .001). These results suggest 
that emotion processing arises with exposure durations that are greater than 4.4 ms but 
smaller than or equal to 6.2 ms. 
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Figure 5.4. Early emotion processing indexed by EPN. (a) EPN response to emotional 
and neutral expressions across increasing exposure durations. Left: EPN peak with 
averaged time window highlighted in grey (295-325 ms); right: voltage means. Emotional 
expressions had significantly more negative voltage than neutral expressions at 6.2 ms of 
exposure. (b) Topographic distributions of EPN for each condition at the relevant time 
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window show increase in negative voltage for emotional expressions than neutral 
expressions across exposure durations. (c) Source estimation of EPN visually identified 
on cortical maps. Distributions of estimated current sources are localised around 
postcentral and parietocentral areas. Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences 
between conditions. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
5.2.3.4 Late emotion processing (LPP) 
The late positive potential (LPP) is another ERP component that is sensitive to 
emotional content and intensity. This component is measured over postcentral areas. We 
entered mean voltage values into a 2 (expression: emotional8, neutral) × 3 (exposure 
durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found an effect of exposure duration 
(𝐹(1.45, 44.97) = 60.735, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .662), indicating that LPP became more positive 
in voltage as exposure duration increased (Figure 5.5). We did not find a main effect of 
expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 2.12, 𝑝 = .156, ηp2 = .064) – overall, LPP did not vary between 
emotional and neutral facial expressions. Crucially, however, we found a significant 
interaction between expression and exposure duration (𝐹(1.98, 61.40) = 9.80, 𝑝 <
.001, ηp2 = .240). To test whether LPP was sensitive to emotional content at specific 
exposure durations, we ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons and 
found that LPP was significantly more positive for emotional expressions (𝑀6.2ms =
6.328 [2.878]) than neutral expressions (𝑀6.2ms = 5.981 [2.904]) only at the longest 
exposure duration (𝑡(90.3) =  4.284, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.757). Thus, these findings of 
LPP, a marker of late emotion processing, converge with those for the EPN, a marker of 
early emotion processing, arising by the longest exposure duration used. 
 
 
8 As an exploratory analysis, we tested whether LPP could discriminate between fearful and happy 
expressions. To test this, we entered mean voltage values into a 2 (expression: fearful, happy) × 3 (exposure 
durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found a main effect of exposure duration (𝐹(1.49, 46.10) =
67.051, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .684), suggesting that voltage turned more positive with increasing exposure 
duration. We did not find a main effect of expression (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.053, 𝑝 = .819, ηp2 = .002) and the 
interaction between expression and exposure duration did not reach significance either (𝐹(1.87, 58.07) =
0.074, 𝑝 = .919, ηp2 = .002). These results might suggest that LPP is sensitive to emotional information 
relative to neutral information, regardless of emotional valence. 
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Figure 5.5. Late emotion processing indexed by LPP. (a) LPP response to emotional and 
neutral facial expressions across exposure durations. Left: LPP peak with averaged time 
window highlighted in grey (310-430 ms); right: voltage means. Emotional expressions 
had significantly more positive voltage than neutral expressions at 6.2 ms of exposure. (b) 
Topographic distributions of the LPP component for each condition at the relevant time 
window show increase in positive voltage around parietocentral areas across exposure 
durations. (c) Source estimation of the LPP component visually identified on cortical 
maps. Estimated current sources are localised around parietocentral and inferotemporal 
areas. Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences between conditions. Error bars 
represent 95% CI. 
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5.2.3.5 Visual awareness (VAN) 
The visual awareness negativity (VAN) is a voltage difference measured over 
occipitotemporal areas, bilaterally. The standard experimental manipulation to extract 
VAN consists on comparing trials where participants reported seeing a stimulus to those 
where they reported not seeing it. We examined how awareness, facial expression, and 
exposure duration conditions affected VAN. By using the distinction between trials with 
and without awareness based on PAS ratings (see EEG analysis section, above), we could 
find the exposure-duration range in which visual awareness arises. Since awareness (by 
including every rating except ‘no experience’) was present over 90% of trials at the longest 
exposure duration (Figure 5.6), we only included trials with the exposure durations of 1.7 
ms and 4.4 ms in this analysis. 
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Figure 5.6. Proportion of Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) ratings. (a) Percentages 
represent overall numbers per exposure duration. At 1.7 ms, 69.8% of the trials were 
reported as awareness-absent trials (“no experience”) and 30.2% were reported as 
awareness-present trials (“vague impression”, “almost clear experience” or “clear 
experience”). At 4.4 ms, 17.9% of the trials were reported as awareness-absent and 82.1% 
were reported as awareness-present. At 6.2 ms, 8% of the trials were reported as 
awareness-absent and 92% were reported as awareness-present. (b) Mean number of trials 
per PAS rating. Error bars denote 95% CI, representing variability across subjects. 
 
We entered mean voltage values into a 2 (awareness: aware, unaware) × 2 
(expression: emotional, neutral) × 2 (electrode: left, right) × 2 (exposure durations) 
repeated-measures ANOVA. We found a main effect of exposure duration 
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(𝐹(1, 30) = 32.042, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .516), indicating that VAN turned more negative 
with increasing exposure duration (Figure 5.7). Importantly, we found a main effect of 
awareness (𝐹(1, 30) = 17.755, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .372), thus suggesting VAN could 
distinguish between awareness-present (𝑀 = −4.299 [1.099]) and awareness-absent 
trials (𝑀 = −3.535 [0.825]). Unexpectedly, we also found a main effect of expression 
(𝐹(1, 30) = 8.679, 𝑝 = .006, ηp2 = .224), indicating that VAN was significantly less 
negative in voltage for emotional (𝑀 = −3.747 [1.073]) than neutral expressions (𝑀 =
−4.087 [1.002]). We did not find an effect of electrode site (𝐹(1, 30) = 1.719, 𝑝 =
.20, ηp2 = .054), indicating that VAN did not significantly vary between hemispheres. 
Crucially, the interaction between awareness and exposure duration reached significance 
(𝐹(1, 30) = 10.062, 𝑝 = .003, ηp2 = .251). To test whether awareness significantly 
modulated VAN at specific exposure durations, and thus answer our main question here 
– i.e. at which exposure duration we find a neural indication of awareness – we ran post 
hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons and found that VAN was significantly 
more negative in awareness-present than awareness-absent trials only at 4.4 ms of 
exposure (𝑡(45.4) =  −5.21, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = −0.935). This finding suggests that 4.4 ms 
of exposure may be sufficient for faces to reach awareness. We did not find significant 
interactions between expression and awareness (𝐹(1, 30) = 2.424, 𝑝 = .130, ηp2 = .075), 
expression and electrode site (𝐹(1, 30) = 0.99, 𝑝 = .755, ηp2 = .003), expression and 
exposure duration (𝐹(1, 30) = 0.06, 𝑝 = .938, ηp2 = 0), electrode site and exposure 
duration (𝐹(1, 30) = 1.232, 𝑝 = .276, ηp2 = .039), or any of the three-way interactions 
and four-way interaction (all p > .113). 
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Figure 5.7. Visual awareness indexed by VAN. (a) VAN response to emotional and 
neutral facial expressions across exposure durations and awareness ratings. Left: averaged 
waveforms resulting from VAN in the left and right hemispheres. Averaged time window 
highlighted in grey (185-215 ms); right: voltage means. Awareness-present trials had 
significantly more positive voltage than awareness-absent trials at 4.4 ms of exposure. (b) 
Topographical distributions of VAN for each condition at the relevant time window show 
an increase in negative voltage in posterior areas across exposure durations across 
expressions, awareness ratings, and exposure durations. (c) Source estimation of VAN 
visually identified on cortical maps. Estimated current sources are localised around 
inferotemporal gyri and lateral occipital sulcus, across all conditions. Asterisks indicate 
statistically significant differences between awareness-present and awareness-absent trials. 
Error bars represent 95% CI. 
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5.2.3.6 Conscious access (LP) 
The late positivity (LP) is a positive voltage enhancement in the P3 wave. This 
component is measured over parietooccipital areas, centrally. To test whether LP was 
sensitive to awareness, we sorted trials in the same manner we did with VAN. Then, we 
entered mean voltage values into a 2 (awareness: aware, unaware) × 2 (expression: 
emotional, neutral) × 2 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found a 
main effect of exposure duration (𝐹(1, 30) = 27.518, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .478), indicating 
that LP became more positive with increasing exposure duration (Figure 5.8). 
Importantly, we found a main effect of awareness (𝐹(1, 30) = 7.737, 𝑝 = .009, ηp2 =
.205), with more positive LP voltage in awareness-present (𝑀 = 3.597 [0.872]) than 
awareness-absent trials (𝑀 = 3.150 [0.111]). Unexpectedly, we also found a main effect 
of expression (𝐹(1, 30) = 4.603, 𝑝 = .04, ηp2 = .133), indicating more positive voltage 
values for neutral (𝑀 = 3.452 [5.590]) than emotional expressions (𝑀 =
3.295 [0.736]). This effect is consistent with the (equally unexpected) effect of 
expression found for the VAN (i.e. greater enhancement for neutral expressions than for 
emotional ones). Crucially, the interaction between awareness and exposure duration 
reached significance (𝐹(1, 30) = 37.420, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .555). To test at which specific 
exposure durations LP can discriminate between awareness-present and awareness-absent 
trials, and thus answer our main question here – i.e. at which exposure duration we find 
a neural indication of awareness – we ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons and found that LP was significantly more positive in awareness-present than 
awareness-absent trials only at 4.4 ms of exposure (𝑡(55) =  5.861, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 =
1.053). This finding suggests that 4.4 ms of exposure may be sufficient for enabling 
conscious access to faces. Importantly, this finding converges with VAN findings. Neither 
the interaction between expression and awareness (𝐹(1, 30) = 0.457, 𝑝 = .504, ηp2 =
.015) nor the interaction between expression and exposure duration (𝐹(1, 30) =
0.377, 𝑝 = .544, ηp2 = .012) reached significance. The three-way interaction did reach 
significance (𝐹(1, 30) = 6.361, 𝑝 = .017, ηp2 = .175). This interaction seems to be driven 
by the fact that exposure duration modulated the effect of awareness more strongly for 
emotional than for neutral expressions. However, we did not examine this in greater detail 
as we did not have a specific hypothesis concerning such modulations. 
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Figure 5.8. Conscious access indexed by LP. (a) LP response to emotional and neutral 
facial expressions across exposure durations and awareness ratings. Left: LP differences 
with averaged time window highlighted in grey (320-520 ms); right: voltage means. 
Awareness-present trials had significantly more positive voltage than awareness-absent 
trials at 4.4 ms of exposure. (b) Topographical distributions of the LP for each condition 
at the relevant time window show increase in positive voltage in parietocentral areas 
across exposure durations. (c) Source estimation of LP visually identified on cortical maps. 
Estimated current sources are localised around parietocentral and inferotemporal areas. 
Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences between awareness-present and 
awareness-absent trials. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
5.2.4 Discussion 
 Are neural systems of emotion processing engaged before faces reach a level of 
processing that enables expression identification and reports of perceptual awareness? In 
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this experiment, we measured neural markers of visual processing (P1), face processing 
(N170/VPP), emotion processing (EPN and LPP), and awareness (VAN and LP) with 
EEG, using three exposure durations that proved relevant according to signal detection 
analyses in Experiment 9: 1.7 ms (when holistic face processing and expression 
identification are absent), 4.4 ms (when holistic face processing arises), and 6.2 ms (when 
both expression identification and conscious awareness are very likely to have arisen). 
Signal detection analyses in Experiment 13 revealed a very similar sequence of processing 
steps: at 1.7 ms we found weak, but above-chance, stimulus discrimination; and at 4.4 ms 
above-chance emotion identification, and metacognitive sensitivity arose. By 6.2 ms, all 
these processes exhibited high sensitivity. If neural markers of emotion processing could 
distinguish between emotional and neutral expressions at shorter durations than those at 
which we find behavioural indications of emotion identification, this would provide 
evidence for unconscious emotion processing. Crucially, we found that both neural 
markers of emotion processing (EPN and LPP) discriminated between emotional and 
neutral expressions at 6.2 ms of exposure, meaning that emotion processing arose at some 
point between 4.4 ms and 6.2 ms of exposure. Together, neural markers and signal 
detection indices suggest that emotion processing does not arise before holistic face 
processing and awareness do. 
 How much visual exposure is required for faces to reach perceptual awareness? 
To address this question, we measured two neural markers of awareness (VAN and LP); 
both markers discriminated between awareness-present and awareness-absent trials when 
faces were presented for 4.4 ms, thus suggesting that perceptual awareness requires 
between 1.7 ms and 4.4 ms of visual exposure, alongside holistic face processing (as 
shown in Experiment 9) and expression identification (as shown in Experiment 13). 
However, what aspects of awareness VAN and LP specifically index is still a matter of 
debate (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010; Railo et al., 2011). Some studies have suggested that 
VAN may index phenomenal consciousness (i.e. subjective experience) whereas LP would 
index conscious access (i.e. the ability to consciously access and thus report sensory 
information; Eklund & Wiens, 2018, 2019; Jimenez et al., 2018; Koivisto et al., 2016; 
Wilenius-Emet et al., 2004). Regardless of this distinction’s validity, the fact that both 
neural markers discriminated between awareness-present and awareness-absent trials by 
4.4 ms of exposure may suggest that perceptual awareness emerges alongside face holistic 
processing. It is interesting to note that we also found an unexpected effect of emotion 
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on both VAN and LP, which might suggest that these components are affected by other 
cognitive processes, too. For example, Hernández-Lorca et al. (2019), using Binocular 
Rivalry, found that VAN was modulated by awareness and emotional content, which they 
interpreted as evidence of an emotional bias in perceptual awareness. It has been also 
suggested that VAN, N170, and EPN may be affected by different but correlated 
underlying processes when studying the interaction between face perception, emotion 
processing, and awareness, as those three markers share very similar topographies and 
time windows (Wierzchoń et al., 2016). Future studies should expand on whether VAN 
specifically indexes awareness or other aspects involved in perception that may be 
necessary but not sufficient for awareness. Similarly, the effect of emotion on LP might 
have been driven by the LPP’s sensitivity to emotion content; they have similar 
topographies and time windows, and both are part of the P3 wave (Hajcak et al., 2010; 
Wilenius & Revonsuo, 2007). 
In conclusion, both neural markers and signal detection indices required roughly 
the same minimal exposure duration to discriminate emotional content in faces. So far, 
however, all experiments in this and the previous chapter have used only images of faces. 
To what extent are the processes and durations we found specific to faces? In Experiment 
9, we found that holistic face processing, indexed by the face-inversion effect, required a 
minimal exposure duration of 4.4 ms to arise. Do neural systems of face processing 
require the same amount of visual exposure to discriminate a face from a non-face 
stimulus? In Experiment 13, we measured the N170/VPP complex, which is a neural 
marker of face processing. However, we did not include a control condition to determine 
by which exposure duration neural face processing arises. To determine the minimal 
required exposure of face processing, we need to measure the N170/VPP in response to 
face and non-face stimuli. 
 
5.3    Experiment 14 
 In Experiment 13, we used signal detection indices and EEG neural markers to 
test whether emotion processing arises before perceptual awareness. We found that neural 
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emotion processing arose with a longer exposure duration (6.2 ms) than perceptual 
awareness did (4.4 ms), thus indicating that emotion processing arises after participants 
become aware of faces. Therefore, perceptual awareness may be required for emotion 
processing to occur. But is this the case of face processing? Does face processing arise 
before perceptual awareness does? It could be the case that while emotion processing may 
require perceptual awareness to arise, face processing arises before perceptual awareness 
does. 
In Experiment 14, our main question is whether neural systems can discriminate 
face from non-face stimuli before holistic processing and perceptual awareness arise. In 
Experiment 9, we found evidence of holistic face processing – indexed by the face-
inversion effect in location discrimination – by 4.4 ms of exposure for stimuli presented 
peripherally, as in the experiments of this chapter. But may neural markers that are specific 
to face perception be evident even before holistic processing (a hallmark of specialised 
face processing) arises? In Experiment 13, we measured the N170 component, which is 
sensitive to face and face-like visual information. The N170 component belongs to the 
N1-family, a group of visually evoked potentials that are elicited over visual cortical areas 
in response to visual stimulation (Eimer, 2011). Therefore, we cannot tell whether the 
responses of N170 in Experiment 13 were specific to faces as any kind of visual 
processing could explain it. By comparing the ERP evoked by face and non-face stimuli 
we can find the exposure duration at which the response evoked by faces becomes an 
N170, distinguishable from the N1evoked by non-face stimuli. If N170 can discriminate 
between faces and non-faces before there is sufficient visual information available to elicit 
the face-inversion effect (i.e. around 4.4 ms), then neural systems can process facial 
information before holistic face processing arises. On the other hand, if the same minimal 
exposure duration is required to generate an N170 that discriminates between face and 
non-face stimuli as is required for the face-inversion effect to arise, then face processing 
may indeed require holistic processing to occur. 
 Measuring the response of N170 to face and non-face stimuli, as just described, 
should answer our main question. However, N170 is a local neural marker with its source 
in the fusiform gyri (Gao et al., 2019). Because neural face processing may recruit different 
neural systems to engage with face stimuli, we also measured a large-scale functional 
connectivity marker: weighted Symbolic Mutual Information (wSMI). wSMI is a marker 
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of information sharing across the cortex. By measuring wSMI, we can address two 
questions: whether information sharing increases within the range of extremely brief 
exposure durations we used, and whether a difference in information sharing for face and 
non-face stimuli arises within this exposure-duration range. Importantly, wSMI offers a 
way to explore whether the information conveyed with these brief exposure durations can 
detect global changes in information sharing across the brain, a relevant characteristic in 
theories of consciousness. 
 
5.3.1 Method 
 
5.3.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-eight students of the Université Libre de Bruxelles provided informed 
consent and were paid €30 for participation. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and reported no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. Six participants were 
excluded from the analysis due to EEG artefacts (see Analysis section). The remaining 32 
participants (21 female; all right-handed) had a mean age of 23.2 (SDage = 3.2; range: 18 – 
27). 
 
5.3.1.2 Stimuli 
 Stimuli were 10 human faces (all with neutral expressions, in upright orientation; 
5 female) taken from the RaFD and 10 highly recognisable objects taken from the Bank 
of Standardized Stimuli (BOSS; Brodeur et al., 2010, 2014). All images went through the 
same standardisation procedure described in Experiment 9, including the generation of 
scrambled images, which followed the same procedure as in Chapter 4. Scrambled and 
non-scrambled object images were additionally put inside a grey oval that resembled the 
faces’ contour. The region between the oval’s edge and the object inside was painted with 
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a shade of grey equivalent to the mean RGB value of the 10 human faces’ contours (see 
Appendix J). 
 
5.3.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure was very similar to that of Experiment 9, but with four exposure 
durations, equally spaced on a logarithmic scale: 0.8, 1.4, 2.45, and 4.288 ms. We used a 
logarithmic scale to describe with higher precision how face processing arose at the 
shortest durations. Half the trials contained an intact face image on one side and its 
scrambled counterpart on the other side; the other half contained an intact object image 
on one side with its scrambled counterpart on the other side. Participants were asked to 
judge the location of the intact stimulus (left or right) and its category (face or object) 
with a single keypress. The ‘left Control’ and ‘Left Shift’ keys of a standard keyboard were 
used for ‘left’ reports, and the ‘up arrow’ and ‘down arrow’ keys were used for ‘right’ 
reports. Mapping of keys to stimulus category was counterbalanced across participants. 
Then they judged their visual experience (PAS). Participants performed 40 practice trials 
followed by 1120 experimental trials. Trial order was fully randomised. Participants were 
given self-terminated breaks every 70 trials and a compulsory 15-minute break after 
completing 560 trials. 
 
5.3.1.4 EEG Recording and Pre-processing 
EEG recording and pre-processing was performed as in Experiment 13, with two 
differences: first, based on eye inspection of canonical sites, we selected slightly different 
time windows for the following ERP components: N170/VPP (175 – 205 ms), VAN (200 
– 230 ms), and LP (300 – 585 ms). Second, mean amplitudes were not computed for EPN 
and LPP because we did not employ emotional expressions. For wSMI, we employed the 
time window used to measure N170/VPP. 
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5.3.1.5 Signal Detection Analysis 
Signal detection analysis of location sensitivity and response bias was performed 
as in Experiment 9. In addition, we measured stimulus category identification sensitivity 
– how well participants can discriminate faces from objects – by defining face trials as 
signal and object trials as noise. Then, we applied the equivalent signal detection analysis 
employed for expression identification sensitivity in Experiment 9 to obtain stimulus 
category identification d’ and criterion scores. 
 
5.3.1.6 ERP Analysis 
ERP analysis and source reconstruction were performed as in Experiment 13. We 
excluded data from six participants with more than 15% of noisy electrodes (whose 
impedance values exceeded 50 kΩ throughout the experiment). They were excluded from 
both signal detection and EEG analyses. One additional participant did not provide 
“almost clear experience” and “clear experience” PAS ratings and therefore their data 
were excluded from the VAN and LP analyses. 
 
5.3.1.7 EEG Neural Information Integration Analysis 
We quantified the information flow between electrodes by calculating the 
weighted symbolic mutual information (wSMI). This index estimates to which extent two 
EEG signals exhibit non-random joint (i.e. correlated) fluctuations. Thus, wSMI has been 
proposed as a measure of neural information sharing (King et al., 2013; Sitt et al., 2014) 
and has three main advantages. First, it is a rapid and robust estimate of signals’ entropy 
(i.e. statistical uncertainty in signal patterns), as it reduces the signal’s length (i.e. 
dimensionality) by looking for qualitative or “symbolic” patterns of increase or decrease 
in the signal. Second, it efficiently detects high non-linear coupling (i.e. non-proportional 
relationships between neural signals) between EEG signals, as it has been shown with 
simulated (Imperatori et al., 2019) and experimental data (Canales-Johnson et al., 2020) 
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that high non-linear coupling between EEG signals is neurocognitively meaningful, and 
it can be easily captured by wSMI (unlike with other traditional EEG connectivity 
measures such as phase synchronization). Third, it rejects spurious correlations between 
signals that share a common source, thus prioritising non-trivial pairs of symbols. 
We calculated wSMI between each pair of electrodes (King et al., 2013), for each 
trial, after transforming the EEG signal into a sequence of discrete symbols defined by 
ordering of k time samples with a temporal separation between each pair (or τ). The 
symbolic transformation is determined by a fixed symbol size (k = 3, i.e. 3 samples 
represent a symbol) and the variable τ between samples (temporal distance between 
samples), thus determining the frequency range in which wSMI is estimated (Sitt et al., 
2014). We chose τ = 32. The frequency specificity f of wSMI is related to k and τ as 
follows: 
𝑓 =
1000
𝜏 ∗ 𝑘
 
This formula, with a kernel size k of 3 and τ values of 32, produced a sensitivity 
to frequencies in the range under 10 Hz. This range encompasses alpha frequencies, which 
are relevant for awareness (Lozano-Soldevilla & VanRullen, 2019; VanRullen & 
Macdonald, 2012), and also cover the frequency range of the N170/VPP complex (Eimer 
& Holmes, 2007; Itier & Taylor, 2004). 
wSMI was estimated for each pair of transformed EEG signals by calculating the 
joint probability of each pair of symbols. The joint probability matrix was multiplied by 
binary weights to reduce spurious correlations between signals. The weights were set to 
zero for pairs of identical symbols, as these could have been elicited by a unique common 
source, and for opposite symbols (i.e. of in opposite direction), as these could reflect the 
two sides of a single electric dipole. The following formula calculates wSMI (in bits, but 
shown in arbitrary units or AU, with absolute values, in Figure 5.14): 
 
𝑤𝑆𝑀𝐼(𝑋, 𝑌) =
1
log (𝑘!)
∑  
 
𝑥∈𝑋
∑ 𝑤(𝑥, 𝑦) 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)
 
𝑦∈𝑌
log (
𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)
𝑝(𝑥)𝑝(𝑦)
) 
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Here, x and y are symbols present in signals X and Y respectively; w(x,y) is the 
weight matrix and p(x,y) is the joint probability of co-occurrence of symbol x in signal X 
and symbol y in signal Y. Finally, p(x) and p(y) are the probabilities of those symbols in 
each signal and k! is the number of symbols used to normalise the mutual information by 
the signal’s maximal entropy. Temporal evolution of wSMI was calculated using a 500ms 
sliding window with 2-ms time step, i.e. with a 96% overlap between two adjacent 
windows. 
 
5.3.2 Behavioural results 
 
5.3.2.1 Location sensitivity 
We measured location sensitivity to confirm that our new participants displayed 
comparable performance to participants in the equivalent conditions of Experiment 9. To 
examine how conditions affected stimulus discrimination, we entered location d’ scores 
into a 2 (stimulus category: face, object) × 4 (exposure durations) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. We found a main effect of exposure duration (𝐹(1.28, 39.75) = 184.63, 𝑝 <
.001, ηp2 = .856), indicating that location d’ scores increased with increasing exposure 
duration (Figure 5.9a). We also found a main effect of stimulus category 
(𝐹(1, 31) = 5.63, 𝑝 = .024, ηp2 = .154), with higher location d’ scores for objects (𝑀 =
0.709 [0.777]) than faces (𝑀 = 0.567 [0.751]). Finally, the interaction between the 
two factors also reached significance (𝐹(2.06, 63.81) = 8.92, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .224). To test 
whether location d’ scores differed between stimulus categories at any exposure duration, 
we ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons and found significantly 
higher location d’ scores for objects over faces at 2.45 ms of exposure (𝑡(98.3) =
−5.386, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = −0.952). This advantage may be due to low-level visual 
differences such as stimulus size – no object could fill the oval entirely like faces, which 
may have led to contrast differences. Overall, these results indicate that location d’ to both 
faces and objects increases with increasing exposure duration even in the brief range from 
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0.8 to 4.288 ms. Importantly, the d’ scores we found resemble the ones found in 
Experiment 9. 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Behavioural results of Experiment 14. (a) Location sensitivity. Location d’ 
increased with increasing exposure duration. A significant advantage for objects over 
faces was found at 2.45 ms of exposure. (b) Absolute-value location response bias scores 
for reporting location (bias toward either left or right). The amount of bias decreased as 
exposure duration increased, with greater bias for faces than objects. (c) Identification 
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sensitivity for stimulus category. Participants’ ability to discriminate faces and objects 
increased with exposure duration. (d) Criterion scores for reporting stimulus category. 
Lower criterion indicates greater bias to reporting a face. Criterion does not significantly 
change with increasing exposure duration. (e) Awareness-based metacognitive sensitivity. 
Meta-d’ increased with exposure duration but was unaffected by stimulus category. (f) 
Metacognitive bias scores for reporting subjective awareness. Metacognitive bias was 
unaffected by exposure duration and stimulus category. Asterisks index statistically 
significant differences between faces and objects. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
To determine the minimal required exposure that exhibited above-chance 
performance (d’ > 0), we ran a series of uncorrected one-sample t-tests against zero. We 
found that the earliest exposure duration that elicited above-chance discrimination was 
1.4 ms for both face (𝑀 = 0.112 [0.239];  𝑡(31) =  2.65, 𝑝 = .013, 𝑑 = 0.468) and 
object stimuli (𝑀 = 0.145 [0.201];  𝑡(31) =  4.08, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.721). 
 
5.3.2.2 Location response bias 
We examined whether participants’ response bias for reporting stimulus location 
varied across conditions by entering the absolute values of 𝐶identification scores into a 2 
(stimulus categories: face, object) × 4 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
As in previous experiments, response bias significantly decreased with exposure duration 
(Figure 5.9b), as indicated by a main effect of exposure duration (𝐹(3, 39.57) = 8.26, 𝑝 =
.004, ηp2 = .210). We also found a main effect of stimulus category (𝐹(1, 31) = 8.60, 𝑝 =
.006, ηp2 = .217), indicating higher amount of response bias for faces (𝑀 =
0.387 [0.127]) than objects (𝑀 = 0.328 [0.140]). The interaction between these two 
factors did not reach significance (𝐹(2.68, 82.95) = 1.79, 𝑝 = .161, ηp2 = .055). 
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5.3.2.3 Stimulus category identification sensitivity 
We examined whether participants’ sensitivity to discriminating faces from objects 
varied across exposure durations by comparing identification d’ scores in a one-way 
ANOVA (Figure 5.9c). As expected, identification d’ increased alongside exposure 
duration (𝐹(3, 124) = 32.4, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .440). 
To determine the minimal required exposure that exhibited above-chance 
performance (d’ > 0), we ran a series of uncorrected one-sample t-tests against zero. We 
found that the earliest exposure duration that elicited above-chance stimulus category 
identification was 1.4 ms (𝑀 = 0.096 [0.260];  𝑡(31) =  2.09, 𝑝 = .045, 𝑑 = 0.369). 
 
5.3.2.4 Stimulus category identification criterion 
We examined whether participants’ criterion for reporting faces rather than 
objects varied across exposure durations by comparing criterion scores in a one-way 
ANOVA (Figure 5.9d). Lower scores indicated a greater tendency to report a face. 
Identification criterion did not vary across exposure durations (𝐹(3, 124) = 1.30, 𝑝 =
.278, ηp2 = .030). 
 
5.3.2.5 Awareness-based metacognitive sensitivity 
We examined whether awareness scores were sensitive to participants’ location 
sensitivity scores by calculating meta-d’, a measure of metacognitive sensitivity. To 
examine whether metacognitive sensitivity varied across conditions, we entered meta-d’ 
scores into a 2 (stimulus category: face, object) × 4 (exposure durations) repeated-
measures ANOVA (Figure 5.9e). A main effect of exposure duration indicated that meta-
d’ increased with increasing exposure duration (𝐹(1.79, 55.36) = 24.20, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 =
.438). However, we did not find a main effect of stimulus category (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.902, 𝑝 =
.350, ηp2 = .003), suggesting that stimulus category did not affect metacognitive 
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sensitivity. We did not find an interaction between stimulus category and exposure 
duration either (𝐹(2.06, 63.96) = 1.744, 𝑝 = .182, ηp2 = .053). 
As described, we did not find a main effect of stimulus category, therefore we 
calculated Bayes factors to test whether the obtained data support this absence of an 
effect. Bayes factors indicated substantial evidence in favour of the null hypothesis model 
(𝐵𝐹01 = 4.67), supporting the finding that metacognitive sensitivity was not greater for 
either stimulus category. 
To determine the minimal exposure that exhibited above-chance performance 
(meta-d’ > 0), we ran a series of uncorrected one-sample t-tests against zero. We found 
that the earliest exposure duration that elicited above-chance metacognitive awareness 
was 1.4 ms for both face (𝑀 = 0.139 [0.341];  𝑡(31) =  2.3, 𝑝 = .028, 𝑑 = 0.407) 
and object stimuli (𝑀 = 0.233 [0.362];  𝑡(31) =  3.64, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.644). 
 
5.3.2.6 Metacognitive bias 
As described above, metacognitive bias is the tendency to give high confidence 
(or awareness) ratings regardless of actual performance. To examine whether 
metacognitive bias varied across conditions, we entered meta-bias scores into a 2 (stimulus 
category: face, object) × 4 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 5.9f). 
We did not find an effect of exposure duration (𝐹(2.05, 63.47) = 0.419, 𝑝 = .664, ηp2 =
.013), or of stimulus category (𝐹(1, 31) = 1.661, 𝑝 = .207, ηp2 = .051). The interaction 
between stimulus category and exposure duration did not reach significance either 
(𝐹(2.12, 65.59) = 0.392, 𝑝 = .689, ηp2 = .012). These results suggest that the participants’ 
tendency to describe their subjective awareness was not affected by any of the conditions. 
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5.3.3 ERP results 
 
5.3.3.1 Early visual processing (P1) 
We examined how stimulus categories and exposure duration conditions affected 
early visual processing by measuring voltage changes in P1. This component is measured 
over occipital regions. We entered mean voltage values into a 2 (stimulus category: face, 
object) × 4 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found a main effect of 
exposure duration (𝐹(1.52, 47.02) = 81.86, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .725), whereby P1 amplitude 
increased with increasing exposure duration, indicating that longer exposure durations 
involve more visual processing than shorter exposure durations (Figure 5.10). We did not 
find a main effect of stimulus category, suggesting that images of faces and objects did 
not affect early visual processing differently (𝐹(1, 31) = 1.49, 𝑝 = .232, ηp2 = .046). The 
interaction between these factors reached significance (𝐹(2.84, 88.04) = 2.88, 𝑝 =
.043, ηp2 = .085), but post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons did not 
reveal significant differences between stimulus categories at any exposure duration. These 
results indicate that P1 was sensitive to visual differences between extremely brief 
exposure durations. 
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Figure 5.10. Early visual processing indexed by P1. (a) P1 response to face and object 
stimuli across exposure durations. Left: P1 peak with averaged time window highlighted 
in grey (105-135 ms); right: voltage means. P1 voltage increased with increasing exposure 
duration. (b) Topographical distributions of P1 for each condition at the relevant time 
window show increase in positive voltage in visual cortex across exposure durations. (c) 
Source estimation of P1 visually identified on cortical maps. Estimated current sources 
are localised around the visual cortex. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
5.3.3.2 Face processing (N170/VPP) 
We examined how stimulus category and exposure duration conditions affected 
face processing by measuring voltage changes in N170/VPP. This component is 
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measured over occipitotemporal regions, bilaterally, and over frontocentral regions. We 
entered mean voltage values into a 2 (stimulus categories: face, object) × 3 (electrode site: 
left, right, central) × 4 (exposure durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found a 
main effect of exposure duration (𝐹(1.38, 42.92) = 45.681, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .596), 
indicating that the magnitude of this component significantly increased with increasing 
exposure duration. We also found a main effect of electrode site (𝐹(1.31, 40.59) =
62.566, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .669), which was expected given that left (𝑀 =
−3.225 [1.510]) and right N170 peaks (𝑀 = −3.394 [1.603]) are negative in voltage 
whereas VPP is positive (𝑀 = 2.789 [1.050]). Like in Experiment 13, this effect helped 
confirm that we were measuring the N170/VPP complex. We did not find a main effect 
of stimulus category (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.005, 𝑝 = .946, ηp2 = 0), but crucially, we found a 
significant interaction between stimulus category and exposure duration (𝐹(2.45, 75.89) =
6.398, 𝑝 = .001, ηp2 = .171). To test whether N170/VPP was sensitive to faces at 
specific exposure durations, we ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons 
and found that the N170/VPP was significantly greater in magnitude for face stimuli 
(𝑀N170: 4.288ms = −5.093 [0.307]) compared to object stimuli (𝑀N170: 4.288ms =
−4.290 [0.159]) only at the longest exposure duration (𝑡(114) =  −3.467, 𝑝 =
.021, 𝑑 = −0.613), thus indicating that 4.288 ms of visual exposure conveyed sufficient 
information for neural systems to distinguish between a face and a no-face stimuli (Figure 
5.11). These results suggest that neural systems require around the same amount of visual 
exposure to trigger face processing as is required for the face-inversion effect to arise (see 
Experiment 9). Taken together, these findings indicate that neural face processing requires 
around 4 ms of exposure – and definitely no less than 2.45 ms where we see no difference. 
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Figure 5.11. Face processing indexed by the N170/VPP. (a) N170/VPP response to face 
and object stimuli across increasing exposure durations. Left: N170/VPP peaks with 
averaged time window highlighted in grey (175-205 ms); right: voltage means. N170 and 
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VPP had significantly more negative and positive voltages, respectively, for faces than 
objects at 4.288 ms of exposure. (b) Topographical distributions of the N170/VPP 
complex for the relevant time window across stimulus category and exposure duration 
conditions. (c) Source estimation of N170/VPP visually identified on cortical maps. 
Estimated current sources are localised around frontocentral areas, the inferotemporal 
gyri, and the lateral occipital sulcus. Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences 
between conditions. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
 
5.3.3.3 Visual awareness (VAN) 
We examined whether VAN could distinguish between awareness-present and 
awareness-absent trials across exposure durations by sorting trials the same way we did in 
Experiment 13. This component is measured over occipitotemporal regions, bilaterally. 
We entered mean voltage values into a 2 (awareness: aware, unaware) × 2 (stimulus 
category: face, object) × 2 (electrode: left, right) × 4 (exposure durations) repeated-
measures ANOVA. We found a main effect of exposure duration (𝐹(1.94, 58.11) =
18.86, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .386), indicating that VAN became more negative with 
increasing exposure duration (Figure 5.12). We also found a main effect of stimulus 
category (𝐹(1, 30) = 4.258, 𝑝 = .048, ηp2 = .124), which indicated that faces evoked 
more negative voltage means (𝑀 = −2.607 [1.076]) than objects (𝑀 =
−2.270 [0.931]). This effect may be due to the fact that VAN was measured at the same 
electrode sites as N170, and at a later yet close time window. Importantly, we found a 
main effect of awareness (𝐹(1, 30) = 19.612, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .395) – awareness-present 
trials had more negative voltage means (𝑀 = −2.766 [1.044]) than awareness-absent 
trials (𝑀 = −2.112 [0.880]). Importantly, the interaction between awareness and 
exposure duration did not reach significance this time (𝐹(2.67, 80.19) = 1.368, 𝑝 =
.260, ηp2 = .044), suggesting that VAN distinguished between awareness-present and 
awareness-absent trials overall, in a linear fashion. This finding is in line with the view that 
VAN may be an index of phenomenal consciousness – arguably, such a marker should 
be sensitive to awareness reports regardless of conscious access to sensory information. 
Therefore, if VAN were a marker of phenomenal consciousness, it should correlate with 
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awareness reports only in a linear way. Interestingly, the interaction between stimulus 
category and exposure duration reached significance (𝐹(2.49, 74.81) = 3.708, 𝑝 =
.021, ηp2 = .110). To test whether VAN was sensitive to stimulus categories at specific 
exposure durations, we ran post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons and 
found that VAN was significantly more negative for faces than objects only at the longest 
exposure duration: 4.288 ms (𝑡(117) =  −3.877, 𝑝 = .005, 𝑑 = −0.696). This effect 
may have been driven by voltage changes in N170, as this component and VAN share 
electrode sites and have very similar temporal windows. We did not find a main effect of 
electrode site (𝐹(1, 30) = 1.845, 𝑝 = .185, ηp2 = .058), suggesting that VAN changes did 
not differ between hemispheres. Finally, we did not find significant interactions between 
awareness and electrode site (𝐹(1, 30) = 1.096, 𝑝 = .303, ηp2 = .035), stimulus category 
and awareness (𝐹(1, 30) = 0.930, 𝑝 = .343, ηp2 = .03), electrode site and exposure 
duration (𝐹(1.95, 58.41) = 1.269, 𝑝 = .288, ηp2 = .041), nor any three-way interaction and 
the four-way interaction. In conclusion, VAN was sensitive to awareness ratings provided 
by participants, irrespective of visual exposure. 
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Figure 5.12. Visual awareness indexed by VAN. (a) VAN response to face and object 
stimuli across exposure durations and awareness reports. Left: VAN peak with averaged 
time window highlighted in grey (200-230 ms); right: voltage means. Awareness-present 
trials (solid lines), irrespective of stimulus category, had significantly more negative 
voltage than awareness-absent trials (dashed lines) at 4.288 ms of exposure. (b) 
Topographical distributions of the VAN for each condition at the relevant time window 
show increase in negative voltage on posterior areas across exposure durations. (c) Source 
estimation of VAN visually identified on cortical maps. Estimated current sources are 
localised around frontocentral areas, parietocentral areas, the inferotemporal gyri, and the 
lateral occipital sulcus. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
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5.3.3.4 Conscious access (LP) 
We examined whether LP could distinguish between awareness-present and 
awareness-absent trials by sorting trials the same way we did in Experiment 13. This 
component is measured over parietooccipital regions. We entered mean voltage values 
into a 2 (awareness: aware, unaware) × 2 (stimulus category: face, object) × 4 (exposure 
durations) repeated-measures ANOVA. We found a main effect of exposure duration 
(𝐹(1.99, 59.78) = 11.715, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .281), indicating that LP voltage increased with 
increasing exposure duration (Figure 5.13). Importantly, we found a main effect of 
awareness (𝐹(1, 30) = 4.826, 𝑝 = .036, ηp2 = .139), which indicates that LP voltage was 
significantly more positive in awareness-present trials (𝑀 = 2.621 [0.858]) than in 
awareness-absent trials (𝑀 = 2.142 [0.372]). Therefore, like in Experiment 13, LP was 
sensitive to awareness ratings. Crucially, the interaction between awareness and exposure 
duration reached significance, indicating that exposure duration may have significantly 
modulated LP’s sensitivity to awareness (𝐹(2.33, 70.03) = 5.393, 𝑝 = .004, ηp2 = .152). To 
test whether LP was sensitive to awareness ratings at specific exposure durations, we ran 
post hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons and found that LP was significantly 
more positive in awareness-present than awareness-absent trials only at the longest 
exposure duration: 4.288 ms (𝑡(87.3) =  3.683, 𝑝 = .011, 𝑑 = 0.661). This finding 
suggests that neural systems require around said amount of visual exposure to elicit 
conscious access. We did not find a main effect of stimulus category (𝐹(1, 30) = 0.168, 𝑝 =
.685, ηp2 = .006) nor significant interactions between stimulus category and awareness 
(𝐹(1, 30) = 20.69, 𝑝 = .161, ηp2 = .065), and between stimulus category and exposure 
duration (𝐹(2, 80.34) = 0.319, 𝑝 = .789, ηp2 = .011). The three-way interaction between 
awareness, stimulus category, and exposure duration was not significant either 
(𝐹(2.32, 69.66) = 1.764, 𝑝 = .174, ηp2 = .056). 
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Figure 5.13. Conscious access indexed by LP. (a) LP response to face and object stimuli 
across exposure durations and awareness reports. Left: LP difference with averaged time 
window highlighted in grey (430-585 ms); right: voltage means. Awareness-present trials 
(solid lines) had significantly more positive voltage than awareness-absent trials (dashed 
lines) at 4.288 ms of exposure. (b) Topographical distributions of the LP for each 
condition at the relevant time window show increase in positive voltage on posterior areas 
across exposure durations. (c) Source estimation of LP visually identified on cortical maps. 
Estimated current sources are localised around postcentral, parietocentral, 
occipitotemporal, and inferotemporal areas. Asterisks indicate statistically significant 
differences between awareness-present and awareness-absent conditions. Error bars 
represent 95% CI. 
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5.3.4 EEG Neural information integration results 
 As a measure of neural information integration, we calculated wSMI, which 
estimates neural information sharing across the cortex. To determine whether wSMI 
could distinguish between faces and objects across exposure durations, we entered wSMI 
mean values into a 2 (stimulus category: face, object) × 4 (exposure durations) repeated-
measures ANOVA. We found a main effect of exposure duration (𝐹(2.17, 67.13) =
34.369, 𝑝 < .001, ηp2 = .526), indicating that large-scale information sharing increased 
with increasing exposure duration (Figure 5.14). However, we did not find a main effect 
of stimulus category (𝐹(1, 31) = 0.042, 𝑝 = .840, ηp2 = .001), which may suggest that 
wSMI was not sensitive to stimulus categories with the exposure durations employed in 
Experiment 14. The interaction between the two factors was not significant either 
(𝐹(2.88, 89.28) = 1.914, 𝑝 < .135, ηp2 = .058). To assess whether the obtained data 
support the absence of an effect of stimulus category, we estimated Bayes factors, which 
indicated substantial evidence for the null hypothesis model (𝐵𝐹01 = 7.38), thus 
supporting the absence of an effect. These results suggest that the exposure durations we 
employed were sufficiently long to elicit an increase in large-scale neural information 
integration, but not to cause different patterns of connectivity for each stimulus category. 
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Figure 5.14. Neural information integration indexed by wSMI. Neural information 
sharing globally increased with increasing exposure durations. (a) wSMI increases across 
exposure durations, similarly for faces and objects, for the time window of interest. (b) 
Connectivity topographies for faces and objects across exposure durations. The height of 
an arc connecting two nodes indicates the strength of neural information integration 
between them. Faces and objects evoke similar patterns. Overall, the strength of 
functional connections increases with increasing exposure duration, but it is not 
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modulated by stimulus category. (c) wSMI means for each time window of interest. 
Higher scores indicate higher information sharing. Neural information sharing increased 
across exposure durations but did not distinguish between faces and objects. Error bars 
represent 95% CI. 
 
5.3.5 Discussion 
In this experiment, we measured neural markers of face processing to test whether 
they can discriminate face and non-face stimuli at shorter exposures than signal detection 
indices do. Crucially, we found that neural markers could discriminate between faces and 
objects at 4.288 ms of exposure, but not at shorter durations. This exposure duration 
roughly corresponds to the minimal exposure duration required for the face-inversion 
effect, as shown in Experiment 9. Therefore, our findings using neural markers here 
converge with findings from signal detection indices in Experiment 9, indicating that 
around four milliseconds of visual exposure are needed for the system to engage in face-
specific processing. 
 What is the minimal exposure duration required for faces to access perceptual 
awareness? We found convergent evidence of faces (and objects) gaining access to 
perceptual awareness by 4.288 ms of exposure coming from signal detection indices 
(metacognitive sensitivity) and neural markers of conscious awareness (VAN and LP). 
Importantly, unlike in Experiment 13 where both VAN and LP discriminated between 
awareness-present and awareness-absent trials by 4.4 ms, in Experiment 14 only LP 
interacted with exposure duration and exhibited discrimination between awareness-
present and awareness-absent trials by 4.288 ms of exposure. Although VAN exhibited a 
main effect of awareness, it did not interact with exposure duration. Importantly, these 
findings may suggest that in the sequence of processing steps of face perception, faces 
gain access to awareness as they become available for holistic processing.  
Some studies have suggested that VAN indexes phenomenal consciousness (i.e. 
changes in subjective experience) whereas LP indexes conscious access (i.e. ability to 
report sensory information; Koivisto et al., 2016; Koivisto & Grassini, 2016; Koivisto & 
Revonsuo, 2010). Our findings in Experiment 14 may support this distinction and provide 
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evidence of a minimal amount of visual exposure required for faces to gain access to 
awareness. Evidence from the N170/VPP complex and from signal detection analyses in 
this experiment converge, thereby suggesting that faces required around four milliseconds 
of exposure to gain access to perceptual awareness; this duration is similar to that required 
for holistic face processing in Experiment 9. This temporal convergence may suggest an 
underlying causal relationship between holistic face processing and awareness – e.g. 
awareness may be necessary for integration of visual features to allow or facilitate face 
recognition and subsequent emotional processing. We return to this point in the General 
Discussion. 
  In this experiment, we also measured wSMI, a neural marker of information 
integration, which indexes information sharing between different pairs of nodes across 
the brain cortex. As a measure of information sharing, wSMI may index global ignition in 
the brain and therefore broader mechanisms required for conscious access (King et al., 
2013). We found that the narrow range of exposure durations used in Experiment 14 was 
sufficient to elicit global changes in information integration. However, we did not find 
differences in connectivity patterns between faces and objects. It may be the case that the 
exposure durations we used, from 0.8 to 4.288 ms, are simply too brief for the system to 
exhibit stimulus-category differences in information sharing. Alternatively, wSMI may not 
be sufficiently sensitive to capture those differences between stimulus categories. Future 
studies should explore whether wSMI can capture differences between contents of 
consciousness. 
 In summary, we found evidence with neural markers that face processing arises 
by four milliseconds of exposure. Similarly, we found evidence both with neural markers 
and signal detection indices that perceptual awareness of faces arises by around four 
milliseconds of exposure as well. Together, these findings suggest that face processing 
and awareness may arise together in face perception. 
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5.4    General Discussion 
 In Chapter 4, we presented participants with face images for exposure durations 
ranging from around half a millisecond to around six milliseconds. By measuring signal 
detection indices, we found evidence of a sequence of processing steps that unfolds in 
the early stages of face perception: stimulus discrimination, holistic face processing, and 
facial expression identification, in this order, all of which increased alongside 
metacognitive sensitivity, a measure of perceptual awareness. These findings fit with two 
viable descriptions of face perception: There are two possible accounts that would be 
consistent with these findings: on the one hand, it is possible that all facial features are 
indeed processed in sequence as visual information reaches the brain cortex. On the other 
hand, it is possible that facial features are processed simultaneously but transmitted to the 
rest of the brain at different speeds. These findings favour the former interpretation over 
the latter one. 
In Chapter 5, we developed two EEG experiments to explore whether neural 
measures can distinguish emotional from unemotional facial expressions (Experiment 13) 
and faces from objects (Experiment 14) before relevant signal detection indices exhibit 
emotional and facial processing, respectively. Critically, in both experiments we 
additionally searched for the minimal exposure required for perceptual awareness. 
 
5.4.1 Emotion processing and expression identification 
Emotion processing was measured through expression identification and EEG 
evoked response (EPN and LPP; Experiment 13). While identification sensitivity suggests 
that facial expressions can be identified above chance with 4.4 ms of visual exposure, 
EEG markers suggest that emotion processing arises with a visual exposure somewhere 
between 4.4 and 6.2 ms. These findings have two key implications. First, that emotion 
processing cannot arise before holistic processing does. As shown in Experiment 9, 
holistic processing arises with a visual exposure of 4.4 ms, indexed by a face-inversion 
effect. And secondly, that emotion processing cannot arise in absence of awareness either, 
thus contradicting past claims about unconscious emotion processing (Hedger et al., 2015; 
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Pessoa et al., 2005; Yang et al., 2007; Yang & Yeh, 2018a). As shown by metacognitive 
sensitivity and ERP findings, perceptual awareness had reached high sensitivity with 
stimuli presented for 4.4 ms of exposure. In conclusion, neural systems do not engage 
differently with emotional and neutral expressions before gaining access to awareness. 
 Our findings may suggest that emotion processing of faces is carried out through 
a sequence of steps, with expression identification preceding emotion (intensity) 
processing. We acknowledge, however, that an expression identification task like ours 
could be completed by simply integrating facial features – physiological reactivity to 
emotion is expected but not required. Expression identification sensitivity showed a clear 
advantage of happy over fearful expressions despite differences in intensity between 
stimulus categories were minimised. This effect has been repeatedly reported in emotion 
recognition studies and has been attributed to happy expressions being easier to recognise 
than negative and neutral expressions, as it was also the case of our face stimuli (Calvo & 
Lundqvist, 2008; Goeleven et al., 2008; Langner et al., 2010; Svard et al., 2012). Future 
studies should address the question of whether expression identification is required for 
emotion processing and whether it is possible to recognise a face’s expression without 
engaging neural emotion processing. 
 
5.4.2 Face processing and visual integration 
 Face processing was indexed by the N170/VPP (Experiments 13 and 14). As 
shown by Experiment 9, a discrimination advantage in favour of upright faces over 
inverted faces (face-inversion effect) arises with a visual exposure of 4.4 ms, once both 
stimulus discrimination and expression identification sensitivity are above chance. Many 
studies have consistently reported that turning a face upside down disrupts face 
recognition (Farah et al., 1995; Goodrich & Yonelinas, 2019; Jiang et al., 2007; Stein et al., 
2012; Yin, 1969), suggesting that face inversion disrupts the holistic configuration of a 
face. But are neural markers that are specific to face processing evident before holistic 
processing arises? N170/VPP indicates that face processing arises with a visual exposure 
of around 4.3 ms (Experiment 14), roughly the same minimal exposure required for the 
face-inversion effect, as reported in Experiment 9. These results elucidate the minimal 
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required exposure for face-specific processing. While perceptual processing in general 
reached above-chance performance by 1.4 ms of visual exposure, face-specific systems 
required around 4.4 ms of visual exposure to discriminate between faces and objects. 
What do the face-inversion effect and the N170/VPP complex specifically index? 
A number of studies have shown that the N170/VPP complex, whose main brain source 
is the fusiform gyrus (Deffke et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2019; Pizzagalli et al., 2002; 
Schweinberger et al., 2002; Shibata et al., 2002), is also sensitive to face inversion – with 
stronger amplitude and slight but consistently delayed latency for inverted faces (Bentin 
et al., 1996; Civile et al., 2018; Eimer, 2000; Heisz et al., 2006; Rossion et al., 2000). The 
fusiform gyrus exhibits increased activation, measured with fMRI, for upright over 
inverted faces (Kanwisher et al., 1998; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2005), which may suggest that 
both the face-inversion effect and the N170/VPP complex index holistic face processing. 
Thus, our findings can be taken as evidence of a consistent minimal required exposure 
for holistic face processing, which is greater than the exposure duration required for 
stimulus discrimination.  
 In Experiment 14, information sharing increased with increasing exposure 
durations ranging from 0.8 to 4.288 ms. This finding indicates that extremely small 
differences between visual exposures can significantly affect large-scale functional 
connectivity in the cortex. However, unlike N170/VPP, wSMI did not find differences in 
how faces and objects were processed. On the one hand, a longer exposure duration may 
be required for functional connectivity to capture high-level differences between faces 
and objects. A numerical trend that fits this interpretation was found. On the other hand, 
wSMI is a relatively new neural marker and it may be the case that it is not sensitive to 
such differences in visual content. 
 
5.4.3 Consciousness: subjective awareness and conscious 
access 
 So far, our findings have presented a very consistent picture of how face 
perception occurs: A sequence of processing steps goes through stimulus discrimination, 
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holistic processing, and emotional processing. However, what is the minimal exposure 
duration required for perceptual awareness to arise? In Experiment 9, we estimated 
metacognitive sensitivity by testing how awareness ratings predicted changes in location 
discrimination across exposure durations. While we did find evidence of better 
metacognitive sensitivity for upright over inverted faces overall, this advantage did not 
interact with exposure duration. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude whether this 
face-inversion effect demands a clear minimal required exposure.  
In Experiments 13 and 14, we measured two neural markers of perceptual 
awareness, VAN and LP, and tested whether their sensitivity to subjective awareness 
emerges by a specific exposure duration. In Experiment 13, both VAN and LP could 
discriminate between awareness-present and awareness-absent trials when stimuli were 
presented for 4.4 ms, suggesting that the exposure duration required for holistic 
processing, found in Experiment 9, may be required for perceptual awareness. This 
conclusion is supported by metacognitive sensitivity, too – in Experiment 13, we found a 
non-linear increase in metacognitive sensitivity with an exposure duration of 4.4 ms. 
Interestingly, though, when using face and object stimuli, as in Experiment 14, VAN 
could only discriminate between awareness-present and awareness-absent trials overall. 
On the other hand, LP was sensitive to awareness, again indicating that around 4.288 ms 
of visual exposure may convey sufficient visual information to discriminate awareness-
present from awareness-absent trials. It is important to note, however, that metacognitive 
sensitivity was above-chance by visual exposures of 1.4 ms in Experiment 14, therefore 
suggesting that some form of awareness may have arisen alongside perceptual sensitivity. 
Because the PAS asked participants to rate their experience in a broad way, it is possible 
that metacognitive sensitivity at short exposure durations reflected awareness of basic 
aspects of the intact stimulus – required for its discrimination from its scrambled 
counterpart – but not awareness of its identity as a face or object. Taken together, these 
findings may suggest that faces (and perhaps objects) require a minimal visual exposure 
duration of around 4 ms to reach perceptual awareness. 
 But how reliable are VAN and LP as neural markers of awareness? Many studies 
have reported that these two ERP components are sensitive to awareness, having 
manipulated stimulus visibility using masking techniques (Genetti et al., 2009; Koivisto et 
al., 2005, 2006; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2007, 2008b; Railo & Koivisto, 2009), reduced 
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contrast (Koivisto et al., 2008; Pins & Ffytche, 2003; Wilenius & Revonsuo, 2007), 
attentional blink (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2008a; Sergent et al., 2005), change blindness 
tasks (Busch et al., 2009; Eimer & Mazza, 2005; Fernandez-Duque et al., 2003; Koivisto 
& Revonsuo, 2003; Niedeggen et al., 2001; Pourtois et al., 2006; Schankin & Wascher, 
2007; Turatto et al., 2002), and bistable perception (Kaernbach et al., 1999; Roeber et al., 
2008; Veser et al., 2008). Some researchers have argued that VAN may index phenomenal 
consciousness (i.e. subjective experience) whereas LP would index reflective 
consciousness (i.e. conscious access to sensory information). Based on this conceptual 
distinction (Block, 2007; Revonsuo, 2009), they have argued that because VAN has an 
earlier onset than LP, and because its topography is closer to visual cortices, it may index 
the subjective component of awareness, before information can be manipulated, 
verbalised, or even accessed (Koivisto et al., 2016; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010; Railo et 
al., 2011). On the other hand, other researchers have argued that VAN may only reflect 
subliminal or preconscious processing rather than consciousness, given that, unlike LP, 
VAN responds to unseen stimuli (Sergent et al., 2005) in a linear fashion (Del Cul et al., 
2007). This argument is based on the assumption that awareness is an all-or-none 
phenomenon rather than a continuous one (Overgaard et al., 2006; Sergent & Dehaene, 
2004), hence implying that a marker of consciousness should exhibit non-linear 
modulation. Meanwhile, LP has shown a non-linear modulation in previous studies, 
leading these researchers to propose it as marker of reflective consciousness or conscious 
access. This second interpretation is based on the tripartite distinction found in the global 
neuronal workspace model of consciousness, which distinguishes between subliminal 
(inaccessible information), preconscious (accessible but not attended), and conscious 
processing (attended and reportable; Dehaene et al., 2006; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). 
According to this model, purely phenomenal consciousness should not exist (Railo et al., 
2011). Regardless of what aspects of consciousness VAN and LP specifically index, we 
found that VAN was sensitive to awareness reports with a visual exposure duration of 4.4 
ms in Experiment 13 but not in Experiment 14, where it was sensitive to awareness only 
overall, providing partial evidence that around 4 ms of visual exposure are required to 
gain access to awareness. LP, on the other hand, was sensitive to awareness reports with 
exposure durations of 4.4 ms and 4.288 ms in Experiment 13 and Experiment 14, 
respectively, thus providing consistent evidence that faces require around those exposure 
durations of visual information to gain access to awareness. 
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5.4.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, we found that face perception occurs in a sequence of processing 
steps, encompassing stimulus discrimination, holistic processing and perceptual 
awareness, and emotion processing, all of which arise, in order, with no more than 6 
milliseconds of visual exposure. 
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Chapter 6 
6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
In this thesis, I have investigated how human faces gain access to perceptual 
awareness. More specifically, whether faces’ access to awareness can be modulated by 
emotional expression, orientation, and gaze. Furthermore, I examined whether face 
perception, and the processes it involves, arises in a unitary manner, all at once, or whether 
different aspects are perceived sequentially. In this thesis, my findings suggest that whilst 
orientation and gaze do modulate faces’ access to awareness, emotional expression does 
not. Importantly, my findings also suggest that face perception arises through a consistent 
sequence of processing steps. 
 
6.1    The present work: a brief overview 
Researchers have claimed that emotional faces, in particular negative ones such as 
fearful faces, gain access to awareness faster than other expressions. This is based on the 
finding that fearful expressions break through masking faster than positive and neutral 
expressions (Capitão et al., 2014; Gray et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2007; Yang & Yeh, 2018a). 
Similarly, researchers have claimed that faces’ access to awareness is also prioritised by 
eye contact, based on the finding that faces making eye contact reach awareness faster 
than faces looking away (Akechi et al., 2014; Chen & Yeh, 2012; Seymour et al., 2016; 
Stein, Senju, et al., 2011). Additionally, researchers have found that upright faces reach 
awareness faster than inverted faces (Jiang et al., 2007; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011). Because 
turning a face upside down disrupts holistic information, researchers have suggested that 
holistic processing could be behind some – if not all – of these effects. 
Most of the studies that led researchers to make these claims employed a specific 
variant of the interocular suppression technique CFS, called Breaking CFS. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, b-CFS presents several limitations: (1) detection tasks in b-CFS studies, 
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often used to measure when a stimulus breaks through CFS, could be confounded by 
identification processes; (2) stimulus reports in b-CFS studies could be confounded by 
post-perceptual factors; and (3) the fact that many reported effects have failed to replicate, 
and some of them have recently been attributed to low-level confounds. 
These issues were addressed empirically in Chapters 2 and 3. To circumvent them, 
I developed a CFS procedure that presents participants with face stimuli for predefined 
exposure durations, thereby preventing them from controlling the amount of visual 
information they receive. This procedure requires participants to detect on which side a 
face was presented and to identify their gaze direction (Chapter 2) or emotional expression 
(Chapter 3) with a single keypress. By measuring bias-independent perceptual sensitivity 
and decision criterion for detection and identification, I could disentangle detection from 
identification, and control in a more reliable way than before for post-perceptual factors. 
However, as explained in Chapter 1, masking techniques such as backward 
masking and CFS may introduce a different potential confound since we do not know 
what specific aspects of visual processing they interrupt. Furthermore, because masks 
replace stimuli, they may also interact differently with different stimulus categories. 
Therefore, extremely brief unmasked visual presentations may offer a more reliable 
approach that would allow researchers to search for the minimal exposure duration 
required for visual perception and awareness, including what factors can modulate faces’ 
access to awareness. However, as explained in Chapter 1, due to hardware limitations, it 
is extremely difficult to present visual stimuli for sufficiently brief exposure durations to 
assess this.  
These issues were addressed empirically in Chapters 4 and 5. By using an LCD 
tachistoscope that allows submillisecond presentations, I presented participants with 
unmasked face stimuli for extremely brief exposure durations, ranging from 0.6 to 6.2 ms. 
By using a modified task based on the one described above (see Chapter 4), I measured 
how perceptual and metacognitive sensitivity increased, and whether any of these 
measures was modulated by face orientation or emotional expression. Unlike perceptual 
sensitivity, which could theoretically increase as a function of visual exposure regardless 
of awareness, metacognitive sensitivity is an index of awareness, as it specifically measures 
subjective awareness’ sensitivity to performance. 
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Finally, to test whether neural activity may reveal evidence of holistic face 
processing, emotion processing, and perceptual awareness with shorter exposures than 
the ones indicated by signal detection analyses, I used EEG to measure neural markers of 
these processes. 
 
6.2    Gaze processing 
 
6.2.1 Summary of findings 
The original b-CFS finding reported by Stein, Senju, et al. (2011), where faces 
making eye contact were associated with shorter breakthrough times than faces looking 
away, did replicate, supporting the existence of an eye-contact effect, i.e. faces making eye 
contact are prioritised over faces looking away in their access to perceptual awareness. 
However, as argued in Chapter 1, b-CFS studies suffer from important methodological 
limitations: they do not distinguish between detection and criterion and are vulnerable to 
post-perceptual factors. In a follow-up experiment using a method that controlled for 
those issues in more stringent conditions, I found that said advantage of eye contact was 
present in detection and identification sensitivity, thus indicating that the eye-contact 
effect just described is due to perceptual sensitivity rather than criterion differences. 
However, the eye-contact effect was not disrupted by turning the face upside 
down, suggesting that the eye-contact effect may rely on low-level rather than high-level 
visual processing. This finding is in line with past b-CFS reports (Akechi et al., 2014; 
Seymour et al., 2016; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011). 
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6.2.2 Theoretical implications and future directions 
Gaze is considered a crucial social cue; it is essential for guessing other people’s 
intentions and actions. Gaze processing is commonly impaired in psychiatric disorders 
that involve social cognition limitations, such as autism (Akechi et al., 2014). Because of 
the relevance of gaze processing in social cognition, it could be hypothesised that the eye-
contact effect relies on holistic information. However, eye-contact has been shown to be 
processed by a subcortical pathway that involves the superior colliculus, pulvinar, and 
amygdala (Senju & Johnson, 2009a), and not in the cerebral cortex, thus supporting the 
notion that holistic processing may not be required for its detection. Future studies should 
explore whether the impaired eye-contact effect in autism is due to low-level visual 
processing, or rather, due to other forms of integration that the face-inversion effect does 
not index. 
 
6.3    Emotion processing 
 
6.3.1 Summary of findings 
I ran eleven experiments that involved emotion, described in Chapters 3, 4, and 
5. Only one CFS experiment – Experiment 6 in Chapter 3 – found evidence of emotional 
expressions gaining prioritised access to awareness. Contrary to our expectations, I found 
an advantage of happy over fearful expressions. Because no other experiment found an 
effect of emotional expression on detection (CFS experiments) or discrimination 
(tachistoscope experiments), I argue that this finding may be due to low-level visual 
confounds or rather, given the number of experiments, a statistical fluke. To my 
knowledge, only Stein & Sterzer (2012) have found an advantage of happy expressions 
over others, in a b-CFS study. Employing schematic faces, they found that this advantage 
was driven by a low-level confound in the mouths’ contours. 
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Expression identification revealed a consistent advantage of happy expressions 
over fearful and neutral expressions, both in CFS and tachistoscope experiments. This 
finding is in line with aspects that are intrinsic to facial expressions, as reported in the 
KDEF (Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008; Goeleven et al., 2008) and RaFD (Langner et al., 2010) 
stimuli norms: happy faces are more easily recognised than fearful and neutral 
expressions. 
Importantly, the identification advantage of happy expressions over other 
expressions was accompanied by more liberal identification criteria associated with happy 
faces than the other expressions. This finding indicates, as argued in Chapters 1 and 3, 
that reporting different emotional expressions may involve different – and consistent – 
decision criteria, which stresses the importance of measuring detection and identification 
separately. If they are not measured separately, and identification processes confound 
detection processes, post-perceptual factors that affect identification (e.g. decision 
criterion) may also confound detection reports. While this may not have been the case in 
our experiments, given that we never found more liberal criterion for reporting fearful 
expressions – the kinds of expressions reported faster in b-CFS studies (e.g. Yang et al., 
2007) – our experiments show that criterion effects are not just a theoretical possibility, 
and provide a stringent effort to address whether emotion modulates faces’ access to 
awareness. 
Moreover, the tachistoscope experiments indicated that emotion processing 
(indexed by EEG markers EPN and LPP) requires a longer minimal exposure duration 
to arise than holistic face processing (indexed by a behavioural face-inversion effect and 
EEG component N170/VPP) and awareness (indexed by SDT measure meta-d’, as well 
as EEG markers VAN and LP), which suggests that emotion processing of faces requires 
face processing and awareness to arise. 
 
6.3.2 Theoretical implications and future directions 
This thesis produced two crucial findings regarding emotion processing of faces: 
that the emotional content of a face does not modulate how faces gain access to 
252 
 
awareness, and that emotion processing probably arises after holistic face processing and 
awareness do. 
Our experiments did not directly test whether emotion effects (should they have 
been found) may be due to low-level confounds. Importantly, though, our face stimuli 
were equated in luminance and their differences in expression identification were 
minimised. If the advantage effect for fearful expressions claimed in past reports (Capitão 
et al., 2014; Oliver et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2007; Zhan et al., 2015) is indeed due to low-
level features, one should not expect to find said effect when using our stimuli. Our 
findings at least indirectly support the claim that emotion effects in b-CFS studies may 
have been due to low-level confounds (Gray et al., 2013; Hedger et al., 2015) and therefore 
call for a re-examination of related findings as those that psychiatric symptoms such as 
anxiety (Capitão et al., 2014) and depression (Sterzer et al., 2011) may prioritise certain 
emotional expressions’ access to awareness. Further studies could explore whether those 
findings hold up under the better-controlled conditions of the methods described in this 
thesis. 
If neural processing of emotion arises at longer exposure durations than holistic 
face processing and perceptual awareness, then emotion processing may require these two 
processes to occur, or rather, may be an independent process that requires a longer visual 
exposure to collect sufficient information to arise. Our findings support the notion that 
emotion processing arises after holistic face processing and perceptual awareness, but they 
are not sufficient to suggest that these two processes are a necessary condition for 
emotion processing to arise. Future studies should explore this possibility. 
In addition, our findings suggest that different indices of emotion processing may 
actually index different processing steps within emotion processing. Above-chance 
expression identification arose at shorter exposure durations than neural markers of 
emotion processing. It is important to note, however, that an expression identification 
task could be done without fully engaging with emotion processing, by simply processing 
the visual features that are relevant to response mapping. Psychopaths, for example, can 
identify expressions above chance, despite exhibiting substantial limitations in that area 
(Hastings et al., 2008). Importantly, the neural markers of emotion processing EPN and 
LPP are specifically sensitive to emotion intensity and arousal (Hajcak et al., 2011), 
regardless of the emotional expression observed. Therefore, our findings may suggest that 
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expression identification may not necessarily index emotion processing but might be a 
necessary condition for neural emotion processing of faces. Arguably, emotional 
expressions convey their valence and intensity through their configuration. If this is 
indeed the case, one would expect expression identification to arise before emotional 
intensity processing. 
Multiple psychiatric disorders involve impairments in emotion processing and 
regulation. For instance, it has been shown that patients with borderline personality 
disorder (Fenske et al., 2015; Kaiser et al., 2019; Kleindienst et al., 2019) and social anxiety 
(Chen et al., 2019; Maoz et al., 2016; Park et al., 2016; Yoon & Zinbarg, 2008) perceive 
facial expressions in a biased way, especially when the face’s expression is ambiguous. In 
such cases, they tend to describe the expression as more threatening and negative than 
healthy participants. Exploring the relationship between expression identification and 
emotion processing may shed light on the nature of such psychiatric ailments, specifically 
on whether their problems in engaging with emotional faces are driven by biased face 
identification or impaired emotional intensity processing. 
 
6.4    Holistic face processing 
 
6.4.1 Summary of findings 
I found evidence of holistic face processing, indexed by the face-inversion effect, 
in most experiments; this consistent finding suggests that upright faces gain access to 
awareness faster due to their holistic configuration. This finding is consistent with 
previous claims that upright faces are processed holistically, whereas inversion disrupts 
their holistic information and therefore their recognition (Farah et al., 1995; Kanwisher 
et al., 1998; Rakover & Teucher, 1997; Yin, 1969; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2005). In addition, 
this finding is in line with b-CFS studies, which have shown that upright faces enter 
awareness faster than inverted faces (Akechi et al., 2015; Gayet & Stein, 2017; Jiang et al., 
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2007; Kobylka et al., 2017; Moors, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2016; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011). 
However, two experiments – Experiments 7 and 8 in Chapter 3 – did not find a face-
inversion effect of detection. I see two possible explanations. First, it could be the case 
that the face-inversion effect is not as consistent among people as it is believed to be – 
some people may exhibit it while others do not. If this were the case, those two 
experiments may have had samples with an over-representation of the latter group. 
Secondly, it could be the case that some people manage to suppress their holistic 
processing when performing a face detection task. Arguably, a participant could perform 
a detection task by simply discriminating differences in contrast between two screen 
locations, whereas an identification task – because identification (recognition) requires 
integration – could not be performed by doing so alone. The fact that I always found a 
face-inversion effect for identification sensitivity supports this second explanation. 
Furthermore, I also found a face-inversion effect in every tachistoscope experiment that 
involved a face inversion manipulation. In these experiments, however, the detection 
tasks were based on discrimination, hence they were discrimination tasks in essence. 
Participants had to compare an intact face with a scrambled face. Unlike comparing a 
screen location containing a face with a screen location containing nothing (as in all CFS 
experiments except Experiment 7), the detection task used in the tachistoscope 
experiments was more difficult as it relied on discriminating intact faces from scrambles. 
The tachistoscope experiments revealed a face-inversion effect both when 
stimulus discrimination relied on peripheral (Experiment 9) and foveal vision 
(Experiment 11), arising by around the same exposure duration. This suggests that despite 
differences in image resolution, face-specific holistic processes prioritised upright faces in 
their access to awareness similarly in both experiments. Crucially, the shortest exposure 
duration by which the face-inversion effect arose was also sufficiently long for the neural 
marker of face processing (N170/VPP) to successfully discriminate between face and 
non-face stimuli (Experiment 14). Taken together, these results suggest that holistic face 
processing does modulate how faces gain access to perceptual awareness. 
I also found a face-inversion effect for a measure of metacognitive sensitivity. It 
is theoretically possible that holistic face processing may prioritise upright over inverted 
faces without impacting how faces gain access to awareness. However, the face-inversion 
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effect found in metacognitive sensitivity suggests that holistic processing provided an 
advantage in perceptual awareness, too. 
 
6.4.2 Theoretical implications and future directions 
The overwhelming evidence for holistic face processing found in this thesis 
indicates that upright faces reach perceptual awareness faster than inverted faces, probably 
due to holistic processing. These findings replicate a long list of reports that have claimed 
that faces’ access to awareness is prioritised thanks to holistic processing (Akechi et al., 
2015; Gayet & Stein, 2017; Jiang et al., 2007; Kobylka et al., 2017; Moors, Wagemans, & 
de-Wit, 2016; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011). Thus, these findings may suggest that faces enjoy 
unconscious processing – a frequent interpretation of the results of b-CFS studies. An 
alternative interpretation, however, is that holistic face processing triggers access to 
perceptual awareness. This latter interpretation may be supported by the fact that I found 
that holistic face processing and perceptual awareness arise by the same predefined 
exposure durations in the tachistoscope experiments. Even though the temporal co-
occurrence of two processes may support such an interpretation, it is not sufficient to 
make a causal claim. 
 
6.5    Perceptual awareness 
 
6.5.1 Summary of findings 
In the tachistoscope experiments (Chapters 4 and 5), perceptual awareness was 
measured psychophysically through metacognitive sensitivity, and neurophysiologically 
through the EEG markers VAN and LP. These experiments revealed that around four 
milliseconds of exposure are required for a non-linear increase in metacognitive 
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sensitivity, and for VAN and LP’s sensitivity to awareness reports to arise. Therefore, one 
could argue that 4 milliseconds of exposure convey sufficient facial information for the 
emergence of perceptual awareness of faces. However, it is important to note some 
inconsistencies in the data. First, metacognitive sensitivity exhibited a linear increase 
across exposure durations in three experiments (Experiments 9, 11, and 14), whereas it 
exhibited a non-linear increase only in one experiment (Experiment 13). And second, 
even though VAN exhibited overall sensitivity to subjective awareness in both EEG 
experiments (Experiments 13 and 14), its sensitivity did not arise by a specific exposure 
duration in one (Experiment 13). 
Metacognitive sensitivity measures how sensitive participants’ subjective 
experience is to objective perceptual performance. The two experiments that found a 
linear increase in metacognitive sensitivity with increasing exposure duration used upright 
and inverted faces, presented for seven equally spaced exposure durations, either 
peripherally (Experiment 9) or foveally (Experiment 11). On the other hand, the 
experiment where metacognitive sensitivity increased non-linearly used only upright faces 
and three exposure durations that were not equally spaced (they were selected based on 
results from those two previous experiments). One possible explanation for this 
inconsistency is that using three exposure durations, more widely spaced, created a clearer 
contrast between conditions’ visibility. Participants may have experienced a discrete and 
perhaps dichotomous perception, where they felt closer to having seen the stimulus (4.4 
and 6.2 ms) or not (1.7 ms). Additionally, this perhaps dichotomously experienced 
exposure conditions may have induced higher consistency in subjective reports – 
participants’ awareness reports may have been more consistent per exposure duration in 
this experiment than in the other two experiments that used seven exposure durations. 
Another possible explanation for said inconsistency is that participants were more 
effective at describing their visual experience when the holistic information in faces was 
not manipulated (no orientation manipulation), in which case the non-linear increase in 
metacognitive sensitivity may have indexed conscious access. 
VAN, as mentioned above, was sensitive to awareness, overall, in both EEG 
experiments (Experiment 13 and 14). However, its sensitivity to awareness arose by a 
specific exposure duration in only one experiment (Experiment 13). As described in 
Chapter 5, it may be the case that VAN was confounded by stimulus category in the 
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second EEG experiment (Experiment 14). Because VAN has very similar topography and 
time window than N170, its voltage response could have been modulated by faces and 
objects differently, thereby diluting a possibly smaller effect of awareness. 
LP, on the other hand, was consistent in its effects. It revealed in both EEG 
experiments a sensitivity to subjective awareness arising by around 4.4 milliseconds of 
visual exposure. 
 
6.5.2 Theoretical implications and future directions 
Our findings suggest that around four milliseconds of exposure can convey 
sufficient information for perceptual awareness of faces. While the required exposure 
duration may differ if the physical properties of the stimuli (e.g. contrast, spatial 
frequency) were altered, the same sequence of processing steps described above should 
still be found. This poses two crucial questions: does differential processing of different 
stimulus features imply that one can become aware of them separately, and at different 
exposure durations? And are the same measures of awareness capable of capturing 
multiple steps in which different stimulus features are processed and reach awareness 
sequentially? 
 
6.5.2.1 The path towards perceptual awareness: a global 
workspace view 
Our findings can be interpreted in the light of the Global Workspace Theory 
(GWT) of consciousness, originally proposed by Baars (1993, 2002, 2017) and 
subsequently expanded into the global neuronal workspace model (Dehaene et al., 2006, 
2014; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Mashour et al., 2020). GWT proposes that conscious 
access emerges as a function of global availability of information in the brain. A stimulus 
gains access to awareness when it activates a set of ‘central workspace’ neurons in parietal, 
prefrontal, and cingulate cortices, which enable broadcasting to many other areas. 
However, a stimulus may not gain access to awareness if it is weak and hence triggers 
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insufficient bottom-up activation, thus remaining subliminal. Conversely, a stimulus may 
carry sufficient bottom-up activation but lack top-down attentional amplification, thus 
remaining preconscious – i.e. potentially gaining access to consciousness if attended. 
Multiple studies, using different experimental paradigms, have suggested that LP 
(i.e. the positive modulation of P3 wave) indexes conscious access (Genetti et al., 2009; 
Koivisto et al., 2005; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2008a; Pourtois et al., 2006; Railo & Koivisto, 
2009; Sergent et al., 2005; Veser et al., 2008), as discussed in Chapter 5. Our findings may 
thus indicate that around 4 milliseconds of visual exposure convey sufficient bottom-up 
activation for a face to stimulate ‘central workspace’ neurons, thereby providing faces with 
access to awareness. Because shorter exposure durations should then have conveyed 
insufficient bottom-up activation for conscious access, our findings may indicate that any 
perceptual process that exhibited above-chance performance with less than 4 milliseconds 
of visual exposure must have been performed subliminally. Both stimulus discrimination 
and expression identification fulfil this criterion as they exhibited very low but above-
chance sensitivity at shorter exposure durations; therefore, they may have been processed 
subliminally.  
Similarly, any perceptual process that arises with more than 4 milliseconds of 
visual exposure should be consciously accessible. This might be the case of emotion 
processing of faces, as described in Chapter 5. However, none of our experiments was 
adequate to test for this specific possibility. The PAS categories used asked participants 
how clear their visual experience of the face was. Arguably, the subjective impression of 
a face, as a general stimulus, may require less visual exposure to become clear than the 
subjective impression of an emotional expression in a face, a question that our PAS did 
not ask. Future studies could address this by determining the minimal exposure duration 
of perceptual awareness when the PAS asks about the clarity of the faces’ expression 
instead. If conscious access requires top-down attentional modulation as predicted by 
GWT, then the way the PAS question is defined becomes relevant as it may direct 
participants’ attention to different stimulus features. 
While LP has been repeatedly associated with conscious access, what VAN 
specifically indexes is less clear. Some GWT proponents suggest that VAN indexes 
preconscious processing that may subsequently lead to conscious access (Del Cul et al., 
2007; Sergent et al., 2005). The fact that VAN is normally found around 100 ms before 
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LP, and that its topography is closer to visual cortices, may support this interpretation. 
On the other hand, other authors suggest that VAN – and not LP specifically – indexes 
conscious access alongside phenomenal consciousness (Eklund & Wiens, 2018; Koivisto 
et al., 2016; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010). The tachistoscope experiments did not involve 
manipulations to test whether VAN and LP index the same or different aspects of 
awareness. However, the fact that these two neural markers showed sensitivity to 
subjective awareness by the same minimal exposure duration (4.4 ms; Experiment 13) 
suggests that this exposure duration may convey a critical amount of information for 
perceptual awareness of faces. 
Surprisingly, VAN and LP were sensitive to subjective awareness by the same 
minimal exposure duration, 4.4 ms, in Experiment 13. This convergence may suggest that 
these two markers index the same aspects of visual awareness, or rather, that they may 
index different aspects of visual awareness that arise with the same exposure duration. 
Arguably, these two markers may be driven by predominantly different neural sources: 
VAN may be mainly associated with temporooccipital cortices (Koivisto et al., 2016; 
Shafto & Pitts, 2015; Chapter 14) whereas LP with parietocentral cortices (Babiloni et al., 
2006; Railo et al., 2015; Chapter 14). Future studies should explore which neural networks 
underly each of these ERP components and what role they play in faces’ access to 
awareness. 
 
6.5.2.2 The role of perceptual awareness: integration? 
Our findings indicate that indices of holistic face processing, neural face 
processing and perceptual awareness, are engaged with facial information by the same 
visual exposure duration: 4.4 ms. While this co-occurrence may simply indicate that these 
three processes require very similar bottom-up activation to arise, it could also suggest a 
causal relationship between them. For example, perceptual awareness could be a 
requirement for visual integration of faces, as occurs in holistic face processing. However, 
none of our experiments were designed to address this question. 
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6.6    Face perception: are faces processed in sequence or at 
once? 
The tachistoscope experiments have provided a consistent picture of face 
perception as a process that unfolds in a sequence of processing steps: (1) stimulus 
discrimination, (2) holistic face processing along with (3) perceptual awareness, and (4) 
emotion processing. Altogether, these findings may indicate that stimulus discrimination 
and perhaps holistic face processing arise before perceptual awareness does. On the other 
hand, emotion processing may arise after faces have already reached awareness, thus 
suggesting that the visual information contained in faces needs to be discriminated and 
integrated before its emotional content is extracted. This claim is also supported by the 
CFS experiments (Chapter 3), which indicate that holistic face processing modulates faces’ 
breakthrough times, whereas emotion does not. 
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8 APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Experiment 2 Pre-registration 
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Appendix B. KDEF Face stimuli selected and standardised for experiments. Experiment 
3: (a) angry, (b) neutral faces, and (c) happy faces. Experiment 4: (d) fearful, (e) neutral, 
and (f) happy faces. Experiment 5: (g) fearful and (h) neutral faces. Experiment 6: (i) 
fearful and (j) happy faces. Experiments 7 and 8 employed the same face stimuli of 
Experiment 5. 
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Appendix C. RaFD intact faces used in Experiments 9 and 11: fearful and neutral 
expressions. 
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Appendix D. Standardisation of face stimuli. (a) Regular stimuli taken from RaFD. (b) 
Main facial features are left. The rest is cropped out. (c) Result of standardisation 
procedure after equating for luminance and contrast with Matlab SHINE toolbox. 
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Appendix E. Intact colour-inverted faces used in Experiments 10 and 12 to emulate 
afterimages. 
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Appendix F. RaFD stimuli used in Experiment 13: fearful, happy, and neutral faces. 
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Appendix G. Expression identification/agreement (%) scores of RaFD stimuli selected 
for Experiment 13, based on RaFD validation norms, between emotional expressions 
(fearful, happy, neutral). 
 
Appendix H. Expression intensity scores of RaFD stimuli selected for Experiment 13, 
based on RaFD validation norms, between emotional expressions (fearful, happy, 
neutral). 
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Appendix I. Experiments 13 and 14 Pre-registration for VAN and LP analysis 
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Appendix J. Neutral faces and highly recognisable objects used in Experiment 14. 
 
 
 
